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Abstract
In this thesis, I focus on North Korea’s communications with the outside world through the
medium of the English-language, with a particular focus on the workings of gender in North
Korea’s international relations. First, I focus on the North Korean government’s
communications in the official English-language magazine, Women of Korea between 1964
and 1992. The magazine was modelled after the Korean-language equivalent Chosǒn Yǒsǒng
(Korean Women). The visual images and text in the English version of the magazine portray
a positive image of gender equality in North Korea to the world. However, close reading of
Women of Korea reveals that the North Korea government operates according to gendered
assumptions about the roles of men and women in society. North Korean women are seen to
be the primary carers of children and responsible for the majority of domestic chores while
men’s role is to work outside the home to earn money. Additionally, visual images and text in
the magazine reveal that women are mobilised to work outside the home in occupations seen
to be “suitable” to their characteristics. While publications like Women of Korea cannot be
taken at face value as a literal and empirical portrait of the situation of women in North
Korea, they can be analysed for insight into the government’s official views of the roles
performed by men and women. I then focus on communications between the North Korea
and the United Nations between 2000 and 2011. Since the admission of the country into the
United Nations in 1991, the North Korean government has communicated formally with the
international community about the human rights of women and other vulnerable groups. The
United Nations has advocated for the North Korean government to accede to and ratify
various conventions and to make changes to its legal system to improve the human rights of
all North Korean people. In this thesis, I analyse reports exchanged between the North Korea
and the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (“CEDAW Committee”) between 2001 and 2005. Although the relationship between
North Korea and the CEDAW Committee is limited, the exchange of reports gives those
outside North Korea an insight into the government’s thinking about the roles men and
women perform in society and the home. While North Korea has taken the initial step in
signing and ratifying United Nations conventions it does not mean that the government has
always followed, implemented, or made legal changes to existing state laws to ensure
requirements within the conventions are met. Consequently, non-governmental organisations
charge that the North Korean government has not adequately addressed issues such as gender
equality and discrimination against women in all forms. Instead, presenting a positive picture
ii

of gender relations and gender equality is one of the North Korean government’s strategies in
international relations. I argue in this thesis that the communication between North Korea and
the United Nations and in its official English-language magazine, Women of Korea, reveals
the North Korean government’s gendered ideologies to the international community.
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Preface
In this thesis, the Revised Romanisation system adopted by the Republic of Korea’s (South
Korea’s) Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in 2000, has been employed. Some
exceptions have been made and warrant a mention. Exceptions are made for the names of
authors who have published in English and where well-known names of people, places or
publications used other forms of romanisation, for example Kim Il Sung or newspaper titles
such as the Chosun Ilbo. Korean names are written according to the standard usage in Korean
with family names preceding given names, except where authors have published in English
and family names have been placed last.
On the subject of Chinese romanisation, the Pinyin system is adopted, for example,
“Mao Zedong” rather than “Mao Tse-tung”.
This thesis is written using British English. Date order reflects British English usage
(day, month, year).
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1. Introduction
Just as a vehicle cannot run smoothly when only one of its
wheels is turning, so society cannot make rapid progress
based on the role played by the men alone.
Kim Jong Il, 30 April 1975.1

Introduction
Before the official formation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North
Korea) in 1948, the Provisional People’s Committee of North Korea (the so-called interim
government) addressed gender equality in Korean society. The leader of the newly-formed
North Korean region, Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) is said to have personally promulgated the
Law on Equality of the Sexes on 30 July 1946 in response to the oppression of women during
the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula (1910–1945).2 The government expressed
the need to address gender equality by embracing women as former victims of human rights
violations experienced under colonial rule (Article 7 and Article 9).3 By addressing gender
equality in this way the newly-formed government was said to have liberated women from
their past experiences, ensuring they were able to leave their homes to participate in the social
labour force to build the new North Korean regime.4 In the decades after the promulgation of
the Law on Equality of the Sexes, the North Korean government established and promoted
gender equality in state laws in the name of liberating women from their homes. As we shall
see, however, North Korean government policies reveal the government’s patriarchal view
towards the roles of North Korean men and women, and assumptions that women’s primary
role is to care for children in the home.
For much of the time from the 1940s to the 1990s, it was difficult to gain a reliable
picture of achieving gender equality and gender relations in North Korea, and this is still true
1

Kim Jong Il (30 April 1975), in “The First Women’s Technical School”, Women of Korea, 4 (124) (1989), p.
28.
2
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
“Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women”, Initial Report of States Parties: Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, CEDAW/C/PRK/1 (Beijing: thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (distributed 11 September 2002),
para. 70 and para. 71, p. 11 and para. 52, p. 8.
3
Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 2003), p. 93.
4
Jiyoung Song, Human Rights Discourse in North Korea: Post–colonial, Marxist and Confucian Perspectives
(London: Routledge, 2011), p. 78.
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to some extent today. In this thesis, I focus on the North Korean government’s
communications with the outside world though the medium of the English-language, with a
particular focus on the workings of gender in North Korea’s international relations. I focus on
the communications of the North Korean government in two sets of texts. First, the North
Korean government presented one picture through its official English-language magazines,
Women of Korea and Korea Today. Women of Korea was largely designed to promote the
results of the Communist revolution and the achievement of gender equality in North Korea,
similar to the Chinese publication Women of China and the Vietnamese publication Women
of Vietnam.5
From 1964 to 1992, the North Korean government disseminated information about
North Korean women’s lives and experiences through the English-language magazine
Women of Korea. The magazine was modelled after the Korean-language equivalent Chosǒn
Yǒsǒng (Korean Women), which was specifically addressed to Korean women.6 The visual
images and text in the English version of the magazine were intended to portray a positive
image of gender equality within the DPRK to the world. Close reading of Women of Korea,
as we shall see below, reveals that the North Korean government operated according to
gendered assumptions about the roles of men and women in society. While women were
mobilised into work outside the home, this was in occupations which were seen to be
“suitable” to their characteristics.7 Further, women were seen to be the primary carers of
children and responsible for the majority of domestic chores while men’s role was to work
outside the home to earn money. Other aspects of North Korean society such as the political
and economic goals of the government were portrayed in the magazine Korea Today, from
1959 to the present. While publications like Women of Korea cannot be taken at face value as
a literal and empirical portrait of the situation of women in the DPRK, as an official
publication it can be analysed for insight into the North Korean government’s views of the
roles of men and women in society and the home.

5

The Chinese publication Women of China is published monthly by the Foreign Language Press in Beijing from
1953 to the present day. The Vietnamese publication Women of Vietnam was originally published by the
Vietnam Women’s Union in Hanoi on a bi-monthly basis from 1958 and in 1963 the magazine was published
quarterly. The Chinese and Vietnamese magazines aimed to introduce the lives, experiences and perspectives of
Chinese and Vietnamese women to the outside world.
6
For further information on the early years of Chosǒn Yǒsǒng see Suzy Kim, “Revolutionary Mothers: Women
in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 52 (4) (2010), pp.
742–767; Suzy Kim, Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 2013), pp. 174–203.
7
Kim, “Revolutionary Mothers”, pp. 742–767.
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The second set of texts I analyse are the reports exchanged between the North Korean
government and the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (hereafter “CEDAW Committee”) between 2001 and 2005.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) admitted the DPRK to the UN under
Resolution 702 on 8 August 1991.8 Since the admission of the DPRK into the UN, tension
has grown, as the UN has urged the DPRK to take responsibility for human rights violations
and the DPRK has often displayed blatant disregard for the human rights institute. The UN
has advocated for the DPRK to accede to and ratify various UN conventions and to make
changes to its legal system to improve the human rights of the North Korean people.9
Pressure has also grown from the international community for the North Korean government
to implement the provisions of the UN human rights instruments which it has signed, as well
as those it has not yet acceded to. As of mid-2015, the DPRK had acceded to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1984, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1984, the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) in 1990, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) in 2001, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) in 2013.10 After its admission to the UN, the North Korean government began to
communicate formally with the international community about the human rights of women
and other vulnerable groups such as children and persons with disabilities.11
8

On 17 September 1991, the United Nations General Assembly welcomed the DPRK and Republic of Korea
(South Korea) under UNSC Resolution 46/. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Admission of New
Members to the United Nations, Resolution 702, S/RES/702 (3001st meeting, 8 August 1991), p. 46; United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Admission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic
of Korea to membership in the United Nations, Resolution 46/1 (1st plenary meeting, forty-sixth session, 17
September 1991, Agenda Item 20).
9
UNGA, Admission of the DPRK and the ROK.
10
The DPRK submitted its initial report to the ICESCR on 14 December 1984, to the ICCPR on 2 April 1984, to
the CRC Committee on 13 February 1996, and to the CEDAW Committee 11 September 2002. Although the
DPRK signed the CRPD on 3 July 2013 it has not submitted an initial report.
11
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), “Report on the mission to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the issue of military sexual slavery in wartime”, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika
Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45, E/CN.4/ 1996/53/Add.1
(4 January 1996); United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), Concluding Comments: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/PRK/CO/1 (Thirtythird session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (distributed 22 July 2005); United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “List of issues and questions with regard to the
consideration of periodic reports: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, CEDAW/PSWG/2005/II/CRP.1/Add.3 (Beijing: Thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (distributed 9
February 2005);United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), “Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the initial report,” Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, CEDAW/PSWG/2005/II/ CRP.2/Add.3 (Beijing: Thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July
3

In this thesis, I am interested in the communication between the North Korean
government and the CEDAW Committee about women’s rights and achieving gender
equality in the DPRK. Although the communication between the North Korean government
and the CEDAW Committee just spans the years from 2001 to 2005, the exchange of reports
gives those outside the DPRK an insight into the government’s thinking about the roles of
North Korean women and men.12 Even though the North Korean government has taken the
initial step in agreeing to the guidelines set out in CEDAW, it does not mean that the DPRK
has always followed, implemented, or made legal changes to existing state laws to ensure
requirements in the UN convention are met, as we shall see. Non-governmental organisations
charge that the North Korean government has not adequately addressed issues such as gender
equality and discrimination against women in all forms (see chapters 3, 7 and 8 below).
Instead, presenting a positive picture of gender relations in the DPRK is one of the
government’s strategies in international relations. I will argue that these texts reveal the North
Korean government’s gendered ideologies.
As gender issues within a country are shaped by the policies of both the state and its
subsidiary organs, as well as the policies of international human rights institutions such as the
UN, I frame this thesis within the field of gender and International Relations. Below I outline
the use of a gender-sensitive lens in International Relations (IR) and what this means when
examining how the North Korean government communicates its views on gender equality to
the world.
2005), (distributed 15 April 2005); United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “Summary Record of the 699th meeting”, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/SR.699 (Thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (New York: 18 July 2005 at 10
am), (distributed 9 September 2005); United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “Summary Record of the 700th meeting”, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/SR.700 (Thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (New York: 18 July 2005 at
3pm), (distributed 9 September 2005); United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
“Consideration of Reports submitted by states parties under Article 44 of the Convention”, Concluding
Observations: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CRC/C /PRK/CO/4 (Fiftieth session, 12-13 January
2009), (distributed 27 March 2009); United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
“Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parities under Article 44 of the Convention”, The combined third
and fourth reports of States parties due in 2007, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CRC/C/PRK/4
(submitted 10 December 2007), (distributed 15 January 2008); United Nations Committee on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), “List of issues to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the third and fourth periodic
report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, CRC/C/PRK/Q/4 (Fiftieth session, 12-13 January 2009), (distributed 20 October 2008); United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Written replies by the government of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to the List of Issues (CRC/C/PRK/Q/4) prepared by the Committee on the Rights of the Child
in connection with the consideration of the third and fourth periodic reports of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, CRC/C/PRK/Q/4/Add.1 (Fiftieth session, 12-13 January 2009), (distributed 22 December
2008).
12
CEDAW, Initial Report; CEDAW, “List of issues and questions”; CEDAW, “Responses”; CEDAW, “699th
meeting”; CEDAW, “700th meeting”; CEDAW, Concluding Comments.
4

Employing a Gender-Sensitive Lens
While gender studies and feminist theories have long been accommodated in other branches
of the social sciences, IR was late to realise the relevance of gender to the discipline.13
Together with a range of new perspectives on world politics, including postmodernism,
constructivism, critical theory and green politics, gender and IR scholars have contested the
power and knowledge of mainstream realists and liberal international relations scholars.14
This has meant that previous research in the IR discipline has only presented a partial picture
and from a masculine perspective.15 Feminists in IR argue that realism, dominated by elite,
white, male practitioners, is a patriarchal discourse that renders women invisible from the
high politics of IR.16 Sandra Whitworth explains that to examine gender within the context of
IR is to explore the ways in which knowledge about gender difference is sustained,
reproduced and manipulated by institutions such as state policies and laws.17 It can be said,
therefore, that gender is an important dimension of IR as it challenges the conceptual
framework which has excluded women from the discipline in the first place.
One of the key contributions of feminist thought to IR has been to draw attention to
the necessity for a “deconstruction of gender-biased knowledge claims” and the
“reconstruction of gender-sensitive theory”.18 This has allowed IR scholars, who focus on the
inclusion of both men and women, to unsettle the gendered foundation of mainstream thought
and to introduce gender into the analysis of key constructions in IR such as the state and
sovereignty.19 Feminist scholars have also encouraged IR to consider perspectives of
previously excluded groups, such as women, children, and ethnic and religious minorities.20
These scholars have a common commitment to highlighting and addressing the disadvantages
of women and other vulnerable groups within the social and political context and from
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different cultural and economic backgrounds.21 Feminist IR scholars are also concerned with
studying the ways in which the practices of state policies and international politics
discriminate against women.22 They note, for example, the exclusion of women from foreign
policy decision making. In this case feminist scholars point to the “extent to which
international politics is such a thoroughly masculinised sphere of activity that women’s
voices are considered inauthentic”.23 For many feminist scholars, the role of gender in IR is
not a subset of the discipline but rather something that is intrinsic to every aspect.24 A gendersensitive lens offers IR scholars a broader series of issues which should be studied as part of
the discipline, and this provides a guide to how to address areas of gender-based
discrimination.
During the 1980s and 1990s, feminist scholars contributed to IR by highlighting what
they saw as the masculine bias of core assumptions and concepts of the discipline.25 Three
important contributions were Cynthia Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making
Feminist Sense of International Politics (1989), J. Ann Tickner’s Gender in International
Relations (1992) and Jan Jindy Pettman’s Worlding Women: A Feminist International
Politics (1996).26 These authors demonstrated how the theories and practices of IR reflected
and respected the experiences of men and masculine qualities over the experiences of both
genders. IR could then shift away from a singular focus on interstate relations toward a
comprehensive analysis of transnational actors and structures and their transformations in
global politics.27 Until these interventions, IR used abstract categories such as “the state” and
“the system”, which effectively removed people as agents embedded in social and historical
contexts from theories in IR. In contrast, when feminist scholars examine such themes as war,
peace, democracy, governance, economics, development, justice, and security they always
keep in mind the concept of gender.28 Consequently, one of the first engagements by feminist
scholars in IR was to question realism’s “rational man” as a basis of international life, a
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theory which modelled human nature based upon aggression, competitive and warlike
mannerisms and did not speak for many women or indeed most men.29
Gender and IR is a broad and diverse field of study and is often interdisciplinary.
Studying gender includes examining stories, locations, and rules of behaviour in connection
with other social categories such as class, ethnic background, age, religion, region and so
on.30 Feminist scholars in IR often take a bottom-up approach, which brings the lives of
ordinary women into focus and works towards understanding IR not as abstract practices but
as something that affects and is affected by the lives of people.31 By exploring the ideas about
gender difference which inform both domestic and international activities, one discovers the
impact these ideas have on cultural practices and the roles of men and women.32 This point is
significant in the North Korean context, as the government’s ideas about gender roles have
shaped state policies and the DPRK’s attitude towards men and women in the home as well
as the state’s relationships with neighbouring countries. By framing this research project
within the field of Gender and International Relations, I consider how the roles of men and
women are represented in official North Korean communication with the world, particularly
when it comes to the portrayal of gender equality in North Korean society.

Gender and Sexuality
At this point, it is important to discuss the meaning of gender and sexuality as standalone
terms and then within the context of IR. First, we need to note the term gender and the
differences between biological sex and socially constructed gender,33 found in most societies
including the DPRK. In the mid-twentieth century feminist scholars conceived the term
gender in order to capture the difference between biological sex and socially and culturally
constructed differences.34 While the term sex refers to the biological and physiological
characteristics that define men and women, gender refers to the socially-constructed roles,
behaviours, activities, and attributes that a society considers appropriate to men and women.35
Feminist scholars use the terminology of gender to argue against the “biology is destiny”
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line.36 As many people think of sexuality as private, individual and biological, it is also a
highly political and policy-related issue, as shown by the current mobilising around sexuality
worldwide.37 In 2002, the World Health Organisation (WHO) provided a working definition
of sexuality as:

a central aspect of being human throughout life [which] encompasses
sex, gender identities and roles, sexual orientation, eroticism,
pleasure, intimacy and reproduction. Sexuality is experienced and
expressed in thoughts, fantasies, desires, beliefs, attitudes, values,
behaviours, practices, roles and relationships.38

While sexuality can include all of these dimensions, not all of them are always experienced or
expressed. Sexuality is influenced by the interaction of biological, psychological, social,
economic, political, cultural, ethical, legal, historical, religious and spiritual factors.39
Unsurprisingly, discussion of sexual rights in the women’s rights movement internationally
and in the field of gender and development has given significant attention to such issues as
sexual violence against women and the trafficking of women. Breaking the silence and
mobilising to prevent sexual violence was a major achievement of the women’s rights
movement.
Gender identities develop in gendered societies, where the pressure to adopt the
“correct” and “corresponding” gender according to one’s biological sex is strong. 40 While
men are socialised to identify with masculine traits which emphasise autonomy, male
superiority, fraternity, strength, public protector roles and ultimately the bearing of arms,
women are taught to defer, as wives and daughters, to the protection and stronger will of
men, while providing the private emotional, economic and social support systems for men’s
activities.41 Gender identity is similar to other social identities in that it relates to physical
embodiment, and is mediated by people’s relative location within their social environment
36
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and how they are judged by others, but ultimately is concerned with how people view
themselves with respect to gender.42 While individuals’ inner feelings influence how they
present themselves as a man, a woman, or another gender, feminist scholars argue that the
state manipulates gender identities for its own internal unity and external legitimacy.43 In the
context of the DPRK, despite the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946,
the government has directed men and women into stereotypical roles based on the assumption
that the home is a space for women and men are to work outside. This point is made clearer
in later chapters of the thesis.

Gender Roles
Assumptions by governments (including the North Korean state), about appropriate gender
roles in society, the labour force, and what is considered masculine or feminine, all inform
the practices of men and women. Practices do not take place independently but exist within
particular historical and material conditions and across different cultures.44 Sociallyconstructed gender roles are considered to be hierarchical and characterised as a maleadvantaged gender hierarchy by social constructionists.45 Feminist scholars argue that it is not
simply the case that there are differences between the social construction of masculinity and
femininity. There is an unequal relationship between masculinity and its associated
characteristics of being strong, aggressive, and dominant and feminine characteristics of
being weak, conciliatory, irrational, and peaceable. Further, femininity is politically,
economically, and socially devalued compared to masculinity.46
The concept of gender is also located in an analysis of social relations, and refers to
the real conditions and particular understandings about relationships between men and
women in society.47 Gender roles can be described as social norms, or rules and standards
that dictate different interests, responsibilities, opportunities, limitations, and behaviours for
men and women.48 Gender roles are social and behavioural norms that are considered
appropriate for a man or a woman in a social or interpersonal relationship. They impact
42
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aspects of daily life from choice of clothing to occupation. While gender roles differ
according to the specific cultural-historical context,49 in every culture the socialised
difference between girls and boys begins during early childhood.50 From middle childhood
and adolescence, children are taught to behave according to customary gender roles. The
roles of women and girls encompass a range of responsibilities associated with taking care of
the home, nurturing and caring for the family, performing biological reproductive functions
and involvement in society and productive labour. In many societies, men and boys
contribute to household security through involvement in productive labour and public
participation and, for men, in ensuring the education of male children.51 Through education
systems and the modelling of female relatives, female children are taught to perform caring
and nurturing roles.52 Gender roles shape and constrain individuals’ experiences because men
and women are treated differently and have diverse life trajectories because of their ascribed
roles and the degree to which they conform to these expectations.53
Gender is both produced and shaped by institutions such as the media, religion, and
educational, medical, and other political and social systems, creating a societal gender
structure that is deeply entrenched and rarely questioned but hugely influential.54
Institutionalised gender refers to the ways that gender is rooted in and expressed through
these large social systems, through the different responses, values, expectations, roles, and
responsibilities given to individuals and groups according to gender.55 Individuals develop
their sense of gender in the face of strong messages about the correct gender role for their
perceived body.56 While individuals can accept or resist the stereotyping of men and women
to certain roles in their own presentation of self, gender roles are a powerful means of social
organisation.57
From as early as the eighteenth century in Europe, the concept of women’s rights
developed in response to claims to the rights to bodily integrity and autonomy, to the vote
(suffrage), to hold public office, to work, to fair wages or equal pay, to own property, to
access education and healthcare, and to have marital or parental rights. Next, I discuss the
49
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contemporary understanding of women’s rights and its development alongside the United
Nations’ espousal of human rights in the period immediately after the Second World War
(1939–1945).
The Women’s Rights Movement
Over the course of the evolution of the human rights system, feminists argued for an explicit
inclusion of women in UN human rights instruments.58 The rights of women differ from
broader notions of human rights through claims of an inherent historical and traditional bias
against the exercise of rights by women and girls in favour of men and boys. 59 Women’s
rights were explicitly mentioned in the founding Charter of the UN in 1945. In 1947, the
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women was established. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
in December 1948. The UN designated the year 1975 as International Women’s Year,
extending it to International Women’s Decade from 1976 to 1985.
In 1979, the UN first applied international rights frameworks to gender with the
establishment of CEDAW. The Convention was one of the major achievements of the United
Nations Women’s Decade (1976–1985).60 While often criticised for its weak language, at the
very least the Convention articulates an international standard for what is meant by “equality”
between men and women, grants formal rights to women, and also promotes equality of
access and opportunity (see Appendix 1).61 CEDAW also recognises that rights can be
meaningless unless attention is paid to the economic, social and cultural context in which
they are claimed.62 The Convention calls for changes to stereotypical gender roles where
these are deemed to perpetuate inequality and discrimination. CEDAW was slow to obtain
signatories and is notable for the large number of reservations made by state members. Many
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governments worldwide, however, including the DPRK in 2001, have now signed, ratified or
acceded to CEDAW.63
In the 1980s and 1990s, there was concerted lobbying for the inclusion of sexuality in
UN human rights instruments.64 The first international instrument of human rights to make an
explicit reference to sexuality was the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. The UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights was created by this Vienna Declaration and endorsed by the UNGA under
Resolution 48/121.65 Due to the intensive lobbying efforts of a global group of feminist
activists, the Vienna Declaration called on states “to eliminate gender based violence and all
forms of sexual harassment and exploitation” (paragraph 18), including trafficking in women,
rape as a weapon of war, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy (paragraph 38).66 In 1994, a
year after the World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna, the notion of “sexual
rights” first appeared on the international agenda, during preparations for the 1994 United
Nations International Conference on Population and Development (UNICPD) in Cairo.
Although advocates of the international women’s health movement put forward the idea of
sexual rights in the end this concept was not incorporated into the final document of the
conference, the Programme of Action (PoA).67 The UNICPD and the PoA understood the
interconnections between gender and sexuality as follows.

Human sexuality and gender relations are closely interrelated and
together affect the ability of women and men to achieve and maintain
sexual health and manage their reproductive lives.68
They also recognised that gender-based sexual violence, and efforts to control women’s
sexuality, affected women’s health and their status in society.69 Following the UNICPD,
63
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autonomy and choice in relation to sexuality were linked to reproduction and began to be
articulated as women’s rights.70
A year later, in 1995, the Beijing Platform for Action (BPA), adopted at the Fourth
UN Conference on Women, imposed on states an obligation to promote and protect all
human rights, regardless of political, economic and cultural systems. 71 Sexual rights were
also a major topic of debate at the Conference where an alliance of conservative Muslim and
Catholic delegations strongly objected to the term, as they believed it represented what they
called a “homosexual agenda”.72 After prolonged negotiation, the BPA was saved from being
completely watered down in the area of sexuality and reproductive rights when agreement
was reached on retaining the language employed at the 1994 Cairo Conference whenever
possible.73 Retaining the “Cairo language” was a crucial political achievement for women’s
groups since it re-asserted the right of women to control their own sexuality. 74 It also had
implications for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) rights in that autonomy
and choice extended to issues of sexual partners.
The BPA also called for efforts to “mainstream” gender issues into all substantive
areas of international and national policy, an emphasis which had begun at the Third UN
Conference on Women, in Nairobi, Kenya (1985). Nevertheless, the BPA allowed a degree of
discretion in how these broad principles would be implemented, in deference to cultural
sensibilities. In practice, those charged with the implementation of women’s human rights
and gender mainstreaming often worked with a notion of gender roles as complementary.75
At the Beijing conference, liberal states and activists resisted concessions to “difference”,
fearing this would result in the watering-down of state obligations to protect and promote
women’s rights. Feminists sympathetic to cultural pluralist arguments, on the other hand,
supported equity, either in deference to cultural differences or on pragmatic grounds as the
only viable way to mainstream gender in policy-making within specific societies outside of
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the West.76 Since 1995, gender mainstreaming has given rise to landmark developments in
international law in the areas of human rights, asylum and humanitarian intervention.77
In 2000, the Optional Protocol to CEDAW entered into force, allowing women within
the jurisdiction of parties to CEDAW to make complaints about breaches of the Convention
(see Appendix 2).78 Potentially, this complaints procedure allows the implementation of
CEDAW to be monitored more effectively. Countries such as the DPRK, who have not
signed on to the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, though, are not scrutinised to the same extent
as those countries that have signed on to the Protocol (see chapter 7).
The existence of strong national women’s movements and their effective lobbying of
official delegations played a critical role in changing the attitudes of particular countries. 79 In
2000, at the Beijing+5 Conference, Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country, became a
proponent of sexual rights for the first time and played a key role in the inclusion of marital
rape, so-called “honour crimes” and forced marriages in the outcome document due to the
pressure of women’s groups.80 Many of the issues raised at the Fourth UN Conference on
Women and the Beijing+5 Conference re-emerged in 2005 in New York at the Beijing+5
Review, a meeting designed to generate renewed momentum for the implementation of the
BPA.81 Some Islamic women’s groups, conservative Catholic women’s groups and delegates
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) affiliated to the Vatican (which enjoys permanent
observer status at the UN) objected to the emphasis given to what they characterised as
“homosexual rights”. These countries and organisations made appeals to protect the
traditional family model against homosexuals’ demand for equal rights in marriage. An
Outcome Document was agreed but only after a period of protracted negotiation and after the
terms “sexual rights” and “sexual orientation” were removed from the document.82 The
difficult and protracted process of negotiation at Beijing, which has been a feature of more
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recent international forums on human rights, evidences that women’s rights continue to be a
contested terrain.83

Gender, Sexuality and the Rights of North Korean Women
Next, I examine scholarship regarding gender, sexuality and North Korean women. Since the
1990s, academic scholarship has attempted to shine a brighter light on the subject of gender
and sexuality and achieving gender equality in the DPRK.84 One element of this interest has
been the large number of North Koreans leaving their homeland and telling their stories to the
international community. The North Korean government also increased communication with
the world at various institutions such as the UN for a time.85 It can be said, though, that
unlike the extensive scholarly literature that examines gender and sexuality in other states in
Asia, such as South Korea, Japan and China, gender roles in North Korea have not been fully
scrutinised. Recent research on gender, sexuality and North Korean women has focused on
several aspects: the role and status of North Korean women, 86 the experiences of North
Korean women as refugees,87 the representation of North Korean women in media,88 changes
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in North Korean women’s roles since the famine in the mid-1990s,89 and studies of family
life in the DPRK.90 This means a large gap still exists in academic research about North
Korea and gender studies. This thesis attempts to fill a small part of the gap, with a particular
focus on how gender roles are presented to the world by the North Korean government. In the
following section, I highlight the scholarly discourse currently available concerning aspects
of North Korean women’s lives, relevant North Korean laws and the representation of women
in North Korean media.
First, it is important to outline the contribution made to scholarship regarding the roles
of Korean women during the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897) and the occupation of Korea by
Japan from 1910 to 1945. Scholarship on these two periods is extensive and is known as a
shared history between North and South Korea.91 Even though the principles of
Confucianism were not law in Korea during the Chosŏn Dynasty the elite ruling class enacted
laws to bring society gradually into line with these principles, ultimately to strengthen their
own power. The integration of Confucianism into Korean society went along with an ongoing
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influence of Chinese culture and language.92 Confucianism and the patriarchal system were
supposedly followed by all classes and saw heaven, husband, king, parents, and men as
holding superior positions, while earth, wife, subject, child, and women were inferior.93
While persons in inferior positions were to obey their superiors, persons in superior positions
were supposed to employ their power to take care of their inferiors. Each position had a role
to fulfil for the good of the whole society, but when Confucianism merged with the ruling
political hierarchy and family unit, it rather served to legitimise the power of those in superior
positions.94
In accordance with Confucian teachings, women learned their role in the family unit.
Although they played an important role in the management of the home and the rearing of
children, often these duties were not evenly distributed amongst family members, particularly
men.95 Fathers were expected to be somewhat emotionally distant from their children in order
to maintain their position of authority.96 However, at the same time they were to guide their
children, in particular sons, and demand discipline and obedience from them. In contrast, the
role of mothers was taken extremely seriously as the preservation, rise and fall of the family
were thought to depend on the education of the children, and mothers were regarded as their
primary educators.97 Elite women were restricted to the inner rooms of their homes and
separated from their male counterparts from the age of seven.98 Unmarried daughters were to
remain confined to the domestic sphere as they prepared for their future roles as wives and
mothers. These customs, though, were unrealistic for common women, who were expected to
participate in work activities in the fields and marketplace. Thus, their ability to move outside
of the family home facilitated the transition for some Korean women to new economic roles
during Japanese colonial rule.99
In the 1920s, during the occupation of Korea, a small group of educated so-called
“New Women” (sinyǒsǒng) emerged from the missionary education system with modern
ideas about Korean womanhood. These women seized the opportunity to enhance all
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women’s access to education, to determine their own physical appearance, and to contribute
to the public debate about changing female identity and roles. 100 They also challenged the
legacy of Confucian principles and the patriarchal system in Korean society and the family
unit which were reinforced during the Chosŏn Dynasty. The “New Women” produced a
desired space for public debates but also had to defend themselves from male intellectuals
and nationalist reformers, who were also fighting to be heard in an occupied Korea.101
During the occupation of Korea by Japan, the Japanese military kidnapped, falsely
recruited, and forced between 100,000 and 200,000 women in the Asian region into sexual
slavery as part of the so-called “comfort women” (Japanese “ianfu”/ Korean “wianbu”)
system.102 It is estimated that 80 per cent of these women were Korean.103 The women were
forced into so-called “comfort stations” (ianjo) to serve up to 50 men a day with little food,
water or sanitation.104 Although factors such as the lack of documentary evidence and the
reluctance of survivors to reveal their past may be offered to explain the long silence about
these war atrocities, a major factor is the cultural legacy of Confucianism.105 During the
occupation of Korea the sexual culture of men was often overlooked by society, while
women’s sexuality was rigidly controlled by standards of virginity and chastity. 106 Unmarried
women were supposed to maintain their virginity until married and widows were expected to
be chaste. Regardless of their individual circumstances, women who lost their chastity were
considered dishonoured, made to feel ashamed and were likely to be ostracised by their own
families and society.107 It was not until the early 1990s that several survivors, predominantly
from South Korea, came forward to testify about their experiences. This encouraged the
DPRK to start reporting on North Korean women who had similar experiences, although their
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testimonies are limited in number.108 Below, I will consider how the DPRK has deployed the
discussion of this issue in its interactions with the international community (see chapters 7
and 8).
Studies of women’s social status in the DPRK have been concerned with the power
relations that socially and culturally structure the reproduction of gender inequality in North
Korean society.109 In this regard, “gender politics is based upon an existing social patriarchal
order and system and the state is gendered by enforcing gendered policies and ideologies”.110
In this context, in modern communist states, such as the DPRK, gender inequality is
reproduced in the family and social patriarchal systems.111 It has also been argued, though,
that the reform process in the DPRK, the collectivisation of agriculture and industry and the
elimination of private property “led to the demolition of inheritance, which destroyed the
material basis of traditional patriarchy” and enabled North Korean women to “acquire
economic independence through paid labour”.112 Others argue that neither the socialist
revolution in the DPRK nor the rapid modernisation in South Korea has liberated women, but
state interference in the North in favour of women, especially, in the economic arena, has
greatly contributed to enhancing women’s position in that society.113 Reform of the North
Korean agricultural and industrial sectors, though, did not necessarily mean that the
patriarchal structure in society was challenged to the extent that all women achieved
economic independence by participating in the labour force. North Korean women were often
assigned to occupations that were seen as lower skilled and therefore lower paid.114
Others acknowledge that gender politics in North Korea is based upon an existing
social patriarchal system and that the state enforces gendered policies and ideologies based
upon this system.115 Kyung Ae Park refers to the household registration system in the DPRK
under the male household head and states that due to the abolition of the system “patriarchy”
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has also been undermined.116 However, the use of the word “patriarchy” is ambiguous as it is
unclear whether Park is referring to the father’s rule within the family, male domination in
society in general, or a form of political power or kinship system.117 We shall see below that
the abolition of the patrilineal household registration system has not necessarily led to
women’s emancipation in the DPRK. While more North Korean women have left the home
to participate in the economy, they have effectively been forced to bear the double burden of
external employment and being responsible for the majority of household chores.118
After the Korean War (1950–1953), North Korea worked to forge a socialist order and
stated its commitment to abolishing the Confucianist patriarchal social structure. 119 To
accomplish this task, the DPRK adopted laws that would bring women out of the home and
into society to participate in the labour force.120 Eun-young Shin argued in the early 2000s
that, “[t]oday, we no longer see such practices as early marriage, polygamy and concubinage
... and now women are an important segment of the labour force”.121 However, Shin has not
considered the gendered rhetoric found in North Korea’s state laws and instead takes the
words of the government at face value. Alternatively, Jin Woong Kang acknowledges that the
North Korean regime has been characterised by contradictory goals in its policies toward
women.122 For example, in the name of gender equality and women’s emancipation, the
DPRK has:

[e]nforced gendered policies and ideologies, structured the patriarchal
family and social systems through the reproduction of the mechanism
of sexual discrimination, and tamed women as passive, gendered
socialist fighters.123
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Thus, the government’s gendered view has created developments contrary to its original
socialist ideals of solving the “woman question”.124 The DPRK moved away from its initial
socialist reforms, which aimed to mobilise women to contribute to nation building.
Superficially, women’s economic participation was egalitarian but this meant that women
suffered the double burden of domestic and social work. In this way the patriarchal state
mobilised society through gender construction and in this process, women’s status in the
family and society was subordinated to gender stereotyping.125
Jiyoung Song, in Human Rights Discourse in North Korea (2011), closely examines
the evolution of the North Korean legal system and human rights discourse in the DPRK.126
Song offers three alternative perspectives to understand North Korean thought on human
rights: postcolonial, Marxist, and Confucian. These perspectives situate North Korea’s
discourse within Korea’s historical context, and within the international evolution of human
rights discourses. Song details North Korea’s human rights thought from the pre-modern
Korean ideas of Confucianism, Sirhak and Tonghak,127 to postcolonial and Marxist ideas on
human rights, to the development of the Juche ideology and its relationship to human rights,
and finally “Our Style” human rights under Kim Jong Il. She has not, however, examined
closely the institution of gender equality. For example, in chapter 4, Song provides an
overview of the so-called interim government period of North Korea from August 1945 to
September 1946 and the wide range of rights institutionalised.128 She only briefly, however,
examines the rights of women and children, outlining the Law on Equality of the Sexes. The
main purpose of the law, she notes, was to embrace women as former victims of human rights
violations under Japanese colonial rule in order to mobilise them into the labour force, 129 but
does not question the gendered logic of North Korean laws and policies. In this thesis, in
chapter 3, I analyse in detail provisions in North Korean laws from 1945 to 2010 and
consider gendered assumptions made by the government that are included in the state legal
system.
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Representations of North Korean Women
Recently, academic scholarship in North Korean studies has made a major contribution to the
new areas of North Korean art, theatre, cinema, and fashion. 130 Two major books are SukYoung Kim’s The Illusive Utopia (2010) and Suzy Kim’s Everyday Life in the Korean
Revolution 1945–1950 (2013).131 Both works examine the representation of revolutionary
women in the personality cult of Kim Il Sung. Suk-Young Kim explores state-produced
propaganda, stage performances, film productions, parades, mass games, and visual arts.132
She investigates how the DPRK’s national imagination is formed, functions, and is
represented for the sake of maintaining and solidifying the regime. Since the foundation of
North Korean cinema and theatre, the main aim of these arts was to glorify the leader and
instil an intense sense of nationalism in the audience. North Korean cinema has relied on a
“process of blurring the boundary between performed illusion and social reality by
transforming spectators into performers”.133 This occurred on two fronts, with actors striving
to emulate the virtues of revolutionary citizens and spectators aiming to become like the film
characters who were role models.134
Suk-Young Kim also discusses North Korean paintings and illustrations and considers
the relationship of the cult of the Kim family to traditional patriarchal authority. She notes
how Kim Il Sung, the father of the nation, overshadows the authority of traditional parents,
especially the father figure, in the many paintings depicting him.135 In North Korean
paintings family life is transformed, “depriving traditional patriarchs of masculinity” and
substituting “omnipresent state patriarchs”.136 They are “shaped by the need to promote a
military spirit”, and feature women as protagonists. Kim outlines the representation of female
protagonists or heroines and the “ideal female body” in North Korean fashion in a variety of
visual media.137 The North Korean state politicised the female body through the production
and consumption of women’s fashion from the 1960s to the 1970s.
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While some other socialist and authoritarian states glorified
masculine clothing as a preferred means to represent revolutionised
women, North Korean fashion has continuously explored and
expressed degrees of femininity, seemingly contradicting the
astringent revolutionary spirit often identified with masculinity.138

She looks at two pieces of clothing in particular: the hanbok (or joseonot), the ethnic Korean
clothing for women composed of the jeogori (jacket) and chima (skirt) and the feminised
military uniform. The hanbok represents timeless national tradition and domesticity and the
military uniform represents the ideals of socialist revolution and public life.139 In North
Korea, visual images of women are not only objects of visual consumption but concrete
models to emulate, instilling in viewers the desire to produce specific bodily presentations.140
Suzy Kim mobilises a range of materials, including statistics, photos, interviews, and
official reports to provide a history of ordinary life in North Korea in the second half of the
1940s.141 During this time, there were three main focuses of governmental activity – land
reform, literacy and elections. Kim examines how villagers experienced, understood, and
later remembered such events as the first land reform and modern elections in Korea’s
history, as well as practices in the schools, communal halls, mass organisations, and study
sessions. North Korea from the outset attempted to meld the old and the new through the
figure of the revolutionary mother as a uniquely feminine revolutionary subject. This is
reflected in the representations of motherhood in Chosǒn Yǒsǒng (Korean Women)
magazine.142 The figure of the revolutionary mother sets North Korea apart from other
historical examples of social revolutions and their handling of the “woman question”.
Although North Korean women during the early period of the country began to participate in
the public arena, women’s agency was cast in the framework of the home, reinforcing
stereotypical roles of women as wives and mothers.143
Although initial reform in North Korea attempted to liberate women from the home,
no legislation or political campaign ever denounced tradition or Confucianism per se, as
occurred during the Communist Revolution in China when the family was configured as the
source of women’s oppression, a position that aligned nationalism, feminism, and Marxism
138

Ibid., pp. 10–13.
Ibid., p. 228–230.
140
Ibid.
141
Kim, Everyday Life, pp.10–13.
142
Ibid., pp. 174–203.
143
Ibid., p. 175.
139

23

against a common enemy.144 In North Korea, rather than the family being faulted for
women’s oppression, the family and the home came to symbolise the Korean nation in the
revolution.145 In this context, motherhood became the primary trope by which to construct not
only women’s revolutionary subjectivity but also all North Koreans, as everyone was extolled
to emulate mothers as the sacrificial model citizen. Thus, the distinctiveness of the process
through which North Korean women’s subjectivity was crafted is in the contradictory
deployment of tradition, shifting the meaning of “motherhood” and thereby the overall
gender scheme.146 This is different from the masculine representations of revolutionary
brotherhood in images of the worker or peasant in the Bolshevik and Chinese revolutions. In
North Korea, the figure of the revolutionary mother became the quintessential icon of female
subjectivity, melding the old and the new, and incorporating both Japanese and Soviet
legacies along the way. This remaking of motherhood as a public persona would not have
been possible without the Korean colonial experience, argues Kim, which served to privilege
women and the domestic sphere in unprecedented ways.147
Although these works have offered a good sense of different aspects of North Korean
society such as its legal system, the representation of women in visual media within North
Korea, the question of how the government has represented itself to the world, in regards to
achieving gender equality, has been left largely unanswered. Therefore, this thesis attempts to
offer some understanding of how the North Korean government has communicated with the
international community through its reporting to the UN, the CEDAW Committee and in
English-language magazines about gender, sexuality and achieving gender equality. Next, I
outline the research focus and objectives of this thesis and the questions I explore.

Research Focus and Objectives
In this thesis, I focus on the gender ideology of the North Korean government in its
communication with the international community. The objective of the thesis is to answer the
following questions:

What gendered views are revealed in the North Korean legal system?
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How has the North Korean government represented gender in the
English-language magazine Women of Korea?

How has the North Korean government reported on gender and
sexuality to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women?

These questions are shaped by the themes of gender, sexuality and international relations that
recur at various points throughout this study. Below I outline my research methodology and
then provide a chapter outline.

Methodology
In this thesis, I have adopted a qualitative methodology, drawing on critical discourse
analysis. As discussed above, the isolation of the DPRK from the international community
led to difficulties in accessing reliable information regarding broader aspects of North Korean
society, especially gender roles in the home and workplace. This meant that those outside the
country had to rely on available testimonies of North Koreans who had fled the country, the
writings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il published by Pyongyang’s Foreign Languages
Publishing House, and the English-language propaganda magazines, Women of Korea and
Korea Today. Since the 1990s, there has been an increase in the number of North Koreans
leaving the country, thus providing a wider range of testimonies. There has also been an
increase in governmental communication with the world.148
Despite the fact the North Korean government has increased attempts at
communication with the rest of the world since the 1990s, news reports in the Euro-American
and Japanese media assign little credibility to reports released from the DPRK.149 The
148
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popular perception of the DPRK by the international community is one of untrustworthiness,
unpredictability, and a threat to regional security.150 This thesis attempts to address the often
over-simplified representation of the DPRK in the international community by critically
analysing sources released by the North Korean government specifically for the world. By
doing this I hope to add another dimension to the representation of DPRK in world politics,
with a focus on the North Korea’s contradictory stance on gender relations and equality
between men and women.
When examining English-language sources from the DPRK, though, I have
considered that the information released by the North Korean government is strictly
controlled by the state and is information deemed suitable for the international community, as
the government wants to project a positive image to the world. In the DPRK, it is illegal to
own a radio or television set which is not adjusted to receive only state-run channels and the
printed word is largely limited to several state-owned newspapers and books that are
published by a small number of state-owned publishing houses.151 Sonia Ryang reminds us
that:
Kim’s words are words, that is, rhetoric, and they have to be treated
as such. His works should be placed on the level of official political
discourse, constituting the social reality only reflexively, rather than
the facts as such.152
In the DPRK, Kim Il Sung’s words carry an immense policy implication for all areas,
including the state’s gender equality policy, as they are normally regarded as the most correct
and safest reference point.153 Therefore, the works of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and currently
Kim Jong Un provide a body of official discourse that needs to be further analysed in
connection to wider aspects of the society, and its effects on specific areas such as gender and
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sexuality in the DPRK.154 I approach North Korean sources by critically analysing the statesanctioned discourse presented in English. I have taken care to view the Kim family words as
rhetorical data that should be cross-referenced with other information as much as possible.155
As I discuss in detail below, the rhetoric deployed by the government provides insights into
constructions of gender in the DPRK.
As suggested by Ryang, previous scholarship on the roles of North Korean women
and men tended not to support the “empirical” data found in the official words of Kim Il
Sung with analytical back-up.156 Instead, the words of Kim Il Sung were seen as fact or
reality and not challenged by evidence that suggested otherwise. For example, although
official North Korean texts claim that Kim Il Sung was responsible for the promulgation of
the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946 this does not mean that he himself drafted the law
or that he was committed to achieving gender equality.157 Further, when the North Korean
government proclaims that all women are liberated from their homes, these words should not
be taken as reality as evidence collected by other sources such as NGOs offers information to
the contrary.158 Therefore, I draw on reporting by the UN and NGOs and position their views
alongside the information presented by the North Korean government to juxtapose the
competing perspectives regarding gender and sexuality in the DPRK.
Here, I elaborate on the utilisation of critical discourse analysis and the numerous
primary and secondary sources employed and scrutinised throughout this work. Critical
discourse analysis is deployed as a method of analysis in the humanities and social sciences
with the aim of mapping three separate forms of analysis.159 These include the analysis of
written or spoken language, the analysis of discursive practice (processes of text production,
distribution and consumption) and the analysis of discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice.160 Fairclough combines the analysis of discourse at the micro, meso and
macro-level to interpret written and spoken text.161 At the micro-level, discourse analysis
considers the text’s syntax, metaphoric structure and certain metrical devices. At the mesolevel, the analyst studies the text’s production and consumption, focusing on how power
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relations are enacted; and finally, at the macro-level of inter-textual understanding, the
analyst tries to understand the broad, societal currents that are affecting the text being
studied.162
Besides linguistic theory, discourse analysis draws from social theory. Contributions
to this discipline have been made by Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Jürgen
Habermas, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu.163 This approach examines ideologies and
power relations involved in discourse. Fairclough and Holes argue that language connects
with the social through being the primary domain of ideology, and through being a site of,
and a stake in, struggles for power.164
Just as text can be analysed using the methods of critical discourse analysis, visual
culture can be subjected to similar kinds of analysis. Analysis of visual culture is a field of
study that includes a combination of cultural studies, art history, critical theory, philosophy,
and anthropology, by focusing on aspects of culture that rely on visual images. Paintings,
photographs, posters, fashion and sculptures, to name a few, give insight into the non-literate
aspects of human culture and can be employed to challenge or validate conclusions drawn
from written discourse.165 Visual culture is presented in the form of visual artefacts, “natural
forms and ways of thinking” that form perceptions in everyday life. 166 Visual culture is
learned and cultivated, and is deeply involved with societies, with the ethics and politics,
aesthetics and epistemology of seeing and being seen.167 In my analysis of the North Korea’s
English-language magazines, I analyse visual materials as well as more conventional written
texts.
Specific text types analysed in this thesis include: official North Korean statements,
reports exchanged between the North Korean government and UN bodies such as the
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CEDAW Committee and North Korean periodicals designed and printed for the international
English community. These sources outline the North Korean government’s approved
discourse on gender, sexuality, and achieving gender equality as presented to the world in
various forms of communication. These sources are especially designed for international
consumption and represent the country as a place of equal opportunity for North Korean men
and women. In contrast, information collected by NGOs and the UN, which tends to be based
on the testimonies of North Koreans who have left the country, provide unique first-hand
insights into life in the DPRK. In this thesis, I juxtapose the official view presented by the
North Korean government with information from NGOs and the UN. Below, I expand on the
North Korean sources and NGO reporting employed in this thesis.

North Korean Sources
After outlining the official views of gender relations in the North Korean legal system (see
chapter 3), I then turn to the English-language magazine Women of Korea, which was a major
means of communicating to the international community about gender relations in the DPRK
(see chapter 4 and 5). The magazine was modelled after the first Korean-language magazine
designed specifically for women, Chosǒn Yǒsǒng (Korean Women).168 The Korean-language
magazine was issued under the guidance of the newly-formed government and the Korean
Democratic Women’s Union (KDWU, Women’s Union) in 1946 and was designed to
circulate information regarding state policy and gender equality.169 Between 1964 and 1992,
the Working People’s Organisation Publishing House (Pyongyang, DPRK) published the
English-language version, Women of Korea. This version of the magazine was designed
specifically to inform the international community of the position of women in North Korean
society, and the political and economic goals of the government. I focus on the English
version of the magazine because I am interested in how the North Korean government
communicates to the world about gender, sexuality and achieving gender equality (see
chapters 4 and 5). The visual images in Women of Korea are instrumental in portraying a
positive image of gender relations in the DPRK, adapted from their original purpose of
portraying positive role models for North Korean women.
I also refer to paintings and poster art published in Women of Korea, which represent
North Korean women in the home and the workplace in different historical contexts. In
revolutionary societies such as the DPRK, art and culture have a social function and do not
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function as an isolated entity.170 In a society where the government shapes reality, North
Korean visual culture is far from spontaneous, as it educates, entertains, and mobilises people
into the workforce.171 The North Korean government has strategically placed paintings,
posters and other forms of visual media about current issues in spaces where the population
have easy access.172 Therefore, in the DPRK, magazines entertain people, inform people and
are employed to mobilise people to certain government causes, such as women joining the
social labour force. Internationally, North Korean magazines work to inform the world of
events happening within the DPRK and to propagate the government’s policies towards
achieving gender equality, economics, and the reunification of the Korean peninsula.
The employment of visual images by the North Korean government was based on
principles initially employed by the Soviet Union as part of its Socialist Realism
movement.173 In 1932, the Soviet Union abolished all independent art groups and by 1934
announced Socialist Realism as the only approved form of art. This approach was based on
the four principles of accessibility of art to the masses, class-consciousness, relevance to
current political issues and faithfulness to the Party. Although these principles were drawn
from Marxist-Leninist ideas, Socialist Realism was a creation of Joseph Stalin (1878–1953)
and was later adopted by China and the DPRK, with national and cultural variations.174
Stylistically North Korean art is more than a mere copy of Soviet Russian Socialist Realism,
as North Korean art had to accord with Korea’s specific historical conditions and cultural
traditions.175 Kim Il Sung pronounced that Korean painting, the indigenous postrevolutionary development of traditional ink painting, was the best representative of Korean
styles and emotions.176 Kim Jong Il described Korean painting as characterised by clarity,
compactness and delicacy, which became the standard characteristics applied to all approved
art in the DPRK.177 This approach to North Korean art became the basis for all art forms
including paintings and posters, which are distributed among the North Korean people and to
the international community.
I then analyse communication between the North Korean government and CEDAW
Committee from 2001 to 2005 (see chapter 7). During this period, the DPRK communicated
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most openly with the UN.178 The relationship stalled shortly after 2005 though, due to the
somewhat hostile relationship of the DPRK with the international community. Although the
period of communication is short – just a few years – the reports exchanged between the
DPRK and the UN are important as they demonstrate how the North Korean government
presents itself to the world, and how it negotiates the gap between the views of gender
equality presented in CEDAW and the actual conditions in the DPRK. On 11 September
2002, the DPRK submitted an initial report for consideration to the CEDAW Committee.179
The DPRK’s report is one of the only official sources available for gaining some indication
of the stance of the North Korean government on women’s rights and reveals the fewrecorded cases where the government acknowledges gender discrimination and stereotyping
within the country. In February 2005, the CEDAW committee provided a list of issues and
questions to the DPRK and the North Korean representatives responded.180 In July 2005, the
CEDAW Committee prepared concluding comments and recommendations for the DPRK to
improve the rights and status of women.181 Then, in September 2005, meetings were held
between the DPRK representatives and the CEDAW Committee where concerns about the
rights of North Korean women were raised and requests were made for the North Korean
government to make realistic and attainable changes.182 Although communication between
the DPRK and the UN has not continued since 2005, these documents are a valuable source
of information as they display the state’s position on the status and rights of North Korean
women.
In comparison to North Korean reporting to the UN, I survey NGO reports and
compare their findings to the official information offered by the DPRK (see chapters 7 and
8). NGO reports are based on the personal accounts from North Koreans who have left the
country and reside in China, South Korea or a third country. In 2004, Amnesty International
presented the report Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea),183 outlining human rights violations by the North
Korean government against its people. These violations included no access to food, education
and healthcare. The report also discusses the role and responsibility of the North Korean
government and the international community to provide food aid to North Koreans. In the
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same year, the Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees (Good Friends)
compiled the report Human Rights in North Korea and the Food Crisis: A Comprehensive
Report on North Korean Human Rights Issues.184 The report reflects the voices of North
Koreans and their experiences in the DPRK and in China.185 Through the testimonies of the
North Koreans, Good Friends has attempted to trace changes in North Korean society, and
the current human rights situation of North Koreans in China.
In 2005, Anti-Slavery International commissioned the author Norma Kang Muico to
write the report An Absence of Choice: The sexual exploitation of North Korean women in
China.186 The report exposes the vulnerability of North Korean women who have fled to
China by their own accord or by trafficking. Included in the report is a wide range of case
studies and testimonies documenting the sexual exploitation of North Korean women,
including arranged marriages. The report also makes a case for North Korean people who
reside in China to be considered refugees and not “economic migrants” as the Chinese
government refers to them. The report concludes with recommendations and actions that need
to be engaged by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
Chinese and North Korean governments.
In response to the DPRK’s initial report submitted in 2002 to the CEDAW
Committee, two South Korean NGOs submitted shadow reports to the Committee. The two
NGO reports submitted outlined concerns about the status of North Korean women inside and
outside the DPRK. In June 2005, Good Friends submitted a shadow report with concerns
regarding the food shortage in the DPRK since the mid-1990s and the impact on women.187
In particular, it focused on the trafficking and prostitution of women, their right to access
healthcare, and the situation of North Korean women in China. In July of the same year,
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) submitted a shadow report to the
CEDAW Committee.188 Concerns raised by NKHR include: gender-based discrimination
against women in society and the home, violence against women in North Korean society and
the sexual exploitation and trafficking of women. In chapter 7, I compare these findings to
the DPRK’s reporting to the CEDAW Committee.
I also refer to three other reports by NKHR. Flowers, Guns and Women on Bikes:
Briefing Report on the Situation of Women’s Rights in the DPRK (2009) focuses on the rights
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of North Korean women and addresses the cultural determinants which negatively affect
women.189 The report then introduces the major areas in which North Korean women’s rights
are violated including: sexual harassment, domestic violence against women, and violence
against in women detention facilities. There are sections on women’s access to the education
system, women’s economic rights, and issues related to family planning, and maternal care.
The report concludes with practical recommendations addressed directly to the DPRK, as
well as to other governments and UN bodies. The Battered Wheel of the Revolution: Briefing
Report on the Situation of Violence against North Korean Women (2011), analyses cultural
and structural practices which are associated with violence against women in various contexts
including the family, educational institutions, the military, local communities, detention
centres, and in China and other countries.190 The report also asserts the responsibility of the
North Korean government to eradicate practices that are harmful to women, such as
trafficking, especially as these practices have thus far avoided national scrutiny and
intervention. The report then makes recommendations to the North Korean government and
relevant international organisations on the eradication of practices that are violent against
women. Status of Women’s Rights in the Context of Socio-Economic Changes in the DPRK
(2013) outlines the promulgation of the Women’s Rights Act in 2010. The NGO suggests that
the timing of the new Act was an outcome of North Korea’s involvement at the UN and a
response to the world’s pressure for change in this area. The objective of the research was to
document the condition of women’s rights in the DPRK after the adoption of the new
Women’s Rights Act. The first part of the report analyses provisions of the Act, while the
second part looks closely at the development in women’s status and rights amid the on-going
socio-economic changes in the DPRK. The report focuses on trends in North Korean society
between 2010 and 2012 and outlines valuable information on the status and rights of women
in recent years, which I refer to in chapter 8.
In chapter 8, I also refer to communication between the DPRK and the UN between
2006 and 2010. Specifically, I refer to two press releases issued by the permanent mission of
the DPRK to the UN in 2008 and 2010, in response to items discussed during the meetings of
the UNGA. In 2008, the DPRK participated in the 63rd session of the General Assembly and
issued a press release in response to Item 56 “Advancement of Women”.191 The press release
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addressed the issue of achieving gender equality and the elimination of customary
discrimination in the DPRK. Then, in 2010, a North Korean delegation participated at the
65th Session of the UNGA. In response to Agenda item 28 “Advancement of Women”
discussed during the session, the North Korean Ambassador issued a press statement
outlining the DPRK’s concerns about achieving gender equality in the country.192 Both press
releases referred to the historical issue of so-called “comfort women” when addressing
gender equality in the DPRK.

Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 outlines the historical background of North Korea from 1945 to 1990, paying
particular attention to the differences between histories retold by North Korean historians as
compared to academic historical accounts. By highlighting differences in historical accounts,
it will give those outside the country a better understanding of why the DPRK makes its
international policy decisions, as well as domestic policy decisions in regard to gender
relations and achieving gender equality. More broadly, I outline events such as the
occupation of the Korean peninsula by Japan, the formation of the two Koreas (officially in
1948), the Korean War (1950–1953), the consolidation of political power in the North by the
Kim family, and the Juche ideology. This chapter ensures the reader is aware of several
major historical events between 1945 and 1990 that have shaped the North Korean
government’s perspectives on gender relations and achieving gender equality.
Chapter 3 focuses on the North Korean legal system between 1946 and 2010. From
as early as 1946, North Korea included provisions in laws that addressed the rights of women
in the labour force and politics, as well as access to education and healthcare. Key to the
government’s promotion of gender equality was to bring women out of the home and into the
workforce. The policy direction of the North Korean government therefore developed
alongside the economic development of the country. Laws addressed the perceived domestic
needs of women by legalising the establishment of childcare and pre-packaged food facilities.
We shall see that issues such as gender discrimination and violence against women in all
forms have not been addressed fully in the North Korean legal system to date.
Chapter 4 looks closely at the representation of exemplary North Korean women in
the magazine Women of Korea between 1960 and 1970. The visual images published in
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Women of Korea represent North Korean women in the role of the revolutionary heroine.
Two prominent exemplary heroines are Kang Ban Sok (1892–1932), mother of Kim Il Sung,
and Kim Jong Suk (1919–1949), first wife of Kim Il Sung and mother of Kim Jong Il. The
representations of these women were to promote qualities of loyalty to the Kim family and
North Korean state, as well as caring and nurturing roles within the home. The domain of the
battlefield as a space dominated by men was challenged to some extent by the representation
of the revolutionary heroines. However, this was often undermined when heroines were
represented performing domestic chores, such as cooking and sewing, as part of their
revolutionary roles. In contrast, the visual representation of North Korean men as soldiers and
defenders of the country, as fathers and carers within the home are largely absent in Women
of Korea. Instead, the ubiquitous image of Kim Il Sung as the “Fatherly General”, who cares
for all Korean children appears on most pages of the magazines. These representations reveal
gendered assumptions about the roles of North Korean men and women in the home. I also
consider the clothing worn by the heroines and their male equivalents. While women are
dressed predominantly in ethnic Korean clothing (joseonot or hanbok) or feminised military
uniforms, their male counterparts are clothed in military uniforms or western clothing.
Towards the end of the 1970s, the visual imagery of the revolutionary heroines was
replaced by the representation of ordinary women who performed the roles of loyal and
supportive wives to husband and family, as well as working outside in the so-called “light
industries”.193 In Chapter 5, I examine the visual and textual representation of North Korean
women in the family unit and labour force in Women of Korea from the late 1970s on. During
this period, the assumptions underlying the North Korean government’s gender equality
policy are revealed in the pages of the magazine, as the visual images expose the acceptance
of institutional gender inequality for the purpose of mobilising women into employment
outside the home.194 From this time, visual imagery and state laws emphasised the
socialisation of childcare and the pre-packaged food industry as a way to lessen the burdens
of women within the home. This illustrates, however, the government’s assumptions about
men and women’s roles and responsibilities in the home. Women were seen to be the primary
carers of children and responsible for domestic chores, while men worked outside the home.
Close examination of the images in Women of Korea reveals a pattern of gender-segregation
in the North Korean labour force, as women are represented in the “light industries” and not
in the so-called “heavy industries”, which were reserved for men. Similarly, there are clear
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distinctions in the clothing worn by women and men in families and in the workplace,
highlighting the government’s gendered assumptions. Just as revolutionary heroines were
represented wearing the hanbok or feminised military uniforms, ordinary North Korean
women have continued to be represented in ethnic Korean clothing or in simple and modern
clothing which retains distinctive feminine traits. In contrast, men are not dressed in ethnic
Korean clothing but Western-style dress, suggesting they have moved forward into modern
society while women are held in the past.
In Chapter 6, historical events in the DPRK during the 1990s are examined in order to
provide vital background for an understanding of North Korea’s communications with the
CEDAW Committee in the early 2000s (discussed in chapter 7). Events surveyed in Chapter
6 include: the collapse of the Soviet Union 1991 and the termination of Soviet aid to the
DPRK, resulting in a food crisis as the North Korean government was unable to provide food
to all people. Coinciding with these events, the DPRK experienced widespread famine,
drought, and floods during the mid-1990s.195 Without adjusting the economic policy to the
rapidly changing circumstances, the North Korean government instead reduced the daily food
rations distributed through the Public Distribution System (PDS).196 Then, on 8 July 1994,
Kim Il Sung died, leaving the country in uncertainty until his son Kim Jong Il officially took
power three years later. Initially, the North Korean government did not share openly with the
world the full extent of the food crisis and instead isolated the country further. Although
NGOs were allowed to work in the country, they were heavily monitored and were only
allowed into selected areas of the country to distribute aid. From this time, an increased sense
of responsibility was placed on women by both the government and society. In most cases,
women shouldered the double burden of household chores and earning a living in the
unofficial economy to support their families.
In chapter 7, I consider how the DPRK constructs a particular history of the country,
which is depicted as having demonstrated a continuous and unbroken commitment to gender
equality. In this chapter, I focus on the relationship between the North Korean government
and the CEDAW Committee between 2001 and 2005. In North Korea’s reporting, the state
maintains that discrimination against women in all forms, verbal and physical, was abolished
after the end of Japan’s occupation of Korea and with the promulgation of state laws under
the new regime. In other words, gender discrimination in the DPRK is generally relegated to
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the colonial period. However, a close examination of North Korea’s reporting also reveals the
extent to which gendered stereotypes underpin the government’s views of the roles of women
and men, even while it promotes a commitment to gender equality to the international
community. I argue that despite the assertion of legal gender equality, the North Korean
government still operates according to a binary model of gender, which shapes the
opportunities for both men and women’s participation in society and the home, although
expectations have been challenged in practice through long years of economic recession and
famine.
Chapter 8 analyses the communication between the DPRK and the UNGA, as well as
other UN bodies, in regards to the state’s policies on achieving gender equality within the
country. I examine communication between the DPRK and the UN between 2006 and 2011,
referring to two press releases issued by the permanent mission of the DPRK to the UN in
2008 and 2010, in response to items discussed during the UNGA. Both press releases confirm
the DPRK’s commitment to gender equality, but also raise concern about the attitude of
Japan on the issue of so-called “comfort women”. In the press releases, the DPRK asserts that
until all pending issues of the past are recognised and clearly settled it is impossible to
achieve the advancement of North Korean women for the present and the future. The
government has taken the position that achieving gender equality in the DPRK is
fundamentally tied to the occupation of the peninsula by Japan and therefore is seen as a
historical rather than contemporary issue. In this chapter, I also examine how pressure from
the international community has forced the North Korean government to amend existing state
laws to include provisions for the greater protection of women’s rights. In 2010, sixty-four
years after the promulgation of the Law on the Equality of the Sexes, the DPRK adopted the
Women’s Rights Act. For the first time, the DPRK addressed contemporary issues faced by
North Korean women and included provisions in the Act to protect their rights with respect to
domestic violence, female infanticide and the protection of pregnant women who face
execution. This final chapter takes us to the end of the regime of Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim
Jong Il.
Finally, in chapter 9, I conclude the thesis with my findings and conclusions.
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2. Historical and Political Background
(1945–1990)
A man who is ignorant of the history and culture of his
nation can have no pride in his nation nor can he [sic]
become a true patriot.
Kim Il Sung, 16 September 1964.1

Introduction
In this chapter, I outline the historical and political background of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) from 1945 to 1990. Events in the DPRK after 1990
will be outlined in chapter 6. The current gender ideology of the North Korean government is
explicated with reference to the historical experiences of the Korean people so I recount
events such as Japan’s occupation of Korea (1910–1945), the division and formation of the
two Koreas, the Korean War (1950–1953), and the consolidation of political power in the
North by the Kim family. This chapter provides details of the major historical and political
events that have helped to shape the North Korean government’s perspective on gender
relations and achieving gender equality within the country.
According to historian Yŏng-ho Ch’oe, after Japanese colonial rule ended on the
Korean peninsula in 1945, there was a “far more militant” nationalist tone in North Korean
historical scholarship compared to South Korean historiography.2 Before the 1950s, North
Korean scholarship concerned itself with fitting Marxist historiography to Korean history.3
After this time, though, class analysis was abandoned in favour of nationalistic categories, in
accordance with the Juche idea.4 While Marxism-Leninism is still important in the DPRK,
Juche has superseded this doctrine as the official state ideology, as will be discussed further
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below.5 Many important historical facts were omitted from the North Korean version of
national history, while many “facts” were (re)invented or exaggerated to push audiences
toward the politically-prescribed nationalistic conclusion.6 For example, the North Korean
leader Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) commissioned historians as propagandists to glorify his own
involvement in the anti-Japanese struggle in Manchuria (now the northeast of China).7 All
Koreans were to imagine Kim Il Sung’s role in liberating the Korean peninsula from Japanese
imperialism. The reinterpretation of North Korean history not only strengthened Kim Il
Sung’s political control over the country but also created a narrative around the entire Kim
family, including his mother Kang Ban Sok (1892–1932) and first wife Kim Jong Suk (1919–
1949). The representations of these women as revolutionary heroines in English-language
publications will be discussed in chapter 4.
Andrei Lankov provides three reasons why the North Korean government has
manipulated national history. First, the government wants the North Korean people to believe
that Korean history is more “ancient” than the history of other societies.8 This will ensure that
it appears that there have been no influences from other countries, thus reinforcing Korean
cultural practices and history. This leads to the second point that the DPRK wants to play
down or deny foreign influences on Korean history. Finally, by establishing a long history
which is not influenced from other countries this ensures the North Korean government is
able to demonstrate that it has always played the decisive role in shaping Korean history and
society.9 Therefore, when reading North Korean documents that recount historical events it is
necessary to be attentive to this historical shaping by the state. While this has helped to shape
the loyalty of the North Korean people, it has also driven a wedge between the DPRK and the
international community, in particular with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South
Korea) and the United States of America (USA). It is thus important to highlight the
differences between what is written by the international community and what has been
constructed by North Korean historians. This gives a better understanding of why the DPRK
makes its political and policy decisions in regards to different aspects of society, including
gender relations and achieving gender equality.
5
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In this chapter, I begin by focusing on Japan’s occupation of the Korean peninsula
between 1910 and 1945. It is important to highlight the significance of this event in Korea’s
history as the North Korean government continues to draw on this period when discussing the
current status of Korean women. I then move on to two events that have continued to shape
relations between North and South Korea as well as the way in which the North Korean
government communicates with the world, that is the division of Korea into two states (1948)
and the Korean War (1950–1953). Finally, I examine the consolidation of power by the Kim
family, the establishment of the Juche philosophy under the guidance of Kim Il Sung and the
further development of this philosophy into “Socialism of Our Style”. As the safest reference
point when developing state policies is to reference the words of the Kims and the Juche
philosophy, this section ensures a deeper understanding of the power held by the Kim leaders
in North Korean society. When recalling North Korean history and more generally Korean
history, I highlight differences between the state rhetoric of North Korean historians with
other more accepted historical works.

Japan’s Occupation of Korea (1910–1945)
There had always been encounters between Korea and the outside world, through invasions
or relationships with other countries including the Chinese, Japanese, Mongols, Manchus,
and French. Each of these powers contested for political control in Korea, as they sought to
expand their influence in Asia.10 From the late nineteenth century, the Japanese government
notified the Korean state of its intention to establish a stronger diplomatic and economic
relationship between the two countries.11 Initially, the Korean Empire did not respond
favourably to this request so Japan threatened to dispatch warships to the peninsula. Faced by
an imminent war the unprepared Korean government signed the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity
on 26 February 1876 under intense political pressure. Korean historians refer to the treaty as
the Treaty of Kanghwa.12 The treaty forced Korea to accept the new economic and political
ties with Japan, which was the main beneficiary of the agreement.13 Under the Treaty three
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Korean ports were opened to Japanese use, tariffs paid by Japan in Korea lowered,
extraterritorial rights were granted to Japanese citizens living in Korea, and the Korean
government was forced to proclaim its independence from China.14 The Sino-Japanese War
(1894–1895) resulted in Japan ending Korea’s tributary relationship with China by formally
declaring Korea to be independent, a status that allowed Japan to increase its influence on the
peninsula.15
From 1905, under intense political pressure from Japan, the Korean government was
forced to sign additional treaties. The DPRK states that Japan illegally fabricated several
treaties to assume total diplomatic rights over the Korean peninsula.16 On 17 November 1905,
the Eulsa Treaty or Japan–Korea Protectorate Treaty was signed between Japan and Korea
and then the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1907 (24 July 1907) was formally recognised by both
states. North Korean historians refer to the treaties as the Ulsa 5-Point Treaty and the Jongmi
7-Point Treaty respectively.17 Each agreement led to greater control of the Korean peninsula,
until Japan finally held all political and economic power over Korea on 22 August 1910, with
the signing of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty, referred to as the Korea-Japan
Amalgamation Treaty by North Korean historians.18 On 29 August 1910, the treaty was
proclaimed to the public, thus officially starting the period of Japanese colonial rule in Korea.
From 1910, Japan formally declared Korea to be a colony, ending its monarchy and
insisting on the allegiance of the Korean people to the Emperor of Japan.19 Japan imposed
various modernising reforms in matters of social, administrative and economic organisation.20
The results of Japan’s modernisation process on the peninsula were characterised by patterns
of development and underdevelopment. The question of whether Japan ultimately assisted
Korea in its development remains highly contested.21 During the colonial period, Koreans
were prohibited from speaking the Korean-language and were made to adopt Japanese
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names.22 Currently all Koreans regardless of which region they live in have overwhelmingly
viewed the colonial experience as negative and brutal.23
Secret societies and patriotic cultural movements within Korea and independence
movements outside of Korea all played important roles in Korea’s struggles for independence
from Japan. Most notable is the March First Independence Movement of 1919.24 Students and
other Koreans against Japanese colonial rule were prompted to protest in several Korean
cities, including Seoul (now the capital of ROK) and Pyongyang (now the capital of
DPRK).25 Approximately 2,000,000 Koreans participated in the protest and more than 1,500
demonstrations took place across numerous cities and towns in Korea.26 The uprising was one
of the earliest public displays of resistance by the Koreans. It was also in response to the
former US President Woodrow Wilson’s (1856–1924) speech, “Fourteen Points”, presented
at the Paris Peace Conference on 8 January 1919.27 The speech outlined the right of national
self-determination, free trade, open agreements and democracy; declared that World War I
(1914–1918) had been fought for a moral cause; and called for post-war peace in Europe.
Although not directly referring to the situation of Korea, after hearing Wilson’s speech,
Korean students studying in Tokyo published a statement demanding freedom from Japanese
colonial rule in Korea. Coinciding with these events the former Korean Emperor Gojong
(1852–1919) died on 21 January 1919 amid widespread suspicion that he had been poisoned.
In the early morning of 1 March 1919, the movement’s core activists met at a
restaurant in Seoul and read the Korean Declaration of Independence which had been drawn
up by the historian Choe Nam-seon (1890–1957).28 The Declaration outlined Three Open
Pledges as:

Our action today represents the demand of our people for justice,
humanity, survival, and dignity. It manifests our spirit of freedom and
should not engender anti-foreign feelings.
22
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To the last one of us and to the last moment possible, we shall
unhesitatingly publicise the views of our people, as is our right.
All our actions should scrupulously uphold public order, and our
demands and our attitudes must be honourable and upright.29

The leaders of the movement signed the document and sent a copy to the Japanese Governor
General, Count Hasegawa Yoshimichi (1850–1924).30 The leaders of the movement then
telephoned the central police station in Seoul to inform them of their actions. The organisers
were arrested soon after. Massive crowds assembled in Pagoda Park (now known as Tapgol
Park, Seoul) to hear the student, Chung Jae-yong (dates unknown), read the Korean
Declaration of Independence publicly. The gathering then formed into a peaceful procession
but the Japanese military police attempted to suppress the movement. The size and intensity
of the movement stunned the Japanese who had assumed that their brutal policies would
eventually break the Korean national spirit, not strengthen it.31 As the number of protesters
grew, suppression by the Japanese police force and army turned to violence, which resulted in
the killing of Koreans.32
The ensuing suppression of the Korean people and the pursuit of activists by the
Japanese police resulted in the expatriation of many Korean leaders into Manchuria,
Shanghai and other parts of China where they continued their activism. As a result, the
movement was a catalyst for the establishment of the Provisional Government of the
Republic of Korea in Shanghai on 13 April 1919.33 Despite renewed Japanese efforts to end
political resistance, Korean nationalists and communists continued to agitate against Japan in
scattered movements throughout the country.34
According to the DPRK, the March First Independence Movement failed due to the
lack of leadership by an outstanding leader.35 It is said that the anti-Japanese liberation
movement was not victorious until the leadership of Kim Il Sung’s father Kim Hyong Jik
(1884–1926), who personally founded the largest underground anti-Japanese revolutionary
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organisation at home and abroad, the Korean National Association (KNA) in Pyongyang on
23 March 1917.36 While working to advance the anti-Japanese struggle, the Japanese police
arrested Kim Hyong Jik and imprisoned him. While in jail Kim Hyong Jik is said to have
heard the news of the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, and the seizure of state power by
urban workers and revolutionaries.37 In light of this information, Kim Hyong Jik is said to
have reviewed the anti-Japanese movement in Korea, and determined that the only valid way
to achieve national independence and win freedom and liberation for the Korean people was
to rely on a proletarian revolution.38 In October 1918, upon his release from prison, Kim
Hyong Jik shifted the KNA to the northern part of Korea near the border. It was from this
time that the guiding principles of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the
future Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union, USSR) shaped the thinking of Kim
Hyong Jik and his son Kim Il Sung. The influence of the Soviet Union weighed heavily on
Kim Il Sung in particular, so much so that it led to the formal establishment of a socialist
DPRK in 1948.
From 1926, on the death of his father, it is said that Kim Il Sung took over the
responsibility to liberate the Korean peninsula from Japan.39 On 5 May 1936, in opposition to
the Japanese occupation of Korea, the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland
(ARF) was said to be personally established by Kim Il Sung to unite anti-Japanese forces
within Korea and abroad. While leading the preparation for the foundation of the Association,
Kim Il Sung is said to have personally drafted the Ten-Point Programme of the Association
for the Restoration of the Fatherland (see Appendix 3) and the Declaration of the Association
for the Restoration of the Fatherland (see Appendix 4).40 Based on this preparation, Kim Il
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Sung called a meeting of military and political cadres of the Korean People’s Revolutionary
Army to Donggang (Fusong County, Jilin, China) from 1 to 15 May 1936. At the meeting,
both the Programme and the Declaration of the Association for the Restoration of the
Fatherland were made public. These documents embodied North Korea’s thoughts on the
social and political rights of all people, with particular focus on the rights of Korean women.
The provisions included in these documents would become key principles in the first DPRK
Constitution in 1948. Laws, policy reform, and the first Constitution promulgated during the
revolutionary period will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. Under the guidance of Kim Il
Sung the ARF is said to have continued to fight back against the Japanese colonisers until
Korea was liberated in 1945.
In November 1943, in anticipation of Japan’s defeat, the Allied Powers at the Cairo
Conference set out an agreement for the independence of Korea.41 Then US President
Franklin Roosevelt (1882–1945), British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1874–1965) and
China’s Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) met at the Conference in part to discuss
what should happen to Japan’s colonies once the Second World War ended. They agreed that
Japan should lose all territories it had conquered by force, including Korea. After the
conference, a joint statement affirmed that, “[t]he aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become
free and independent”.42 For some Korean nationalists who wanted immediate independence,
the phrase “in due course” caused great dismay. Any further discussion about Korea among
the Allies waited until victory over Japan.43

The Establishment of Two Koreas
Two days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, the Soviets invaded
Manchuria.44 The American leaders, though, worried that the whole Korean peninsula might
be occupied by the Soviet Union, and feared this could lead to a Soviet occupied Japan. On
41
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10 August 1945, two American colonels, Dean Rusk (1909–1994) and Charles Bonesteel
(1909–1977), proposed the 38th parallel as the administrative line for the two opposing
armies of the US and Soviet Union.45 The officers’ plans for Korea were incorporated into
General Order No. 1 on the administration of post-war Japan.46 More interested in obtaining
the territories north of Hokkaido, the then Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1922–1952) agreed to
the dividing line. This action resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula, which would
be governed by two rival provisional administrations. In the north, the country was under the
administration of the Soviet Union and in the south by the US. Soon after the division of the
country mistrust grew rapidly between competing administrations and no agreement could be
reached on how to reconcile competing provisional governments. The US continued to be
concerned that the Soviet Union would not stop at the 38th parallel, and would try to occupy
the entire Korean peninsula.47 Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, and was occupied by
the Allies until 1952.
With the abrupt departure of Japan from the Korean peninsula, many Koreans were
displaced. It is estimated that by 1945, 20 per cent of all Koreans were moved, with 11 per
cent outside of Korea.48 There were approximately 2.4 million Koreans in Japan, 2 million in
China and about 200,000 in the Soviet Union.49 During the colonial period, Japan had
instigated major industrialisation on the peninsula as part of its war effort and much of the
Korean population were uprooted from its agrarian base. Koreans were sent to labour in
factories in the northern part of the peninsula and in Manchuria and to mines and other
enterprises in Japan. Many of the labourers worked under terrible conditions, and a large
number of Korean men and women were conscripted as forced labour. Consequently, with
the defeat of Japan in 1945, millions of displaced Koreans sought to return home while others
stayed behind in Japan, China and the Soviet Union.50 The legacy of this forced displacement
includes substantial minority populations of Koreans in Japan and northern China.51
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On 13 October 1945, the North Korean Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea
(North Korean Bureau) was established.52 Historians debate the initial meeting of the
Communist Party and claim it was held on 10 October and not 13 October as the early date is
regarded as the “Party Foundation Day” in the DPRK.53 Nevertheless, although technically
under the control of the Seoul-based Communist Party, the North Korean Bureau had little
contact with Seoul and instead worked closely with the Soviet Union.54 The first chairperson
of the Party was Kim Yong-bom (dates unknown), who had been sent to Korea by the
Communist International (also known as the Third International or Comintern, 1919–1943) in
the 1930s to conduct underground activities.55
In December 1945, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the US and United
Kingdom (UK) met in Moscow where they agreed to a joint trusteeship of Korea for five
years. Nationalists across Korea staged rallies against the decision. At the same time, Kim Il
Sung, who had been a member of the North Korean Bureau, replaced Kim Yong-bom as
chairperson. North Korean historians seek to downplay the roles of the early communist
leaders other than Kim Il Sung and his family members and dispute Kim Yong-bom’s
involvement in the Party. Instead, it is claimed, Kim Il Sung was promoted to the position of
the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Korea at the same time it was established in
October 1945.56
In spring 1946, the Communist Party of Korea was renamed the Communist Party of
North Korea.57 By July 1946, the Party merged with the New People’s Party, a party
composed mostly of Korean Communists who had been exiled to China during the
occupation of Korea.58 On 28 July 1946, a special commission between the two parties
ratified the merger, and on 29 July 1946, the merger became official.59 One month later, from
28 to 30 August 1946, the new party held a founding conference and established the
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Workers’ Party of North Korea (WPNK).60 At the conference, Kim Tu-bong (1889–1958)
(the leader of the New People’s Party) was elected the first Chairperson of the WPNK, while
Kim Il Sung was appointed Deputy Chairperson.61 Despite his formal downgrading in the
party hierarchy, Kim Il Sung remained the party’s unofficial leader.62 Official North Korean
documents deny the position held by Kim Tu-bong and instead insist that Kim Il Sung was
the first Chairperson of the WPNK.63 It is said that under the guidance of Kim Il Sung, the
Party carried out reform in all aspects of Korean society in the aim of building a socialist
state. This included developing laws on agrarian reform, on nationalisation of industries,
transport, communications, and banks, reform on labour, and on gender equality. At the same
time, various steps were taken to reform the judicial and educational systems and cultural
affairs. These democratic reforms and the involvement of Kim Il Sung in the process of state
reform as presented by historians other than North Koreans will be discussed in chapter 3.
On 17 September 1947, the USA brought the issue of governance on the Korean
peninsula before the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet Union opposed the
United Nations’ (UN) involvement in any issue on the peninsula because Koreans had not
been asked to participate. On 14 November 1947, the UN passed Resolution 112 (II),
officially establishing the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to
supervise government elections in both North and South Korea, with a view to developing a
single national government.64 The resolution also aimed to assist in the withdrawal of the
occupying forces, and guide the new political entity of Korea to full independence. The
commission soon found that the communist administration in the north would not allow it to
operate to its full potential in the northern region. The Soviet Union argued that UNTCOK
should be boycotted and any election non-binding. As UNTCOK could not carry out its
mandate in the north, it subsequently recommended that elections be held in the south and
that the winner be recognised as the sole legitimate Korean government.
On 10 May 1948, a general election was held in South Korea and Syngman Rhee
(1875–1965) was elected President of the ROK.65 Both the UN and the US supported his
presidential candidacy. The report of UNTCOK, approved by a United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 195 (III) on 12 December 1948, stated that a lawful election
60
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had been held only in the south of the country.66 The same resolution also created the United
Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to replace UNTCOK. UNCOK was established to
help Korea move towards unification, as well as to observe the activities of military forces on
the peninsula. UNCOK was able to assist in the departure of the occupying forces, but had
little success when it came to furthering Korean unification and, indeed, on 25 August 1948
elections were held in the north electing deputies to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA).
North Korean historians state that in the north 99.97 per cent of voters took part in the
election and that in the south 77.52 per cent of the electorate participated. 67 As a result, 572
candidates were said to be elected to the SPA. The first session of the SPA was then held in
Pyongyang on 9 September 1948, which announced to the world the foundation of the DPRK
and the election of Kim Il Sung as the Premier of the Cabinet and the head of the new state in
what was described as an uncontested election.68 Since the election of Kim Il Sung to his
position of political power, political opposition to the government has not been permitted,
and anyone expressing opinions contrary to the state risks punishment and imprisonment.69
Nine months after the first election was held in the DPRK, the ruling party, the
Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) was established on 30 June 1949. At the time, the Workers’
Parties of North and South Korea merged to create one Party and Kim Il Sung was promoted
to the position of General Secretary (Party Chair). Knowing that he had the support of the
WPK and the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung removed people who did not support his political
position.70 From this time, the Soviet Union withdrew its administration and military forces
from the DPRK.

The Korean War (1950–1953)
Between 1945 and 1948, the 38th parallel turned into a heavily guarded border, while both
sides of the divided peninsula contemplated the use of military force to achieve
reunification.71 During 1949, the war of words between the two Koreas escalated, and
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infiltration and clashes along the border increased. As a result the UN changed UNCOK’s
mandate via Resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949, adding the task of observing and
reporting on any developments “which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in
Korea”.72 In March 1950, UNCOK requested additional military observers to monitor the
situation on the peninsula. In mid-1950, tensions along the Korean border reached breaking
point. In the early hours of 25 June 1950, the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel
and invaded South Korea. North Korean historians assert, though, that it was the USA’s
armed invasion of the DPRK that initiated the war.73 On the same day that the north invaded
the south, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met to discuss the situation and
adopted Resolution 82.74 The resolution noted the DPRK’s attack on South Korea and called
upon the immediate withdrawal of North Korean troops.
The Soviet delegation to the UNSC did not attend the meeting as they were
boycotting the UN for recognising Chiang Kai-shek’s (1887–1975) government in Taiwan as
the official government for China whilst ignoring Mao Zedong’s (1893–1976) communist
regime in Beijing. Therefore, the expected use of the veto by the USSR did not occur. At the
meeting, the USA claimed that the DPRK had broken world peace by attacking South Korea.
America called on the DPRK to withdraw to the 38th parallel and nine out of the eleven
countries in the UNSC supported this view.75 Two days later on 27 June 1950, the USA
called on the UN to use force to get the DPRK out of South Korea as the North Korean
government had ignored the Security Council’s resolution of 25 June. The resolution was
voted on, but again the Soviet Union did not use its veto as it was still boycotting the UN, and
Yugoslavia abstained. From this meeting Resolution 83 was adopted, recommending that
member states of the UN assist the ROK to “repel the armed attack and restore international
peace and security in the area”.76
Once member states voted for the UN to intervene in Korea, the UN had to formulate
its plan. Sixteen UN member states provided troops under a UN Joint Command, which
would fight alongside the South Korean Army.77 The Joint Command was dominated by the
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USA under the command of General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964).78 On 15 September
1950, UN troops landed at Inchon, South Korea. The UN effectively cut the North Korean
army in half and pushed them out of South Korea. Under the leadership of General
MacArthur, Allied troops then advanced into the DPRK, despite warnings from the DPRK’s
ally, China. This resulted in a Chinese attack on UN troops and between November 1950 and
January 1951, the Chinese managed to push back the UN force. After a clash with the then
US President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972), General MacArthur was sacked and the war
degenerated into a stalemate with neither the UN nor the Chinese managing to gain the upper
hand. While not directly committing forces to the conflict, the Soviet Union provided
material aid to both the North Korean and Chinese armies.
Despite the outbreak of fighting, UNCOK remained in existence and its task
continued to be to submit reports to the UN, observe the mandate of North Korea’s
withdrawal from the south, and to keep the UNSC informed of the progress of its resolution.
UNCOK was officially terminated on 7 October 1950 when the UNGA created the United
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) under
Resolution 376(V).79 UNCURK consisted of representatives from Australia, Chile,
Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey and assumed the functions of
UNCOK.
On 27 July 1953, the fighting finally ended on the Korean peninsula, when a ceasefire
was agreed upon between the USA, North Korea and China at Panmunjom (Gyeonggi
Province, ROK), which has continued to this day. The Korean Armistice Agreement was
signed by the then US Army Lieutenant General William Harrison Junior (1895–1987),
representing the UN Command, North Korean General Nam Il (1915–1976), representing the
North Korean People’s Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. The document was
designed to “insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea
until a final peaceful settlement is achieved”.80 The Armistice agreed on the permanent
establishment of a three-mile wide buffer zone, known as the Demilitarised Zone (or DMZ),
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between the two countries;81 put into force a cease-fire, and finalised the repatriation of
prisoners of war. No final peaceful settlement has ever been achieved to this day on the
Korean peninsula.82
In the DPRK, the Korean War is far from forgotten and stories of war sacrifices were
used to bolster the narrative of Kim Il Sung’s “forging of the nation”.83 The authorised
history of North Korea remains that the Fatherland Liberation War was started by the USA,
and that Kim Il Sung not only defended the nation but wrought devastation on the American
military.84 This rhetoric has continued to date. For example, food aid from the USA provided
during the famine of the 1990s was reportedly explained to the population as war reparations.
In both North and South Korea, there remains fear of invasion and infiltration. In the DPRK,
this fear has been instrumental in maintaining a state of emergency invoked to justify harsh
governmental rule and its accompanying human rights violations.85 In this context, perceived
political dissidents have been branded as spies in the service of foreign powers and shortages
in food and other essential means of survival have been blamed on a hostile outside world.
Nevertheless, with the end of the Korean War in 1953, both the North and South Korean
governments were left to rebuild. In South Korea the state was supported by the USA, while
the rebuilding of the DPRK was possible due to the extensive financial and agricultural
assistance of the Chinese and Soviet governments over several years.86

Consolidation of Power by Kim Il Sung
While Confucian principles have remained enmeshed in Korean culture, in the North they
were in many ways instrumental to Kim Il Sung’s effort to consolidate his authority and that
of the WPK under his control.87 The relationship between sovereign and subject that is
expressed as a mutually binding one under Confucian principles has been stretched to one of
absolute obedience to the North Korean leader. Within the North Korean context, this
principle is articulated in the Suryong (Supreme Leader) system established by Kim Il Sung
81
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and carried on by his son Kim Jong Il (1941–2011) and grandson Kim Jong Un (1983–).88
The Suryong system positioned Kim Il Sung and his heir apparent as unchallenged rulers due
to their proclaimed wisdom and benevolence under which the general population would live
in a prosperous and righteous society.
In 1953, whilst rebuilding the DPRK after the Korean War, Kim Il Sung sought to
consolidate further his political power by eliminating anyone perceived to be a threat to his
position.89 Those perceived as threats were imprisoned or exiled to remote agricultural and
mining villages. Up until this point, North Korean politics had been represented by four
factions: the Yan’an faction made up of returnees from China, the Soviet Koreans, native
Korean communists, and Kim Il Sung’s own loyal followers who had fought against Japan in
the 1930s and 1940s. Kim Il Sung and his followers had the advantage of appearing as
national heroes due to their resistance against the Japanese and there was no question about
their patriotism. By contrast, the Yan’an and Soviet Korean groups tended to appear as the
representatives of other nations.90 South Korean communist sympathisers who had defected
to the North were also accused of espionage and other crimes, and subsequently killed.
During a visit to Moscow in 1955, Kim Il Sung was criticised by the Soviet Union for
practising a Stalinist style cult of personality. On 29 May 1956, at meetings held between
Soviet officials and the North Korean ambassador to the Soviet Union, Li Sangjo (dates
unknown), the outspoken North Korean representative, encouraged the Soviet Leader Nikita
Khrushchev (1894–1971) to criticise Kim Il Sung during their upcoming visit to Moscow.91
Previously, on 25 February 1956 Khrushchev had denounced Joseph Stalin and the “Stalin
cult” in a speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 92 The
speech sent shock waves through communist countries, such as the DPRK, Albania, and
China. In the North Korean context, Li Sangjo criticised Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality,
the post-war reliance on heavy industry, and the party’s ideological work.93 He also charged
Kim Il Sung with rewriting history to appear as if his guerrilla faction had single-handedly
liberated the Korean peninsula from the Japanese, completely ignoring the assistance of the
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Chinese Communist Party.94 While Kim Il Sung was visiting Moscow to personally meet
with Khrushchev in June 1956, the Soviets recommended that Kim Il Sung discard the
personality cult, adhere to the ideas of collective leadership, remove falsified history accounts
from textbooks, and work towards improving the living standards of the Korean people,
which remained poor and below pre-war standards.
During Kim Il Sung’s visit to Moscow a group of his opponents tried to seize control
of government in the DPRK.95 They denounced Kim Il Sung as a tyrant who practised
arbitrary, one-man rule and criticised his Stalinist rule. When Kim Il Sung hastily returned
home, the brief attempt at political liberalisation of the DPRK ended when General O Chin-u
(1917–1995) dispatched troops to the streets of Pyongyang to prevent any further protests in
favour of reform.96 A series of purges followed from 1956 to 1958, and by 1961 the last
remaining opposition to Kim Il Sung had disappeared.97 In order to sustain the large-scale
purges of the late 1950s, a system of secret political prison camps was set up and later
expanded.98
With the aftermath of the failed 1956 coup and the continued presence of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army in the DPRK, there was a growing nationalistic mood in
Pyongyang. Relations with China were strained because of the continued presence of the
Chinese military following the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. 99 The army increasingly
came to be seen as occupation forces but by 1958 the last of the Chinese forces had
withdrawn from the country. Aside from the presence of Chinese troops in the DPRK, the
leadership in Beijing was nearly as unenthusiastic about Kim Il Sung as the Soviets. The
former Chinese leader Mao Zedong criticised Kim Il Sung for having started the whole
“idiotic war”, referring to the Korean War, and for being an incompetent military commander
who should have been removed from power.100 In the end, however, Kim Il Sung remained in
power partly because the Soviets turned their attention to the Hungarian Uprising (23
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October–10 November 1956) and because both the Soviet Union and Chinese governments
were unable to stop the inevitable purge of Kim Il Sung’s opponents.101 From this time,
relations with both the Soviet Union and China deteriorated. In the case of the Soviet Union
this was because of the elimination of the pro-Soviet Koreans and in China’s case because of
the regime’s refusal to acknowledge Chinese assistance in either the liberation of Korea from
Japan or the Korean War.102
The gradual rift between China and the USSR that developed in the early 1960s
caused the DPRK to pursue a delicate balancing act between the two countries but by 1963
this balance clearly tipped towards Beijing.103 The North Korean government joined the
Chinese in criticising Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Joseph Stalin and for being too
soft on the USA.104 It was said that a “complete agreement of positions” was reached between
the DPRK and China on all major issues.105 Perceived racial, cultural, and historical ties also
pulled the DPRK closer to China. However, Kim Il Sung eventually decided that he was
moving too far towards the Chinese government. China was comparatively unindustrialised,
and could not provide the technical and military assistance Pyongyang sought. Kim Il Sung
was also eager to promote his own leadership in the Third World independent of the Chinese
and the Soviets.106
The fall of Khrushchev from power in 1964 proved advantageous for the DPRK as it
allowed the North Korean government to pull away from Chinese dominance. 107 While
Khrushchev had maintained personal control over Soviet foreign policy the new Soviet
leadership of Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) and Alexei Kosygin (1904–1980) had little
experience and knowledge of international affairs. It was in this situation that Kim Il Sung
easily convinced them to supply greater financial assistance in several economic ventures, all
101
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of which the new leadership in Moscow readily agreed to despite their scepticism over Kim Il
Sung’s domestic and foreign policies.108 The Soviet Union believed it to be their duty as a
fraternal socialist state to keep the DPRK out of the reach of China. In this sense, the Soviet
Union could feel quite satisfied at the DPRK’s divorce from China after 1964 as well as Kim
Il Sung’s condemnation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1969).109 Kim Il Sung,
though, did not want to become a Soviet puppet any more than he wanted to become a
Chinese puppet and so he hurried to restore ties with Beijing as soon as the chaos of the
Cultural Revolution subsided.110 By 1970, most of the instability created by the Cultural
Revolution had passed and relations with China returned to normal. At the same time, the
Soviets were again criticised by both Chinese and North Korean officials for being too soft
on the USA.
Meanwhile, the Korean peninsula remained divided and relations with South Korea
and the USA bitterly hostile. When the US government became engaged in the Vietnam War
(1956–1975), Kim Il Sung saw an opportunity.111 Inspired by the actions of the Communist
Vietnamese, he began employing his own guerrilla squads to infiltrate the ROK, spread
propaganda, and commit sabotage. North Korean agents went south between 1966 and 1969,
creating disruption, but ultimately failing to win over the South Korean population.112
In July 1972, the first formal summit meeting between Pyongyang and Seoul was held
but cautious talks did not lead to better relations between the two Koreas.113 With the fall of
South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese on 30 April 1975, Kim Il Sung began to feel that the
USA had shown its weakness and that reunification of Korea under his regime was finally
possible. He visited Beijing in May 1975 in the hope of gaining political and military support
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for his plan to invade South Korea again, but China refused.114 Despite public proclamations
of support, Chinese leaders privately told Kim Il Sung that China would be unable to assist
the DPRK this time because of the lingering after-effects of the Cultural Revolution
throughout China, and also because China had recently decided to restore diplomatic
relations with the USA.115 Relations between the DPRK and China remained on an even
course after the death of Mao Zedong on 9 September 1976, and the North Korean
government continued its usual balancing act between the Soviet Union and China.
Over the coming years Kim Il Sung reduced contact with the Soviet Union and East
European socialist states and economic assistance from these countries, which had been
substantial, began to dwindle.116 At the same time, Kim Il Sung expanded his cult of
personality and set out a policy of self-reliance and extreme nationalism known as Juche.

The Juche Ideology
Initially, North Korea adopted Marxist-Leninist principles in the name of socialism and
liberating the oppressed Korean people from Japanese colonial rule. Between the 1950s and
1970s, though, Kim Il Sung and party theorist Hwang Jang-yop (1923–2010) elaborated the
Juche idea into a set of principles.117 The first known reference to Juche was in a speech by
Kim Il Sung on 28 December 1955, entitled “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and
Establishing Juche in Ideological Work” (see Appendix 5).118 In the speech, Kim Il Sung
sought to develop his own version of Marxism-Leninism into a North Korean creed.119 The
speech focused on the importance of education and learning Korean history.

To make revolution in Korea we must know Korean history and
geography as well as the customs of the Korean people. Only then is
it possible to educate our people in a way that suits them and to
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inspire in them an ardent love for their native place and their
motherland.120

It was believed that educating the working people in the North Korean version of the history
of Korea would “stimulate their national pride and rouse the broad masses to revolutionary
struggle”. Kim stressed significant past events and how certain outcomes could have been
prevented in Korean history such as the occupation of the country by Japan.
The speech also attempted to justify Kim Il Sung’s purge of political opponents,
similar to the earlier Yan’an Rectification Movement in China (1942–1944).121 The Yan’an
Rectification Movement was the first ideological mass movement initiated by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and took place at the communist base of Yan’an, a remote area in
northern Shaanxi Province. More than 10,000 Chinese were killed during the restructuring
process, as the CCP made efforts to attack intellectuals and replace the culture of the May
Fourth Movement (4 May 1919) with that of Communist culture.122 In the DPRK, from the
mid-1950s, as Kim Il Sung steered the country away from the influence of the Soviet Union,
his decision was hastened by news of de-Stalinisation in Moscow, as discussed above.123 Kim
Il Sung saw the new Soviet policies as potentially threatening to his own personal power. It is
also quite likely that he and the people around him felt a genuine ideological contempt for
Khrushchev-style socialism, which emphasised individual well-being and material
prosperity.124 In this situation, from 1956 to 1959, Kim Il Sung purged the local pro-Soviet
officials. Many of these officials had taken part in the unsuccessful 1956 coup.125
Well into the early 1960s, the political speeches and writings of Kim Il Sung were
filled with the terminology of Marxism-Leninism but as his own interpretation of socialism
(the Juche idea) evolved, references to the past ideological system declined. The principles of
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Juche are quite different to Marx’s socialist ideas. Marx argued for urban workers to unite in
a global struggle against capitalist exploitation, overthrow landowners, and launch the
socialist phase of history.126 Marx envisioned the eventual weakening of the state and the
dissolution of all social and economic classes and predicted that humanity would achieve an
egalitarian utopia without government or social and economic distinctions.127 In contrast,
Kim Il Sung saw the state as an all-encompassing and benevolent defender of nationalism,
and positioned himself as the national leader of the masses. These principles turn Kim Il Sung
into an absolutist, supreme leader, while the working class are not to think for themselves, but
instead to think through him.128 Kim Il Sung is positioned at the top of the working class,
meaning that he is their only legitimate representative and the safest reference. 129 Class
struggle in the DPRK context can only be realised therefore through Kim Il Sung and
difficult tasks and revolutionary changes can only be introduced through and by Kim Il Sung
himself.130 Consequently, Kim Il Sung is the leading force of the working class and is
represented as a flawless human being, who never commits mistakes, is always benevolent,
and always rules for the masses.131
On 14 April 1965, Kim Il Sung outlined the three fundamental principles of the Juche
idea in his speech “On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution” at the
Academy of Social Sciences of Indonesia.132 The three principles included: “political
independence”, “economic self-sustenance” and “self-reliance in defence”. “Political
independence” refers to the society’s sacred right to assert its sovereignty to protect itself
from alleged imperialist exploitation and ideological suppression.133 There is no room for
individual independence or freedom, as individuals are required to assimilate fully into
society’s collective whole and to submit to the common good. “Economic self-sustenance”
was proclaimed by Kim Il Sung when the nation’s grain production was still yielding
surpluses, exports of minerals were flowing steadily to the Communist bloc and heavy
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industry was turning the North Korean military into a highly mechanised and mobile force. 134
An independent North Korean economy was to distinguish itself from a capitalist economy
by aiming to meet the demands of the country and by generating personal profit. 135 Heavy
industry was to be the cornerstone of the economy while light industry and agriculture were
less important because they did not contribute directly to the production of arms and
ammunitions.136 “Self-reliance in defence”, is a fundamental principle of an independent
state, while imperialism is its key villain.137 The best defence against the imperialist war of
aggression is the perpetual preparedness to counter its violence with violence. In this context,
the entire North Korean population was mobilised to support the nation’s defence. From this
time, the Songun or “military first” era began when a young Kim Jong Il, together with his
father Kim Il Sung, visited the 105th Guards Armoured Division Headquarters in
Pyongyang.138
For the Juche principles to function uncontested, a unitary ideological system had to
be in place.139 In 1970, Kim Jong Il organised the Fifth Party Congress of the KWP, which
proclaimed Juche as the monolithic ideology of the DPRK and further enhanced his father’s
cult of personality, thereby setting in motion the process for his own succession. The “Ten
Principles for a Monolithic Ideological System” (see Appendix 6) set out ten principles and
65 clauses which establish standards for governance and guidance for the population’s
behaviour.
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The Monolithic Ideological System emerged in the context of internal policy

debates within the WPK and the external challenges posed by the Sino-Soviet split (1960–
1989).141 Kim Il Sung implemented the system in order to suppress internal dissent and
cement his family’s dominance over the North Korean political system. 142 The Ten Principles
have come to supersede the state Constitution as announcements by the WPK and in practice
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serve as the supreme law of the country.143 The principles must be memorised by every
citizen and they call for absolute loyalty and obedience to the Kim dynasty. 144 The principles
are integral to the political and daily lives of the people and are to be exercised through daily
self-criticism sessions, in work and schools, forming the foundation of the country’s
pervasive personality cult.145
From the 1970s, Juche was transformed into a highly elaborate and structured belief
system based on the semi-deification of Kim Il Sung and his family.146 As the North Korean
government exercised total control over all aspects of society, this was used to perpetuate a
cult of personality surrounding the Kims.147 It was also during this time that Kim Jong Il
mentioned the term “Kimilsungism” and not long after the “Kimilisungismisation of the
Whole Society” campaign was launched.148 This campaign strengthened and legitimised the
position of Kim Jong Il within the WPK.149 According to political analyst Jae-cheon Lim,
“Kimilsungism” refers to the thoughts of Kim Il Sung and is interchangeable with the Juche
idea.150 In 1976, in a speech “On Correctly Understanding the Originality of Kimilsungism”,
Kim Jong Il said that Kimilsungism comprises the “Juche idea and a far-reaching
revolutionary theory and leadership method evolved from this idea”.151 In the past, Kim Il
Sung’s thoughts had been described by the official media as “contemporary MarxismLeninism”, but by calling it “Kimilsungism”, Kim Jong Il was trying to elevate it to the same
level as Maoism, Hoxhaism, and Stalinism.152
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Kim Jong Il argued that Kim Il Sung’s thoughts had evolved, and therefore deserved
their own distinct name.153

Kimilsungism is an original idea that cannot be explained within the
frameworks of Marxism–Leninism. The idea of Juche which
constitutes the quintessence of Kimilsungism is an idea newly
discovered in the history of mankind.154

Kim Jong Il further stated that Marxism–Leninism had become obsolete and needed to be
replaced by Kimilsungism.155

The revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a revolutionary theory,
which has provided solutions to problems arising in the revolutionary
practice in a new age different from the era that gave rise to
Marxism–Leninism. On the basis of Juche (idea), the leader gave a
profound explanation of the theories, strategies and tactics of national
liberation, class emancipation and human liberation in our era. Thus,
it can be said that the revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a
perfect revolutionary theory of Communism in the era of Juche.156
The ideas of Juche and Kimilsungism were, in essence, the “expressions of North Korean
particularism over supposedly more universalistic Marxism–Leninism”.157 In many ways, it
signalled a move from socialism to nationalism.158 This was made clear in the speech of
1982, when the DPRK celebrated Kim Il Sung’s 70th birthday, where love for the nation
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came before love for socialism.159 This particularism gave birth to such concepts as “A theory
of the Korean nation as number one” and “Socialism of Our Style”, discussed below.160
Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality became an important instrument of Kim Jong Il’s
consolidation of his own succession, as his father was the main source of his legitimacy to
rule the nation.161 Kim Jong Il spent twenty years preparing for his succession and was able to
sideline his uncle and win the confidence of his father, particularly through his efforts to
expand the cult of personality of the Kim family.162 In 1980, Kim Jong Il was appointed to
the Presidium of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission.163 At this stage, he was
officially ranked fifth in the North Korean leadership system. At this time, only Kim Il Sung
and Kim Jong Il held positions in all three of the Party’s leadership bodies (the Politburo,
Secretariat and Central Military Commission). While Kim Il Sung’s highly personalised
approach to running the country had involved the Party in decision-making and governance
processes, Kim Jong Il adopted a highly centralised, top-down leadership style that often
relied on informal channels. Kim Jong Il subsequently shifted decision-making on all policies
and personnel appointments from the Politburo to the Party Secretariat Office, his base of
power.164 This move helped to strengthen his support base and his legitimacy to succeed his
father.

The “Socialism of Our Style” Ideology
On 27 December 1990, Kim Jong Il introduced the ideological concept of “Socialism of Our
Style” in his speech “Socialism of Our Country is a Socialism of Our Style as Embodied by
the Juche idea”.165 The speech was delivered to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee
of the KWP. In the speech, Kim Jong Il stated that:
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the experiences of the Soviet Union in socialist construction is, in
every point, the reflection of the then historical conditions and the
concrete situation of the Soviet Union.166
The experiences of the Soviet Union however, can “hardly accord fully with the specific
situation of other countries”.167 Speaking about communist regimes in the Eastern Bloc (but
not the Soviet Union), Kim Jong Il claimed that it was because these countries “transplanted
Soviet-style socialism on their lands” that socialism did not “display its advantages to the
full” and thus led to the failure of the system within their countries.168 These countries had
failed to understand that the Soviet experience was based on specific historical and social
circumstances, which could not be used by other countries aside from the Soviet Union
itself.169 It was within this context that Kim Jong Il explicitly stated that the DPRK survived
because of its own style of socialism.170
Kim Jong Il is said to have stated that North Korea was “once a backward, colonial
semi-feudal society” but when the communists came to power in 1945, the interim
government “could not literally accept the Marxist theory which had been advanced on the
premises of the socio-historical conditions of the developed European capitalist countries or
the Leninist theory”.171 The government, therefore, had to find an ideological solution to the
country’s own socio-historical conditions. Kim Jong Il states that it was immediately after the
liberation of Korea that the interim government started to build a country guided by its own
ideological thought of Juche.172 The situation in the DPRK was seen to be more complex than
that of the Soviet Union as Korea was divided into North and South and the North was in
“direct confrontation with the US imperialists”.173 Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are said to
have addressed these concerns by putting “forward original lines and policies suited to our
people’s aspirations and the specific situation of our country”. 174 By reflecting on the
“people’s desire and demand for independence”, Kim Il Sung is said to have personally
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created the Juche idea, thus providing a new guiding ideology for the DPRK.175 This was to
become the foundation for “Socialism of Our Style”.
In stating that “Socialism of Our Style” was “a man-centered [sic] Socialism”, Kim
Jong Il breaks away from basic Marxist–Leninist thought which argues that material forces
are the driving force of historical progress, not people.176 The DPRK considers human beings
in general as the driving force in history, which is summarised as the “popular masses are
placed in the center of everything, and the leader is the center of the masses”.177 Therefore,
“Socialism of Our Style” was presented as an organic socio-political theory, using the
language of Marxism–Leninism, although no reference is made to Marxist–Leninist thought,
instead containing populist and organic nationalist concepts. Kim Jong Il describes this in his
speech “Socialism of Our Country is a Socialism of Our Style as Embodied by the Juche
idea”.

The political and ideological might of the motive force of revolution
is nothing but the power of single-hearted unity between the leader,
the Party, and the masses. In our socialist society, the leader, the
Party, and the masses throw in their lot with one another, forming a
single socio-political organism. The consolidation of blood relations
between the leader, the Party and the masses is guaranteed by the
single ideology and united leadership.178
Within the socio-political organism, the “monolithic ideology” of Juche is realised based on
the leader’s ideas and the DPRK’s unified leadership, which is ensured by the leader’s
guidance.179 The DPRK has “established the monolithic ideological system firmly through
the Party and society and consolidated and developed it from generation to generation”.180
Kim Jong Il states that the leadership and WPK have been able to achieve unbreakable unity
and cohesion of the Party based on the Juche ideology.
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Conclusion
Kim Il Sung held the position of General Secretary of the WPK until his death in July 1994,
simultaneously holding the office of Prime Minister from 1948 to 1972 and the office of
President from 1972 to 1994. With the death of Kim Il Sung the presidential post was written
out of the 1998 DPRK Constitution, and Kim Il Sung was designated the country’s “Eternal
President” (Preamble). Three years after the death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il assumed
official power in 1998. It is unclear why Kim Jong Il waited to take power after his father’s
death but if he had assumed power hastily, it could have exhibited greed, insecurity in his
legitimacy, and a lack of respect for his (and the nation’s) father.181 To this day, the
sanctification of Kim Il Sung and his family remains a legacy in North Korean society as the
written and spoken words of the Kims are the safest reference point for the people.182 As a
result, the political discourse of the Kims, in particular Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and in
more recent years Kim Jong Un, affect the construction of a wide range of social issues from
the judicial system to the rights of Korean women and gender relations.183
Events in the DPRK during the 1990s, such as the influence of the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1992, the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and the economic and food crisis in
the mid-1990s will be discussed in detail in chapter 6. These events not only influenced the
political dynamics of the country as power was handed from Kim Il Sung to his son Kim
Jong Il, they also influenced the roles of North Korean men and women. In particular, the
economic and food crisis challenged, to some extent, the roles of men and women in the
home and North Korean society.
In the following chapter, I trace the promulgation of North Korean laws between
1945 and 2010 with a specific focus on women’s rights and gender relations. I focus on three
broad periods: the revolutionary period (1945–1950), the Juche period (1951–1990), and the
period 1991–2010, known as “Our Style”. Initially, the key to the government’s promotion of
gender equality was to bring women out of the home and into the labour force. It can be seen
in the North Korean legal system that the government’s policies on women’s rights
progressed as the construction efforts and economic development of the country advanced.
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Although state laws socialised childcare and housework, these laws also assumed that
women’s roles in the home were made up of these activities, as we shall see below.184
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3. North Korea’s Legal System and Gender
Equality (1946–2010)
By the enactment of the Law on Sex Equality, Korean
women came to have equal rights in all areas of political,
economy, culture and social life... Of course, the
enactment of this law does not guarantee women’s
emancipation completely. We have still many things to do
for women’s substantive equal rights.
Kim Il Sung, (date unknown).1

Introduction
In 1946, the Provisional People’s Committee of North Korea (the interim government in the
northern region of Korea) reformed the legal system in the north of Korea under the guidance
of the Soviet Union.2 For the first time in Korean history, the North Korean government
included provisions in state laws that addressed and promoted gender equality. The
Committee institutionalised a series of interconnected laws on labour, the family and
marriage, health care, education, nursing and childrearing.3 It was through these laws that the
government promoted the importance of women exercising equal rights and fundamental
freedoms.4 The North Korean government maintains that Korean men and women are
guaranteed equal rights before the law and that both genders are entitled to equal protection
by the state.5 The role of the government, therefore, is to ensure that women have the
conditions to advance, through legislative, administrative, and other appropriate measures to
1
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provide basic freedoms and rights of citizens in political, economic, social, and cultural life.
The government maintains that it has taken practical legal measures so that all North Koreans
can realise their rights and that as a result “all female citizens find themselves in the position
of masters of the State and society”.6 The government also states that due to state legislation,
gender equality policies and preferential treatment of North Korean women, they now have
“a strong position in society and are contributing vigorously to the social and economic
development of the country”.7
In this chapter, I focus on gender equality provisions in the North Korean legal
system. The chapter is divided broadly into three sections. First, I examine the revolutionary
period (1945–1950), when gender equality was emphasised. It is said that during this time
Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) focused on the “women’s question” by promoting their right to
participate in all aspects of society. Next, I examine the Juche period (1951–1990), and the
government’s focus on women’s roles in the home. I then examine the period from 1991 to
2010 or the “Our Style” period, which includes when the DPRK communicated with the
United Nations (UN). This is also the period of famine and extreme economic problems in
the DPRK. The analysis of North Korean laws and policy statements between 1945 and 2010
reveals the assumptions of the North Korean government concerning the role that men
perform in the home as primary financial providers and women as primary carers. State laws
and policies also ensure that women are able to return to the workforce to fill a labour
shortage. However, this is achieved by the socialisation of household chores, which the North
Korean government assumes are tasks that women perform.

The Revolutionary Period and North Korean Laws (1945–1950)
Shortly after the liberation of Korea in 1945, the Provisional People’s Committee of North
Korea, under the guidance of the Soviet Union officials and military, revoked all existing
laws from the Japanese colonial period.8 Some laws had to be reinstated, though, to maintain
public order until new laws could be promulgated.9 Internationally, during June 1945 the
Charter of the United Nations (UN) was signed at the conclusion of the UN Conference on
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International Organisation. The Charter entered into force on 24 October 1945, after being
ratified by the original five permanent members of the Security Council—the Republic of
China (later replaced by the People’s Republic of China), France, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, the US and a majority of the other signatories. Article 1 of the Charter
protects the rights of men and women by stating: “To achieve international co-operation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Also in 1945, during the Allied
Occupation of Japan, the Japanese electoral law was revised allowing women over the age of
twenty the right to vote. French women were able to vote from 1946.
Within North Korea, the new legal code introduced in 1946 included revised
provisions from the colonial period and a Soviet-based judicial structure. North Korea
followed the Soviet pattern in terms of court structure and the offices of public procurators.10
Soviet advisors to the Provisional People’s Committee also had a role in drafting the 1948
DPRK Constitution.11 Despite the influence of the Soviet Union on the early development of
the North Korean state, the North Korean government did not adhere to the early Soviet idea
of limiting the enjoyment of rights to the proletariat at the expense of the bourgeoisie. 12 Only
those categorised as opponents to North Korea, primarily those who had earlier collaborated
with the Japanese occupying forces, were deprived of rights. 13 The North Korean government
imprisoned or purged those deemed “hostile” to the state. By gathering the support of
underprivileged groups, Kim Il Sung consolidated his power.14 Previously, the Korean
communists who had spent years in China attempting to mobilise resistance groups had also
employed this method as a way to consolidate political power.15
From 1946, the North Korean interim government aimed to improve the lives of
underprivileged groups and mobilise these people into large social organisations in support of
new policies for nation building. Land reform helped to establish support among the poor
10
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peasant majority of society,16 while gender equality reforms established support among
women. The support of these groups, particularly in the early years of the country, was
essential in ensuring the new government’s survival. The Kim Il Sung regime deemed it
necessary to embrace as many people as possible in an effort to make North Korea strong and
resist the threat of foreign intervention. This meant that rights were said to be applicable to
the vast majority of the populace irrespective of factors such as gender and social class. By
gathering many of the underprivileged groups in support of the regime rather than focusing
on the small elite group that held power and composed the party, Kim Il Sung consolidated
his power.17
Welfare rights such as equal access to healthcare, education and land to work were an
important part of the early development of the North Korean legal system. This can be seen
in the promulgation of the Law on Agrarian Reform in North Korea (1946), the Labour Law
for Factory and Office Workers in North Korea (1946), and the Law on the Equality of the
Sexes (1946).18 The importance placed on these rights stems primarily from the practical
realities confronting new socialist regimes such as North Korea. 19 Marx had envisaged the
gradual reduction of any need for rights in his materially abundant post-revolutionary society,
which was to be based on the egalitarian principle of “from each according to his ability, to
each according to his need”, but the reality of post-liberated North Korea was quite
different.20 On coming to power, socialist regimes, including North Korea, are often faced
with conditions of social and economic deprivation, usually in a post-colonial or a war-torn
context and sometimes both.21 Within this context the North Korean government stressed
welfare rights to ensure people were able to work, to foster rapid social and economic
development and to raise the living standards of the people.
Although welfare provisions in state laws are a common feature of socialist states,
North Korean rights thinking also refers to the Confucian idea that the provision of welfare is
the principal obligation of the government.22 The Confucian element in North Korea’s
development and the emphasis on welfare rights is in accordance with the teachings of the
Confucian disciple Mencius (most accepted dates: 372–289BCE), and the notion of
16
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“benevolent government”, which imposed a sacred obligation on the ruler to govern
exclusively in the interests of the populace.23 The legitimacy of the ruler was deemed to be
contingent upon the ability to guarantee the sustenance and livelihood of the people. In the
case of North Korea, the “benevolent leader” (Kim Il Sung) provides rights to those who are
loyal to the state and the Kim family.
The principles of socialism and Confucianism can be seen in the laws promulgated
from 1946, which aimed to protect vulnerable groups such as Korean women, whilst also
encouraging loyalty to the state.

The Twenty-Point Platform (1946)
In March 1946, the interim government drafted the Twenty-Point Platform as a short-term
measure to protect the rights and interests of the North Korean people (see Appendix 7).24
The North Korean historian Baik Bong describes the Platform as a nationalistic document
that was a “brilliant political program of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic
revolution, a thoroughly Juche creative programme”.25 The Platform made a clear delineation
between people who were entitled to rights and the “enemy”, who were not.26 The latter
group were described as “reactionaries”, “fascists” and “anti-democratic forces”, who had
been involved with pro-Japanese elements and had collaborated with the Japanese authorities
during the colonial period.27 The Twenty-Point Platform encompassed a broad range of
human rights, including equal legal rights for all (Article 5), the guarantee of an eight-hour
working day for workers and the guarantee of a standard minimum wage (Article 14), a
compulsory education system (Article 16) and free medical treatment for the poor (Article
20).28 However, the Platform did not directly address the rights of Korean women.
Below I outline three key laws promulgated by the North Korean government in 1946
that addressed the situation of North Koreans, particularly women.

The Law on Agrarian Reform in North Korea (1946)
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On 5 March 1946, as part of the reform process to dismantle the Japanese colonial social
structure, the Law on Agrarian Reform in North Korea was promulgated. Article 1 stated that
all “land previously belonging to Japanese and Korean property owners will be confiscated”
(Article 1) and then redistributed amongst households based upon labour ability and the
number of family members, regardless of gender (Article 15).29 The Law was important for
Korean women who were heads of households, as they would never have previously enjoyed
land ownership under the old patriarchal system. The Law was also a critical part of the
nation-building process as it gave peasants the rights to land.30 With the land reform, the
traditional class structure in Korean society was challenged as the ruling class, made up of
property owners, capitalists and religious institutions, lost all ownership of their land,
livestock and houses without any monetary compensation.31 Disadvantaged peasants were
given their own land to cultivate according to the number of family members and labour
capacity.
Those who had previously owned a large amount of land did not agree with the
government’s decision to confiscate their property and redistribute it based on equality and
not wealth. Therefore, during the land reform there were random acts of violence in
opposition to the government’s decision but nothing like the bloodshed that accompanied the
land reforms in the Soviet Union, China, or the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam).32 In
each of these countries, thousands of people were wrongly accused of being landowners and
were killed by each respective government. In the case of North Korea, the land reform
process was rapid and implemented successfully with little violence.33 Close to 673,000
households of landless peasants, smallholding peasants, agricultural labourers, and relocated
ex-landlords received the newly distributed lands.34 By the end of 1949, the newlyestablished agricultural class represented 74.1 per cent of the entire North Korean
population.35 The Law on Agrarian Reform successfully dismantled the old feudal society in
North Korea and created a new society under the control of the new socialist regime.
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The Labour Law for Factory and Office Workers in North Korea (1946)
Three months after the implementation of the land reform, the Provisional People’s
Committee promulgated the Labour Law for Factory and Office Workers in North Korea
(Labour Law) on 24 June 1946. The Law was adapted from the Soviet Union’s Labour Codes
of 1912 and 1922, as well as the Twenty-Point Platform which had been established just four
months earlier.36 While the Platform listed the tasks needed to end workforce practices from
the colonial period and listed the ways to establish democratic rule for workers,37 the Labour
Law validated the working rights of all North Korean people. Beneficiaries of the law
included labourers and office workers of national organisations, corporations, individual
entrepreneurs, and business institutions.38 The government focused primarily on factory
workers, as there was a sizable urban working class already within the country. 39 The
Japanese colonial government, from the late 1920s and into the 1930s, had concentrated
efforts to develop and expand the industrial base in Korea. This was especially true in the
areas of heavy industry, such as chemical plants, steel mills and arms production. 40 The
Japanese military felt it would be beneficial to have production closer to the source of raw
materials and closer to potential front lines for a future war with China.41 Therefore, the
working class in North Korea had already increased significantly during the industrialisation
of the country in the colonial period.
The Labour Law stipulates that all workers should have an eight-hour working day
(Article 1), but those aged between 14 and 16 years would have a six or seven hour working
day (Articles 2 and 3). No one under the age of 14 years was to work (Article 4). All workers
should receive equal pay for equal work (Article 7). The Law also included for the first time
provisions for pregnant women and working mothers. Article 15 prohibits assigning pregnant
or nursing women overtime or night work, and stipulates transferring a pregnant woman to
easier work with equal pay. Nursing women are also allowed to take baby-feeding breaks
with pay (Article 16). There is also provision for seventy-seven days of maternity leave with
full pay (Article 18). Although these provisions were an advance, the North Korean
government defined the primary role of women as mothers, with no recognition that male
workers may also be fathers. No provisions have been included in the Law to suggest that
men are a part of the childrearing process or need assistance to fulfil their roles in society.
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Further, the Labour Law does not include provisions to protect working women who may not
be mothers. For instance, there is no mention of unfair dismissal on grounds other than being
a mother.

The Law on Equality of the Sexes (1946)
One month after the promulgation of the Labour Law, Kim Il Sung is said to have personally
promulgated the Law on the Equality of the Sexes on 30 July 1946.42 At the time, some
members of the Yan’an group expressed their apprehension towards the institution of gender
equality, as they believed that addressing gender equality was an attack on the deep-seated
patriarchal values in Korean society.43 North Korea claims to be the first country in Asia to
address discrimination against women in its legal system.44 However, provisions were
included in the 1930 Chinese Civil Code by the Nationalist government (1927–1948) during
the Republic of China (1912–1949). The Chinese Civil Code regarded men and women as
individual persons, equal in status, rights and obligations. In particular, daughters obtained
equal rights to inherit their fathers’ property, wives gained mostly equal rights to marry and
divorce and men and women shared nearly equal rights over their children. 45 Nevertheless,
the Chinese Civil Code was hardly adopted or implemented due to the chaotic political
situation and the brief rule of the Nationalist government.46 In the DPRK, similarities in
provisions to ensure gender equality can be seen between the North Korean Law on the
Equality of the Sexes and the earlier 1936 Soviet Constitution, which are discussed below.
The Law on the Equality of the Sexes included provisions on the protection of
women’s welfare rights and rights during marital relationships. Article 1 of the Law was
closely modelled after Article 122 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution which stipulates equal
rights for women in all spheres of economic, social, cultural and political life. The North
Korean Law includes provisions for women to vote and be elected to local and supreme
organs (Article 2), have equal access to labour, pay, social insurance and education (Article
3), and to own or inherit land (Article 8). The law provides equal rights for women to marry
and divorce freely (Article 4 and Article 5); and the legal age for females to marry is set at 17
years and for males 18 years (Article 6). Although the North Korean government officially
42
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recognises divorce in this provision, the state took measures from the mid-1950s to
discourage divorce.47 The government states in its report to the United Nations Committee on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, however, that the
comparatively small number of divorces in the DPRK is not due to any legislation that makes
divorce difficult but because since “olden times, it has been a traditional national custom
peculiar to the Korean people for a married couple to live together until they die”. 48 Divorce
from spouses branded “bad elements” is granted comparatively easily to either gender and, in
fact, is often strongly encouraged by the government.49
According to Jiyoung Song, the main purpose of the Law on the Equality of the Sexes
was to embrace women as former victims of human rights violations experienced under
Japanese colonial rule, in order to mobilise them as a solid labour force for the process of
nation building.50 This can be seen in Article 9 of the Law, which stipulates, “[a]long with the
promulgation of this law the Japanese imperialist laws and regulations relating to the rights of
Korean women shall be nullified”. This can also be seen in Article 7 of the Law, which
protects women against violations such as polygamy, trafficking, concubinage, licensed or
unlicensed prostitution and the Kisaeng system.51 This was a repudiation of the recent
memory of the exploitation of Korean women by the Japanese colonists in the licensed
prostitution system and in the enforced prostitution/military sexual slavery system of the
Second World War (1939–1945).52 As we shall see below, the North Korean government
stated in 2002 that the “traffic in women and prostitution [of women] are regarded as the
most shameful crime” and claimed that there has been no reported case for many years.53
Instead, the government points to the colonial period, stating, “[t]here used to be the systems
of licensed or unlicensed prostitution, Kisaeng, and traffic in women in the days of the
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Japanese colonial rule”.54 The government insists that immediately after the liberation of
Korea in 1945, the strict legal prohibition against the prostitution and trafficking of women
was recognised in Article 7 of the Law on the Equality of the Sexes.55
Even though the Law on Equality of the Sexes was the first legal document in Korea
to outline the rights of women to participate in society, to vote, and receive equal pay, social
insurance, and education, the North Korean government did not address many issues faced by
Korean women. Issues not addressed include discrimination against Korean women in society
and the continual description of their roles as mothers without the equal responsibility of men
within the home to care for children. It can be said, therefore, that this law was intended to be
an initial foundation for future laws. However, it would be another sixty-four years before the
North Korean legal system once again addressed the rights of women in the Women’s Rights
Act (2010), discussed below.

The DPRK Constitution (1948)
In April 1947, the first Constitution of North Korea was drafted at the Second Party Congress
of the Democratic Party.56 The structure of the proposed Constitution was based on the
Twenty-Point Party Platform (see Appendix 7).57 The draft Constitution was then presented
at a Provisional People’s meeting on 6 February 1947. It was not immediately instituted as
the draft needed to be approved by the Soviet Union, which was overseeing the initial nation
building stage. Several recommendations were made before the final approval of the
Constitution at the first Supreme People’s Assembly on 8 September 1948.58 Internationally,
on 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the
United Nations General Assembly. For the first time, fundamental human rights were
universally affirmed. Under Article 2 of the Declaration everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth, without distinction of any kind according to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status. Under the Declaration the right of women to marry freely (Article 16), to own
property (Article 17), and the right to participate in government was also protected. Some of
these provisions had been included in the Law on the Equality of the Sexes, as noted above.
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Within the DPRK, the procedure employed to establish the 1948 Constitution closely
followed the Soviet model.59 For example, Article 31 of the 1948 North Korean Constitution
was closely modelled after Article 123 of the 1936 USSR Constitution, which stipulates
“[e]quality of rights of citizens of the USSR irrespective of their nationality or race in all
spheres of economic state, cultural, social and political life is an indefensible law”. Article 31
of the 1948 DPRK Constitution stipulates, “The national minorities who have the citizenship
of the DPRK are guaranteed equal rights with Korean citizens”. The protection of ethnic
minority rights though, was less of a social issue in the relatively homogeneous North Korea.
As a result, the North Korean government deleted Article 31 from its 1972 Constitution.60
North Korea’s first Constitution was not replaced until 1972.61
In the first Constitution, the list of rights was extremely broad-ranging and many were
lifted directly from the Ten-Point Programme of the Association for the Restoration of the
Fatherland (see Appendix 3) and the Twenty-Point Platform.62 Both the Programme and
Platform ensured the social and political rights of all people with particular focus on women
and vulnerable groups. The 1948 DPRK Constitution also reaffirmed provisions in existing
laws, which guaranteed the welfare rights of people regardless of gender. For example,
Article 22 stipulates that women “in the DPRK are accorded equal rights with men in all
spheres of government, political, economic, social, and cultural activity” (Article 22). There
are also provisions on the advancement of women’s access to education, training, and
employment (Article 15 and Article 18), which would also be elaborated upon in laws and
regulations in the following years.63 The Constitution also provided what it calls special
protection to mothers and children (Article 22), and marriage and the family (Article 23).64
This “protection” of the family also features in the 1972 DPRK Constitution and each of the
1992 and 1998 amended Constitutions stipulating, “[m]arriage and the family shall be
protected by the State”. Although the 1948 DPRK Constitution confirmed provisions for
women included in previous laws such as equal rights with men in all spheres of political,
economic, social and cultural activity, the North Korean government also awarded “special
protection” to mothers and children. The government reinforced gender stereotypes of the
division of labour in the home with provisions for women based on their roles as mothers.
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Internationally, two years after the DPRK promulgated the state’s first Constitution,
the new Communist government of the People’s Republic of China promulgated the New
Marriage Law on 1 May 1950. The Chinese leader Mao Zedong is said to have personally
established this law.65 The New Marriage Law challenged the patriarchal marriage traditions
of arranged or forced marriage and concubine. Before the promulgation of this Law Chinese
women could not seek a divorce.66 The New Marriage Law became an essential part of the
Chinese land reform as women in rural communities stopped being sold to land owners. By
this time the DPRK had already addressed the rights of women in marriage in the 1946 Law
of Equality of the Sexes. It would be several years later in 1990 though, that the North
Korean government would return to address in detail women’s rights within marriage in the
Family Law, which is discussed below.
In the following section, I will examine the influence of the Juche ideology and the
legal protection of gender equality in the DPRK between 1951 and 1990.

The Juche Ideology and North Korean Laws (1951–1990)
While Marxism-Leninism is still important in the DPRK, Juche has superseded this ideology
as the official state ideology, as we have seen above.67 Kim Il Sung is said to have
progressively developed Juche into a nationalist ideology, resting on three pillars of political
sovereignty, an independent economy and military self-defence.68 Juche is not limited to the
spheres of politics, economics or defence, though, as the ideology permeates all aspects of
North Korean society, including the state’s development of gender equality laws. As part of
the North Korean government’s aim to develop an independent economy, it emphasised the
need for women to join the labour force. It became clear that the government was less
interested in women’s rights than ensuring that there was a large enough labour force to build
the country. The government insisted that by promulgating laws to protect women’s rights
and encouraging them to join the labour force as paid workers the groundwork for women’s
liberation was achieved. It was within this context that the government socialised childrearing
and the pre-packaging of food to encourage more women to leave the home to participate in
the official economy. Laws such as the Law on Nursing and Upbringing of Children (1976)
and the Family Law (1990) ensured working mothers better working conditions. However,
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there was an assumption that all North Korean women were mothers or would be in the
future. North Korean laws during this time focused on the role of women as the primary
carers and never considered that men could share household chores.69 As a result, women
continued to suffer from the double burden of being responsible for the majority of household
chores while being directed to relatively low status and low paying occupations in the
workforce, which will be discussed further in chapter 5.70

The DPRK Constitution (1972)
The North Korean government adopted the amended Constitution at the Fifth Session of the
Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) on 27 December 1972. This action brought the old
Constitution of 1948 into line with the political system and state ideology of Juche. Although
Marxist-Leninism had been the primary doctrine for the early formation of the North Korean
state and legal system, in 1972 the Juche philosophy officially replaced this ideology in the
Constitution.71 The later Constitution confirmed provisions in the 1948 Constitution, such as
eight-hour work days (Article 30), free education and training for all North Koreans (Article
45 to Article 47), and free medical services (Article 56). The amended Constitution also
emphasised the mobilisation of female workers by protecting the rights of working mothers. 72
Article 77 stipulates special protection of mothers and children by providing maternity leave,
reduced working hours for mothers with many children, providing a wide network of
maternity hospitals, crèches and kindergartens, and other measures. Article 49 of the 1972
DPRK Constitution stipulates that the state “shall maintain all children of preschool age in
crèches and kindergartens at State and public expense”. This provides women with facilities
to care for their children while they are working in the official economy. The North Korean
government has continued to define the role of women as mothers and then by their
contribution to society. These provisions are not equally provided to men, who may also be
working parents. Instead, the government’s gendered lens has tied women to gendered
stereotypes.

The Law on the Nursing and Upbringing of Children (1976)
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On 29 April 1976, the North Korean government promulgated the Law on the Nursing and
Upbringing of Children.73 The Law provides for all North Korean children to be cared for in
nurseries and kindergartens at state and public expense (Article 2); or parents are free to raise
their children in their homes, instead of sending them to nurseries (Article 3). Childcare is
provided for children from the ages of 3 months to 4 years in nurseries and from 5 years to 7
years in kindergartens. The Law includes provisions to maintain a high standard of feeding
and encourage the physical development of children, as well as assuring hygiene and
epidemic prevention in childcare facilities (Article 6, Article 7 and Article 28). Operationally,
social cooperative organisations are obliged to maintain the material conditions of nurseries
and kindergartens at levels determined by the government (Article 12 and Article 15). The
Law also makes a commitment to the care of women during pregnancy and after childbirth by
providing maternity benefits (Article 20). The nurseries and kindergartens are under the
direct control of the central education and public health organs and the local power organs
(Article 47). Each city (or district) or county also has a food-processing factory or workshop
to help lift the burden of housework (Articles 54 to Article 56). The Law on Rearing and
Education of Children includes new provisions such as the right for working mothers to
access nurseries and kindergartens at state expense, once again defining women as mothers.
The Law confirms the government’s gendered view that the home is a woman’s primary
workplace and thus provides provisions to ensure they are able to join the labour force. The
law does not address the responsibility of men in the home but instead reinforces the sexual
division of labour.

The Family Law (1990)
The North Korean government promulgated the Family Law on 24 October 1990. This
addresses several areas of men and women’s lives from marriage and divorce to childrearing
and parental responsibility. The Law stipulates that the “State shall provide material
conditions for mothers to bring up and educate children soundly” (Article 6). This Article
shows that childrearing responsibilities rest firmly on the shoulders of women and that the
government does not recognise the equal responsibility of men to care for their children.
Articles 27 and Article 28 stipulate that both parents “have the same obligation to educate
and the daily care of health and growth of their children”, but the Law does not elaborate or
provide material conditions for fathers “to bring up and educate children soundly” as seen in
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Article 6 which refers only to women. Due to this lack of explanation on the role of fathers, it
could be said that the government views the role of men in the home as less important than
that of women. By enforcing this gendered view in state laws it only perpetuates the problem
of gender stereotyping in the DPRK, as the gendered division of labour in the home is left
untouched.
Article 18 of the Family Law stipulates that a husband and wife “shall have equal
rights within the family”.74 Further, “marriage is recognised legally and protected by the State
only after it is properly registered at a registry office and married life is forbidden in cases
where the marriage is not registered” (Article 11). The government awards special protection
to couples who marry, as the family unit is considered central in North Korean society,
reflecting the continued influence of Confucianism.75 From as early as 1948 the DPRK
Constitution stipulated that “marriage and the family are under the protection of the state”
(Article 23). The Article does not provide details on what is meant by equal rights within the
family. It could be assumed though, that the government prefers couples to be married and
care for each other, as this would help eliminate state responsibility for providing food and
facilities to its people. If a married couple wants to divorce in the DPRK, it “may be granted
if a marriage cannot be continued because one party has been guilty of gross infidelity to
conjugal love and trust” (Article 21). Article 22 of the Family Law stipulates that the custody
of children in the case of divorce is “decided according to mutual agreement and in
consideration of the interests of the children”. When no agreement can be reached between
the couple, the matter is settled by the court (Article 22). No reference is made in the Article
to who has preferential custodial rights when a couple divorces, suggesting that North Korean
men and women have equal rights.
In the following section, I examine the influence of “Our Style” philosophy on the
development of legal protection of gender equality in the DPRK.

The “Our Style” Ideology and North Korean Laws (1991–2010)
From the 1990s, there were significant social changes in the DPRK due to the collapse of
both the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. To add to this instability there were also natural
disasters, which decreased agricultural production and adversely affected the economy and
society. The North Korean government maintains, however, that social benefits such as the
free education system and universal free medical care remained at normal levels during this
74
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time.76 In reality, as the industrial economy began to implode from the withdrawal of
subsidies from the Soviet Union, Russia and then China, and the misguided effort of the
government to pursue a strategy of self-sufficiency,77 a number of North Korean women
stopped going to their official workplaces as they searched for food and money in alternative
places.78 In this context, the government still sees women as primarily responsible for
carrying the burden of family chores and childrearing. Although social changes have
encouraged women to become financially independent, it has also increased their burdens, as
they are now in many cases financially responsible for their families.
In 1995, Kim Jong Il used the phrase “our style of human rights”.79 “Our Style”
focused more on conservative values such as those of the family and the military.80 The
Marxist notion of class rights was de-emphasised and entitlement to rights was now much
more dependent upon an individual’s loyalty to the nation and its leaders.81 While collective
interests remained highly pertinent to North Korean thinking, they were now expressed in
more Juche-specific terms, such as the right to national sovereignty and the right to national
self-determination. A distinct feature of “Our Style” is the emphasis on the protection of the
human rights of people in need, in correlation with the image of a caring, fatherly leader able
to protect and take care of them.82 This idea refers to a particular governing style of Kim Jong
Il as the sole benevolent ruler of the DPRK, acting exclusively to safeguard and protect the
interests of the nation.83 In this situation, only those people who are loyal to the virtuous
leader enjoyed rights. At the same time, rights can be withheld or withdrawn by the North
Korean government from those who are not seen to be loyal to the state and Kim family.84
This reinforces a patriarchal relationship between the Kim dynasty and the North Korean
people.
In the following section, I examine revisions made to the DPRK Constitution in 1992
and 1998.

The DPRK Constitution (1992)
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After the 1972 DPRK Constitution, the SPA adopted an amended Constitution in April 1992.
The revisions aimed to legitimate the achievements and experiences of the country since the
previous Constitution.85 The revisions were also a result of a build-up of external events in
the 1980s, which culminated at the beginning of the 1990s with changes to the geopolitical
world order and the end of the Cold War.86 The Soviet Union and Eastern European states,
which formed the Communist bloc, fell into decline and later collapsed. China also continued
on its path of transformation, incrementally enacting measures in order to adopt a market
system. This new post-Cold War period that began in the 1990s drove the DPRK into
desperation as the country was forced to try to find its own way to survive in a new, radically
altered international environment.87 All of these external events had a huge impact on the
North Korean economy and political survival and the amendments made to the 1992
Constitution. Perhaps the most notable change to the DPRK Constitution was the elimination
of the expression of Marxism-Leninism and its replacement with the terminology of the
Juche ideology. Article 3 of the revised Constitution stipulates that the “DPRK is guided in
its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centred on people, a revolutionary ideology
for achieving the independence of the masses of the people”. Provisions to protect the rights
of women who were mothers and worked in the labour force (Article 49 and Article 77)
continued in this revised version of the Constitution.

The DPRK Constitution (1998)
On 5 September 1998, the SPA again amended the DPRK Constitution. Just as the previous
Constitutions included provisions to protect the rights of the North Korean people, the 1998
Constitution also guaranteed these rights. For example, those who work “are provided with
stable jobs and working conditions” (Article 70) and it stipulates “fixed working hours, the
provision of holidays [and] paid leave” (Article 71). The Constitution states that the
government is to provide “accommodation at health resorts and holiday homes at the State
expense and by a growing number of cultural facilities” (Article 71). All North Koreans are
also guaranteed free medical care under Article 72, which stipulates, “an expanding network
of hospitals, sanatoria and other medical institutions, State social insurance and other social
security systems” (Article 72). Finally, all North Koreans are guaranteed an “advanced
educational system” (Article 73).
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The amended 1998 DPRK Constitution continued to state the principle of special
protection for women. Paragraph 2 of Article 77 stipulates:

The State shall afford special protection to mothers and children by
providing maternity leave, reduced working hours for mothers with
many children, a wide network of maternity hospitals, crèches and
kindergartens, and other measures. The State shall provide all
conditions for women to play a full role in society (1998 DPRK
Constitution).
This provision reinforces the state’s gendered view of women, which has not altered since the
early gender equality laws of the post-revolutionary period. Women have continued to be
defined by the North Korean government as mothers and thus subject to provisions that are
seen to lessen their burdens within the home. Until this time, the North Korean government
has not addressed gender stereotyping in state laws.
Next, I briefly outline the DPRK’s relationship with the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereafter “CEDAW
Committee”), as this relationship has influenced the amendment and promulgation of laws
since 2005. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) (see Appendix 1) will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.

The DPRK and the CEDAW Committee
In February 2001, the DPRK agreed to the guidelines and procedures outlined in CEDAW.88
The timing of the DPRK’s action suggests that it was an outcome of its involvement with the
UN over previous issues such as the famine in the mid-1990s and in response to international
pressure for improvement of the state’s human rights record. An initial report for
consideration to the CEDAW Committee was submitted by the DPRK on 11 September 2002
and the DPRK continued communication with the Committee until 2005.89

The North
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Korean government has offered no reason as to why communication stalled with the
CEDAW Committee. To date the CEDAW Committee continues to request further
information from the DPRK concerning gender equality within the country. The Committee
has also requested that the North Korean government sign the Optional Protocol to CEDAW
but to date the country has neither signed nor ratified the Optional Protocol.90
In the DPRK’s initial report, the government states that “the idea of the inferiority or
the superiority of either of the sexes or the stereotyped roles for men and women have nearly
been eliminated” so “discrimination based on the outmoded customs is no longer a big issue
of social concern”.91 Then again, the North Korean government states that customary
discrimination exists within society and households, as in the following example:

Calling a man the outer householder and a woman the inner
householder in a family, a man becoming the head of a family, the
community employing mostly females in the jobs like restaurant
reception, switchboard operation, typing and the like, regarding a
hard or big work as a man’s job and an easy or sundry task as a
woman’s job.92
Within this context, the North Korean government has tried to “enhance the consciousness of
respecting women among the new generations and to thoroughly prevent the discriminatory
conception and happening occasionally witnessed among the old generation”.93 The DPRK is
said to encourage active education in the idea of respecting and caring for girls and women
from school age and through mass media and the promulgation of the state Constitution,
laws, regulations, and rules.94 However, guaranteeing equal rights in law did not liberate
women from the patriarchal system embedded in North Korean culture, as North Korean
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women continued to be assigned to stereotypical roles in the home and to gendered work in
the labour force.
The CEDAW Committee noted with concern the persistence of customary
assumptions and attitudes in respect to the roles and responsibilities of women and men,
which are primarily discriminatory against women and influence all areas of their lives. 95 In
particular, the Committee is concerned about the perception of women as caregivers and
homemakers and their assignment to areas such as education and employment based on
spheres suitable to their perceived ability. The Committee states that these expectations of
women have serious consequences, preventing North Korean women from accessing rights
and entitlements on an equal basis with North Korean men and creating a dependency on
men, husbands, and family for housing, food entitlements, and other services.96
Communication between the DPRK and CEDAW will be detailed further in chapter 7.
The North Korean government addressed some of the concerns of the CEDAW
Committee in new and amended laws after communication stalled. This is particularly
evident in the Women’s Rights Act promulgated on 22 December 2010 (see Appendix 8).
This was the first law since the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946 to address
discrimination against women in all forms. In the following section, I examine amendments
to the 2009 DPRK Constitution and provisions included in the Women’s Rights Act.

The DPRK Constitution (2009)
The SPA adopted the revised DPRK Constitution on 9 April 2009. To date the content of the
revisions has not been made public by the North Korean government but in late September
2009, Radio Free Asia reported that revisions were made to the 1998 version of the
Constitution.97 The revised Constitution strengthened the legitimacy of Kim Il Sung’s legacy
in the preamble, stating that he was the “great leader and founder of the DPRK and the father
of socialist Korea”. Further, it states that the immortalisation of the “Great Leader” is held in
high esteem by the KWP and the Korean people, as Kim Il Sung will always be known as the
“Eternal President”. The term communism was removed from the revised 2009 Constitution
and replaced with “military-first politics”. During the North Korean food crisis in the mid1990s, “military-first politics” was born from the idea that the human rights of the North
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Korean people were fully protected by the “Great Leader” and party. In return, the people
defend the North Korean leader and country by endless loyalty and filial piety. The role of
the North Korean armed forces under the guidance of “military first politics” is to protect
both the state and the working people. Article 59 of the 2009 amended Constitution states that
the “mission of the armed forces is to carry out the military-first revolutionary line in order to
protect the nerve centre, safeguard the interests of the working people, defend the socialist
system and the country from foreign aggression”.
The 2009 North Korean Constitution also included for the first time the terminology
of human rights. Article 8, paragraph 1 stipulates, “The social system of the DPRK is a mancentred [sic] social system whereby the working popular masses are the masters of
everything, and everything in society serves the working popular masses”. The government
“safeguards” the human rights of the North Korean people under Article 8, paragraph 2 of the
Constitution.

The state shall safeguard the interests of, and respect and protect the
human rights of the working people, including workers, farmers,
soldiers, and working intellectuals, who have been freed from
exploitation and oppression and have become the masters of the state
and society.
The previous version of the Constitution, adopted in 1998, had vowed to “defend and protect
the interests” of the same groups. Under Article 63 of the 2009 Constitution, though, the
rights and responsibilities of citizens are based on the collectivist principle of “One for All,
All for One”. Further, the state guarantees all citizens democratic rights and freedom, and
happy material and cultural lives (Article 64). Article 64 continues that, in the DPRK, “the
rights and freedom of citizens shall be further expanded with the consolidation and
development of the socialist system”. Previously, the protection of human rights in the DPRK
was only mentioned in lower-level laws, such as the Criminal Procedure Law (2006). It could
be assumed that changes made to the state Constitution were a result of the DPRK’s
engagement with the UN and from international pressure. It is unclear, though, to what extent
the UN and international community has influenced amendments to existing laws or the
promulgation of new laws, as the DPRK does not share this information when reporting to
UN bodies.
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As in previous Constitutions, the rights of all North Koreans are provided for in the
revised 2009 version regardless of gender. For example, Article 70 stipulates, “Citizens shall
have the right to labour”, free medical care (Article 72) and an education (Article 73). The
rights of North Korean women were also offered “special protection” by provisions in Article
77 of the 2009 Constitution.

Women shall be entitled to the same social status and rights as men.
The state shall provide special protection to mothers and children by
guaranteeing maternity leave before and after childbirth, reducing
working hours for mothers with many children, and expanding the
network of maternity hospitals, nurseries, and kindergartens, and by
implementing other measures. The state shall provide every possible
condition for women to participate in society.

In this provision though, the North Korean government has addressed gender equality as the
ability of women to leave the home and participate in the labour force. To achieve this aim
the state stipulates the provision of maternity hospitals, nurseries, and kindergartens (Article
77). Again these provisions reinforce the gender stereotype that women are carers in the
home.
The Women’s Rights Act (2010)
In recent years, one of the most important laws to be promulgated was the Women’s Rights
Act on 22 December 2010. The announcement of the Act suggests that the DPRK has
responded to the international attention by organisations like the UN and the CEDAW
Committee, who have focused on its poor human rights record.98 This was the first law since
the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946 to address discrimination against women in all
forms. While the Act reiterates women’s equal right to own property (Article 36), equal rights
to marriage (Article 44 and Article 45) and divorce (Article 47), and the rights of working
mothers (Article 28 to Article 29) it also addresses discrimination against women in other
forms such as domestic violence (Article 46), rape and trafficking (Article 39). However, the
language employed by the North Korean government on the role of women has not changed
significantly, as the government continues to stress the importance of their roles in the home.
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This can be seen in Article 3 of the Women’s Rights Act, which states that women “play an
important role in the welfare of the family and the development of the society”. The wording
of this Article implies that the role of women is first within the family and then in society, as
noted by the non-governmental organisation Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human
Rights (NKHR).99 The language employed by the North Korean government on gender
equality has changed little since its accession to CEDAW in 2001. The fact that it is the
“Women’s Rights Act” rather than, say, the “Gender Equality Act” reveals that the North
Korean government still does not question men’s roles in society or the home.
Although the rights of women in marriage (Article 44) and divorce (Article 42) have
continued to be protected under the Women’s Rights Act what has changed (to some extent)
since the DPRK’s accession to CEDAW is the actual role of men and women within the
home. Since the famine of the 1990s, North Korean women are often absent from their
families, as they are away searching for food, trading in distant places, or peddling goods
across the country.100 This has led to disharmony within marriages and family breakdowns.
The growing financial independence of women has also created conflict between married
couples and women have started to demand more rights within the home.101 In this situation,
some North Korean men have responded with violence. The DPRK has addressed violence
within families for the first time in Article 46 of the Women’s Rights Act, which stipulates
that there must not be any form of domestic violence against women in the family. Although
the Article attempts to act as a preventive measure against domestic violence, it does not
provide any legal protection for victims of spousal violence.102 This is a step forward in the
DPRK’s legal system as previous laws did not address domestic violence at all. Instead,
violence within the home was seen as a private matter and incidents often went unreported.103
The Korean Institute of National Unification reports that many defectors have testified in
recent years that incidents of domestic violence are widespread in the DPRK.104 It is difficult
to clarify the number of cases of domestic violence, as the North Korean government has not
provided statistical data to the UN in its reporting.
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In the DPRK, labour in the official economy is the responsibility of all people,
because it is not seen as an individual benefit but is based on the collectivist principle to
benefit everyone.105 Therefore, the right to work is not a right but a duty to respond to the
mobilisation of labour, and thus the North Korean government has long promoted the
participation of women in work.106 The Women’s Rights Act states that women have equal
rights with men in labour and that Municipal People’s Committees and relevant organs are to
guarantee the equal rights of women to take part in labour (Article 26). Article 37 states that
to ensure women are able to leave the home relevant institutions, corporate associations, and
organisations should establish day-care centres, kindergartens and other facilities. This idea,
however, rests on the belief that women are primarily responsible for the care of their
children. For women who do not have access to these facilities because they work in the
unofficial economy childcare is an added responsibility. Further, it is evident that the
government’s thinking on women’s roles has hardly changed since the promulgation of the
Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946 or the state’s accession to CEDAW in 2001.
It has been a long-held practice for the North Korean government to assign women
between the ages of 16 and 55 years to specific positions in the labour force. Therefore,
discrimination against women in the workplace has emerged in the forms of differentiated
pay scales and the type of work women are assigned to. Article 28 of the Women’s Rights
Act highlights this view.

Institutions, corporate associations and organisations, except for
those professions or departments that are not appropriate for women,
are not allowed to not take in women or restrict them for reasons such
as gender, marriage, pregnancy, and childbirth.
The exception made in the Article to “professions or departments that are not appropriate for
women” shows that the DPRK deems some occupations unsuitable for women. The Act does
not elaborate on what occupations are considered “not appropriate” but Article 30 states that
the “supervising organ for labour administration determines which fields and professions are
prohibited for women”. Consequently, men are assigned to important and higher paying jobs,
while women are assigned to relatively less important and lower paying jobs,107 in the so105
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called “light industries”, such as agriculture, communications, health and education.108 This
does not give North Korean women the right to choose their own profession or employment
but confirms their assignment to certain roles in the North Korean gendered labour force. The
Women’s Rights Act will be discussed further in chapter 8.

Conclusion
The North Korean government has repeatedly stated its support for the principle of women’s
rights but many aspects of gender equality are not adequately addressed in the DPRK’s legal
system. Since the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946, North Korean
rhetoric has emphasised that the role of women was to turn to productive work in society to
help build an independent socialist country. To achieve this goal North Korean laws have
stated the principal of protecting the economic, social, and political rights of women.
However, these legal documents did not include provisions for preventing gender
discrimination, altering the division of labour in the home, or consider the needs of women
without children. Instead, the rights of women have often been secondary to the
government’s economic goals and promotion of family unity. At times women’s rights have
been held back to assure a harmonious society, a stable family unit, 109 and work units. As the
North Korean government has focused on bringing more economic resources into society
through the efforts of women, childrearing and food preparation have been socialised. Then,
once women have left the home to work in the economy, the government has claimed that
women have achieved liberation since the groundwork for gender equality had been instituted
by the state.110 Discriminatory practices still exist in North Korean society and are even
promoted by the government to ensure stability. For example, the government still assumes
that women are primarily responsible for the care of their children. Any changes that have
occurred to the roles of men and women since the mid-1990s and the DPRK’s accession to
CEDAW in 2001 have taken place independently of the state and the North Korean legal
system. Rather, changes to gender roles are an effect of the ongoing socioeconomic
transformation of the DPRK.
In the next chapter, I examine how the DPRK presented women’s rights and gender
relations to the world in the medium of its English-language propaganda magazines. From the
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1960s, the government promoted the images of revolutionary heroines and expected ordinary
Korean women to emulate their qualities in their daily lives, while promoting an image of
gender equality to the world. Within the country, the heroic portraits of the Kim family
matriarchs, Kang Ban Sok (1892–1932) and Kim Jong Suk (1919–1949) were held up as
exemplary women for all Korean women to emulate. These women were represented as being
able to excel in all forms of housework, such as childcare, tailoring, and cooking, even on the
battlefield. They performed these chores while armed with the revolutionary idea to defend
the country and help their husbands who also worked for the revolution as soldiers.111 When
these images were disseminated internationally, this was presented as proof of the success of
the Korean revolution and the achievement of gender equality within the country. At the
same time, Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) was represented as the father of all Korean people, who
are expected to praise and show filial piety towards him just as they would their own fathers.
The depiction of gender roles in these propaganda magazines is revealing of the gendered
assumptions of the North Korean regime, in ways that are not so evident in the regime’s
official statements about gender equality.
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4. The Revolutionary Kim Family in
Women of Korea
During the anti-Japanese armed struggle, ... the fine
working women of Korea fought as bravely as men for the
country’s liberation and the people’s honour, and for
their social emancipation and freedom.
Kim Il Sung, (date unknown).1

Introduction
Following the liberation of the Korean peninsula from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the
peninsula was divided into North and South, temporarily entrusted to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR, Soviet Union) and the United States of America (USA)
respectively. Before the permanency of the separate states in 1948, socialist reforms were
implemented in northern Korea by the North Korean interim government under the policy
influence of the Soviet Union.2 As we have seen, from 1946 the North Korean government
implemented state laws to encourage gender equality in social and family institutions.
Initially, the reform process as well as the creation of large-scale social organisations were
directed towards underprivileged groups in Korean society, particularly peasants, workers,
women, and youth.3 During the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897) and then the colonial
occupation of Korea (1910–1945) these groups had lived in oppressive situations. Society
adhered to a rigid social hierarchical order based on age, sex, and class, which encouraged
women to follow Confucian ideals and attain Confucian virtues. A virtuous woman obeyed
men throughout her life: in youth, she obeyed her father; when married, she obeyed her
husband; and if her husband died she was subject to her son. However, legally there was great
potential for the rights of North Korean women to improve significantly during the initial
stages of state formation.
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From 1946, the visual image of the revolutionary heroine appeared frequently in the
Korean-language magazine, Chosŏn Yŏsŏng (Korean Women). This magazine was designed
specifically for North Korean women. Then, from 1964, the English-language version of the
magazine, Women of Korea, disseminated to the international community topics concerning
Korean women’s roles in society. In both magazines, government rhetoric and art promoted
gender equality through the visual image of revolutionary heroines fighting equally alongside
fellow male revolutionary soldiers on the battlefield. These images challenged, to some
extent, the battlefield as a masculine domain, but other roles performed by women alongside
their fellow comrades were not so different to their domestic roles in the home. Ultimately,
this exposed the view of the North Korean government that women were to leave the home
and defend the country but this was to be done by performing the roles of mother and wife,
cook and tailor.
In this chapter, I focus specifically on the representation of the Kim family and state
rhetoric in Women of Korea.4 Official North Korean historiography, assisted by paintings and
photographs, cultivated the idea that the Kim family epitomised national purity through their
resistance to Japanese aggressors.5 I focus on the English-language version of the magazine
because I am interested in how the North Korean government communicates with the
international community about gender relations and the rights of women. In the visual images
and text, two exemplary women are prominent, Kang Ban Sok (1892–1932), the mother of
Kim Il Sung (1912–1994), and Kim Jong Suk (1919–1949), the first wife of Kim Il Sung and
the mother of Kim Jong Il (1941–2011). Both Kim women are depicted as uniquely feminine
revolutionary subjects who were capable of caring for their families and the nation. 6 They are
represented performing the roles of mother and wife and educator, and demonstrating skills in
domestic chores on the battlefield. Both women set the standard of skills that the government
deemed necessary for ordinary Korean women to emulate in the building and defending of
the country. Internationally, these women presented a picture of achieving gender equality in
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). Both women also
4
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represented exemplary mothers who supported their families but stood in supportive roles to
their male counterparts. This suggests a contradiction in the government’s aim to emancipate
women from outdated customary practices. In contrast, the representations of ordinary men as
soldiers and defenders of the country, as fathers and carers in the home are largely absent in
Women of Korea. Instead, Kim Il Sung is ubiquitously represented as the “Fatherly General”,
who cares for all Korean children and thus the entire nation.7 These gendered representations
of the Kim family members reinforce assumptions about the roles of ordinary men and
women in North Korean society.
When examining the visual representations of the Kim family in this chapter, I have
also considered the difference in clothing worn between revolutionary heroines and their
male counterparts. The clothing worn by these heroic men and women reveals the gendered
lens of the North Korean government. Therefore, when examining the visual images of the
Kim family in Women of Korea, the analysis of fashion is an important indicator of official
attitudes towards gendered roles in society and the change from the colonial modernity of the
Korean nation to a nationalistic North Korea.
First, I begin by discussing briefly the Korean-language magazine Chosŏn Yŏsŏng and
then the English-language version, Women of Korea.

The Chosŏn Yŏsŏng Magazine
Just weeks after the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in September 1946,
the first Korean-language magazine designed specifically for women, Chosŏn Yŏsŏng, was
published.8 The magazine was issued under the guidance of the Korean Democratic Women’s
Union (KDWU, Women’s Union) and was designed to circulate information approved by the
newly-formed North Korean government.9 Although the magazine was intended for North
Korean women it is unclear on what basis the magazine was distributed and to what extent
women were exposed to the magazine. They were likely distributed during meetings and
study sessions conducted by the Women’s Union and through the local government offices
and cultural institutions rather than women buying individual copies.10
7
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Chosŏn Yŏsŏng covers a wide range of topics from reports on economic development
to the social and domestic responsibilities of North Korean women. The magazine also
includes an editorial section, a column on homemaking, educational material, and an arts and
literature section. As we shall see below, the English-language version of the magazine
follows this format. The earliest versions of Chosŏn Yŏsŏng were influenced by the Soviet
Union and included a small section on news about Soviet women and the Soviet state.
Anticipating the end of the Soviet occupation in the northern region of Korea, the North
Korean government attempted to form a more independent view of North Korean society and
the role of an independent North Korean government within the magazine.11 By April 1948,
the formal section on the Soviet Union in the magazine was excluded, with only the
occasional article on Soviet women and culture.12 The focus shifted to aspects of Korean life
and the rights of Korean women. The theme that emerged in Chosŏn Yŏsŏng was the ability
of women to combine their duties as wives and mothers with their new positions as workers
outside the home.13 This theme has continued in the magazine to date and has also influenced
content published in the English-language version. Throughout the history of both magazines,
articles also promoted the government’s role in promulgating gender equality laws.

The Women of Korea Magazine
The Working People’s Organisation Publishing House in Pyongyang published the Englishlanguage magazine Women of Korea between 1964 and 1992. The magazine was designed
specifically to inform the international community of the position of Korean women in
society, and the political and economic goals of the North Korean government. Each edition
of Women of Korea follows the same format as Chosŏn Yŏsŏng. During the 1960s and 1970s,
the magazine emphasised stories and visual images of revolutionary heroines,14 the history
and politics of the DPRK,15 homemaking articles,16 and North Korean arts and literature.17
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From the early days of its formation, the North Korean government promoted women as
revolutionary fighters ready to sacrifice their own life for the nation, as well as fulfilling their
duties in the home through the imagery of the revolutionary heroine. Stories and visual
imagery of these heroines emphasised the domestic virtues of women as mothers and wives
who participated in the revolutionary cause on the battlefield.18 The representation of these
revolutionary women to the international community promoted a positive image of women’s
equal rights in the DPRK.
Below I discuss the role of the “Revolutionary Heroine” Campaign in North Korean
society as a background to the visual images and text published in Women of Korea from the
1960s to the 1970s.

The “Revolutionary Heroine” Campaign
The second wife of Kim Il Sung, Kim Song Ae (1928–2011?), initiated the “Revolutionary
Heroine” Campaign and it was built upon by Kim Il Sung’s son Kim Jong Il in later years.19
Once Kim Jong Il took a prominent role within the Propaganda and Guidance Department of
the government, Kim Song Ae’s involvement in the campaign decreased. Instead, Kim Jong
Il promoted his own family members, such as his mother and grandmother, to important
positions with the campaign as revolutionary heroines. North Korean historiography
surrounding the family cultivated the idea that each Kim member epitomised national purity
through their resistance to Japanese colonisation of the Korean peninsula.20 While Kang Ban
Sok and Kim Jong Suk have long been celebrated as the foremost examples of heroines,
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purity and anti-imperialist spirit, they obtained their status through their relationship to Kim Il
Sung.21 Neither woman ever held any real power within North Korean decision-making
bodies but they were given a special place in the state’s official historiography.22
In the 1960s, Kim Song Ae became vice-chairperson of the Women’s Union and was
the chairperson from the mid-1970s until 1998.23 During her appointment, she expelled
several Women’s Union officials who had close ties to Kim Il Sung’s first wife, Kim Jong
Suk. It was also during this time that the visual images and accounts of Kim Jong Suk as a
revolutionary heroine were gradually removed from exhibitions and printed materials. Kim
Song Ae did not want to favour her predecessor. Instead, Kim Il Sung’s mother, Kang Ban
Sok was promoted as the primary revolutionary heroine for others to emulate.24 The emphasis
by Kim Song Ae on the mother of Kim Il Sung as the dominant revolutionary heroine is
prominent in Women of Korea during the 1960s. In the following decade, though, this would
change as Kim Jong Il took up his position within government.
From October 1970, North Korean art underwent a major revolution under the
guidance of Kim Jong Il, who was promoted to the position of deputy director in charge of
culture and arts in the Propaganda and Guidance Department of the government.25 In
September 1973, at the seventh plenary session of the fifth Central Committee of the
Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK), Kim Jong Il was promoted to party secretary in charge of
propaganda. As part of the artistic reform process, Kim Jong Il systematically promoted the
representation of his own mother, Kim Jong Suk, as the primary revolutionary heroine for
ordinary women to follow. Kim Jong Il’s campaign to promote the visual imagery of Kim
Jong Suk also ensured a legitimate connection was made between himself and his
revolutionary parents as he was to succeed his father as leader of the DPRK.
The North Korean government intended ordinary women to feel a strong degree of
empathy when viewing or reading about the roles of revolutionary heroines. Initially, it was
difficult for the North Korean government to encourage ordinary women to become like these
heroines, as they had to master a new and unfamiliar role and take up arms to defend the
country. In the early editions of both Chosŏn Yŏsŏng and Women of Korea visual images and
stories of unknown revolutionary women who had worked as revolutionary fighters and as
21
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members of the revolutionary sewing group were published (see figure 4.1, Hun Yong
Kang’s painting “Members of the Sewing Group”).26 However, no matter how intensively
these visual images were promoted in North Korean society, they presented a difficult
challenge for ordinary women because of the gap between themselves and these heroines.27
For this reason, the North Korean government needed an intermediary procedure that would
enable everyday women to identify with the persona of the revolutionary heroine. By
employing exemplary women from real life, such as Kang Ban Sok and Kim Jong Suk, they
attempted to convince viewers that such women and their courageous stories existed.28 The
government promoted the ideal woman through the careful invention of the legendary tales of
the two Kim women, blurring reality and illusion.29
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Figure 4.1 Hun Yong Kang, “Members of the Sewing Group”. Date unknown. Oil Painting.
Women of Korea, 5 (24) (1966).

Below, I discuss the visual and textual representation in Women of Korea of Kang
Ban Sok and Kim Jong Suk as part of the revolutionary Kim family. In the DPRK, these
heroines were presented as models for ordinary women to follow. In the international context,
these exemplary women were presented as proof of the success of the North Korean
transformation.
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Kang Ban Sok, “Mother of Korea”
In the 1960s, numerous articles in Women of Korea describe the life achievements of Kang
Ban Sok.30 These stories recount her life from birth to death through the different stages of a
woman’s life, from a child to mother to wife. Her most famous role was that of mother of
Kim Il Sung, which eventually extended to metaphorically include the entire North Korean
population.31 Thus, she became known as the “Mother of Korea”.32 The article “Glorious life
of Kang Ban Sok, Mother of Korea”, explains that Kang Ban Sok was born on 21 April 1892
into a patriotic Korean family who fought against the occupation of Korea by Japan.33 Her
revolutionary spirit was said to be awakened under the guidance of her father, Kang Don Uk
(dates unknown) and younger brother Kang Jin Sok (dates unknown), an educator and
revolutionary fighter respectively.34 Kang Ban Sok married Kim Il Sung’s father, Kim Hyong
Jik (1894–1926), a supposed founding leader in the anti-Japanese liberation movement. Kang
Ban Sok is said to have helped her husband in his revolutionary work. Kang Ban Sok’s
revolutionary work, though, involved caring for her family, as she was conscious of her
husband’s commitment to his work. In this context, Kang Ban Sok is said to have “managed
[the] domestic affairs of her family of twelve [members] by her own efforts”.35 This implies
that Kang Ban Sok’s role was in the home performing the role of mother and wife, who cared
for her family dutifully and not with her husband fighting actively against the Japanese.
Therefore, it could be said that Kang Ban Sok was not equal to her husband on the battlefield
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but confined to the role of mother.36 This is reinforced in visual images and articles published
in Women of Korea.
In the painting captioned, “The Respected and Beloved Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung
Receiving a Patriotic Education from His Mother” (see figure 4.2), a young Kim Il Sung sits
at a desk and his mother Kang Ban Sok sits alongside him, guiding and teaching him in his
work.37 In addition to helping her son, Kang Ban Sok is sewing or mending clothing. Here I
draw attention to the space in which the figures are sitting, the home, and the role performed
by Kang Ban Sok, as educator. In the DPRK, the education of children has predominantly
been considered women’s work, either within the home or in the school setting. From the
initial stages of state formation, North Korea relied on women to hold together the very fabric
of society, as sacrificing mothers, who would reproduce and educate future generations as
model communist citizens, while contributing to the developing economy as dedicated
workers and citizens of the new revolutionary regime.38 The North Korean government
believed that children were the reserve in the revolutionary struggle, the future of the
revolution and the destiny of the country, which depended on the upbringing of the children
by their mothers.39 The representation of Kang Ban Suk in this image reinforces the gender
stereotype that women belong in the home caring for both children and housework.
In the painting, both figures are dressed in ethnic Korean clothing for women
(joseonot/hanbok) and are positioned in the domestic sphere, a space usually reserved as a
woman’s place of work. As Rosemary Roberts states, “[d]espite its seemingly superficial
nature, dress is an important site for cultural enquiry”,40 for clothing conveys culturally
determined meanings about the bodies of men and women. Suk-Young Kim argues that, from
a socio-political point of view, the way people dress is a worthy subject of scrutiny as fashion
is a domain in which self-perception and taste manifest, where the desires for beauty and
consumption materialise, and a site that contests the ground where social hierarchy is
articulated through individual spontaneity and state control.41 In the North Korean context, it
is interesting to look closely at how revolutionary heroines are dressed compared to their
male counterparts as this reveals the gendered lens of the government. Suk-Young Kim states
that, during the revolution, state regulation dominated everyday life, including fashion
36
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choices.42 North Korea is a highly fashion-conscious nation where political leaders are
preoccupied with how people dress. They impose rigid regulations, including uniforms for
various social sectors, and systematically recommend certain designs to civilians.43
Therefore, when reading Women of Korea, clothing styles are an important indicator of
official attitudes to male and female positions in North Korean society. The ideal clothing
style for North Korean women is found in the officially sanctified domestic history of the
Kim household and Kang Ban Sok was the ideal standard for women’s behaviour and
appearance.44 Nevertheless, as these magazines were produced from the 1960s on, they
represent an idealised version of revolutionary dress, rather than a literal image of behaviour
and dress during the anti-Japanese struggle and the establishment of the North Korean state.
In visual images of Kim Il Sung as a child he is almost always dressed in the ethnic
Korean clothing for males, consisting of a jacket (jeogori), a vest (jokki) and trousers (baji).
Children’s clothing is the same as that of adults but with appropriate adaptations.45 In
contrast, Kang Ban Sok is seen only in the ethnic Korean clothing for women, consisting of
the skirt (chima) and jacket (jeogori). This configuration of women’s clothing often resulted
in a triangular silhouette, which deemphasises the upper torso of the wearer, 46 but draws
attention to the wearer’s exposed legs if the length of the skirt is modified. The clothing worn
by Kang Ban Sok is not usually modified, unlike the clothing worn by her successor Kim
Jong Suk who is depicted mostly on the battlefield, as we shall see below.
The North Korean book, Korean Folk Customs (1990), by Hwan Ju Pang, outlines
clothing worn by Korean men, women and children.

Korean costume is the product of a long historical process which had
close bearing on the constitution of Koreans, the mild climate of
Korea, their principal occupation in agriculture, their living in the
room with heated floor and national predilection for smartness and
gracefulness [sic].47
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In the Three Kingdoms period (37BCE–935CE) upper, lower, and outer garments already
existed.48 In the Koryo (or Goryeo) period (918–1392) and the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897),
improvements were made to clothing worn by both genders.49 There were slight alterations in
length and width of skirts and jackets and the outer garments varied depending on gender,
age, occupation, and social status.50
As noted above, Kim Il Sung is clothed in the traditional jacket, vest and trousers. On
long journeys men often wore leggings under the trousers to ensure brisk movement.51 The
colour of men’s clothing was mostly white but sometimes grey, jade-green or other muted
colours. Alternatively, Korean women wore the ethnic clothing, the female hanbok, and
sometimes an overcoat (turumagi).52 Pang states that there are two kinds of skirts in North
Korea, a long wrap skirt and a cylindrical skirt (see figure 4.3).53 The long wrap skirt had
wide pleats to encircle the body from the waist down, while the seamless cylindrical skirt is a
rounder shape and resembles the skirt style worn today in the DPRK. The long wrap skirt is
made wide and is so long that its hem trails along the ground. When walking, it is held up by
the wearer. The seamless cylindrical skirt has been designed for ceremonial or gala
occasions, is longer than that for ordinary use, and its length differs according to the wearer’s
age.54 Material used in the making of skirts is colourful and changes according to the
season.55 In contrast to the men’s jacket, the jacket worn by women is characterised by curves
and the edge of the neckband and outer collar is rounded (see figure 4.4).56 Rich colours and
patterns are also features of the female jacket. Today North Korean women wear the ethnic
Korean clothing for holidays and on special occasions. Various transformations of Korean
dress can be seen in the pages of Women of Korea.
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Figure 4.2 “The Respected and Beloved Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung Receiving a Patriotic
Education from His Mother”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. “Great Women”, Women of
Korea, 2 (94) (1982), pp. 42–44.

106

Long Wrap Skirt and Cylindrical Skirt (Left to Right)

Figure 4.3 “Long Wrap Skirt and Cylindrical Skirt”. Hwan Ju Pang, Korean Folk Customs
(Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1990), p. 10.
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Figure 4.4 “Korean Jacket”. Hwan Ju Pang, Korean Folk Customs (Pyongyang: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1990), p. 8.

With the arrest and imprisonment of Kang Ban Sok’s husband, Kim Hyong Jik, by the
Japanese police in 1917, Kang Ban Sok is depicted as moving from just caring for her son
and family to caring for the entire Korean nation. Kang Ban Sok’s new role will be discussed
further below. First, it is said that Kim Hyong Jik was arrested because of his role in the
establishment of the Korean National Association (KNA) on 23 March 1917. In the prison, he
is said to have mapped out a new plan for the higher phase of the revolutionary struggle. His
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plan was to develop the anti-Japanese national liberation movement from a nationalist one to
a proletarian one. After one year of imprisonment, he was released in October 1918. Kim
Hyong Jik left Mangyongdae for the northern border area on Amnok River, where he
regrouped and reinforced the KNA organisation. Kang Ban Sok is shown taking care of the
household and continuing the revolutionary activities of her husband during his
imprisonment. With the death of her husband in 1926, Kang Ban Sok is shown working
alongside her son in battle against the Japanese.57 While Women of Korea includes
representations of women joining their male counterparts on the battlefield, Kang Ban Sok’s
role is limited to the representation of a caring mother. This is seen in the painting captioned
“Kang Ban Sok Encouraging the Men of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army Founded
by the Great Revolutionary Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung” (see figure 4.5).58 Kang Ban Sok
is represented as a mother figure to Kim Il Sung and the fellow soldiers whom she comforts
before they enter battle.59 Kang Ban Sok has placed her hand on one soldier’s chest,
encouraging him in his revolutionary work, symbolising her role as a nurturing mother figure
to the soldiers and thus the Korean nation. While she inspects and consoles the soldiers in the
Korean People’s Revolutionary Army, a young Kim Il Sung stands to the left of his mother
and looks in the direction of the figures, surveying the scene.
The clothing style worn by Kang Ban Sok, the only female figure in the painting, is an
important indicator of the view of women’s position in North Korean society. While the male
figures are dressed in military uniforms consisting of jackets, trousers, knee-high socks, and
hats, Kang Ban Sok is dressed in a pale coloured ethnic Korean dress. Suk-Young Kim
suggests that the ideal clothing for women found its prototype in the representation of Kang
Ban Sok dressed in the female hanbok.60 However, as Suzy Kim points out, many Korean
women had always worn ethnic Korean dress and never fully accepted Western clothing, so
that state reform was not needed by the North Korean government to promote this dress
code.61 During the occupation of Korea by Japan, the ethnic national dress for women had a
nationalist meaning, when modernity for females meant wearing Westernised clothing.62
Within the masculine domain of the battlefield, the female hanbok signifies that Kang Ban
Sok stands equal to her son and fellow revolutionary fighters but retains feminine qualities.
57
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The pale colour of the dress makes Kang Ban Sok’s figure stand out from the dark
background and from the men that surround her. As the ethnic Korean clothing has not been
modified in length in this painting, it reflects the ideal of modesty, achieved by concealing
the female form.63 In other paintings, particularly of Kim Jong Suk, to be discussed below,
the length of the skirt and jacket are shorter, revealing the wearer’s legs and the shape of the
waist. Modifications made to the female hanbok ensured the wearer was able to move more
easily but also sexualised the female figure, drawing the male gaze to the revolutionary
heroines. In comparison, the revolutionary men are never depicted wearing ethnic Korean
clothing in Women of Korea.64 Instead, revolutionary men are always depicted wearing
unaltered military uniforms and carrying guns ready to defend the country by force. It could
be said that even the revolutionary female is confined by the assumptions of the North
Korean government and what it deems to be appropriate fashion and behaviour for women.
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Figure 4.5 “Kang Ban Sok Encouraging the Men of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army
Founded by the Great Revolutionary Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung”. Date unknown. Oil
Painting. “The Mother of Korea”, Women of Korea, 2 (70) (1976), pp. 9–11.

Kang Ban Sok is said to have put the revolutionary cause before herself even when
severely ill. Towards the end of 1932, when a young Kim Il Sung was leaving for south
Manchuria to expand the guerrilla unit to which he was a member, he learned that his mother
was critically ill. Due to the news of his mother’s health, Kim Il Sung decided to return home
to visit her. Kang Ban Sok however, reprimanded him for leaving his revolutionary work so
Kim Il Sung left his mother’s house and walked through dense forests and across rough
mountains to reach his destination.65 After covering some distance, Kim Il Sung is said to
have stopped to rest and take off his shoes. There in the bottom of his boots was Kang Ban
Sok’s hair spread out to cushion his steps and stop his feet from freezing. 66 Stories such as
this exemplify Kang Ban Sok’s sacrifice for her son and the revolutionary cause. Qualities
such as a loving, caring, and thoughtful mother, who puts the needs of her children and the
65
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revolutionary cause before herself, were all characteristics ordinary North Korean women
were encouraged to emulate. In 1932, at the age of forty, Kang Ban Sok passed away. She is
described as an ardent communist and a prominent member of the early women’s movement
in Korea.67 This self-sacrificing image of revolutionary heroines, who exemplify qualities of
loyalty, caring and nurturing continued to be illustrated in visual images of Kim Il Sung’s
first wife Kim Jong Suk.
From the late 1970s, the North Korean government attempted to meld the old and new
images of women in Women of Korea through the figures of women participating in the
revolutionary struggle as tailors, cooks, and fighters as well as mothers. This change in the
representation of heroic women suggests that the old way was represented through the images
of Kang Ban Sok and her ethnic Korean clothing, while the new role of women was
represented in Kim Jong Suk in her modified military uniform. In the following section, I
discuss the representations of these two women and the promotion of revolutionary heroines
to the world.

Comrade Kim Jong Suk
In Women of Korea, numerous articles and visual images represent the life and achievements
of Comrade Kim Jong Suk.68 The representation of Kim Jong Suk was developed far beyond
that of her mother-in-law Kang Ban Sok. Kim Jong Suk is shown as defending the “Fatherly
General” and performing domestic duties on the battlefield. While Kang Ban Sok is shown in
a supportive motherly role to her son and other revolutionary soldiers, the visual imagery of
Kim Jong Suk was extended to include her role as a revolutionary fighter, a domain usually
dominated by males. Kang Ban Sok’s revolutionary work also extended to gathering and
67
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educating Korean women, and performing domestic duties in the middle of battle. Kim Jong
Suk is described as a revolutionary fighter faithful to Kim Il Sung and an outstanding female
revolutionary activist, nurse, cook and tailor.69 Kim Jong Suk is shown negotiating the worlds
of the domestic and nationalist femininity,70 as seen in the different roles she performs and in
her clothing. In visual images, a young Kim Jong Suk continues to wear clothing similar to
Kang Ban Sok, the ethnic Korean clothing for women (hanbok), but in later artworks she is
seen in a feminised military uniform.
The article “Only for the Sake of the Leader” states that Kim Jong Suk was born on
24 December 1917 to a poor peasant family in Hoeryong County in North Hamgyong
Province (present day northeast DPRK).71 With her family, Kim Jong Suk fled Korea to
Yanji (Jilin Province, China) around 1922. By 1935, when she was 18 years old, all members
of her family had died. The Chinese village in which her mother and sister had lived is said to
have been attacked by the Japanese military and the two women were killed. Kim Jong Suk’s
elder brother, Kim Ki Jun (dates unknown) was arrested by the Japanese authorities, jailed
and died whilst imprisoned. Her younger brother, Kim Ki Song (dates unknown) died for
unreported reasons in December 1933. The article continues that with “bitter grief in her
heart”, Kim Jong Suk set out on the road in search of Kim Il Sung, the leader of the Korean
revolution.72 In early 1935, Kim Jong Suk met Kim Il Sung for the first time, at Xiongzhiying
in Sandaowan (Jilin Province, China). It was at this location that a secret guerrilla camp had
been established by Koreans who were fighting against the occupation of the country. 73 After
the meeting, Kim Jong Suk is quoted as saying, “He [Kim Il Sung] is really a great man... I
will fight only for General Kim Il Sung at any time and at any place”. 74 Since this initial
meeting, Kim Jong Suk was a loyal follower of Kim Il Sung and the revolutionary cause, and
she did not waver until her death in September 1949.
In visual images, Kim Jong Suk is represented as a revolutionary soldier, ready to
sacrifice herself for both Kim Il Sung and the Korean nation.75 This is evident in the image
captioned, “Dauntless Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Guards the Great
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Leader at the Risk of Her Life” (see figure 4.6).76 Suk-Young Kim suggests that North
Korean artworks and their captions work in tandem to contain and redirect the dual roles of
women, as housewives and revolutionary fighters, towards each other.77 She notes that the
military space dominates paintings such as this one while the caption draws attention to the
domestic role of Kim Jong Suk.78 This is demonstrated in the following paintings that
represent Kim Jong Suk performing domestic chores whilst on the battlefield. Accompanying
this painting (see figure 4.6) the article “Anti-Japanese Heroine” states:

Sometimes, shielding the great leader with her [Kim Jong Suk’s] own
body, she shot down enemies one by one at a stroke at the critical
moment for the great leader owing to the secretly approaching enemy
soldiers and sometimes she saved the Headquarters of revolution and
her unit from crisis by luring the enemies toward herself and
annihilating them.79

Kim Jong Suk stands in front of Kim Il Sung, lovingly protecting her husband from enemy
fire and apparently ready to give her own life to the anti-Japanese cause and husband,
therefore illuminating the role of loyal and self-sacrificing wife. The two main figures, Kim
Jong Suk and Kim Il Sung, stand in the centre of the painting, while other revolutionary
soldiers surround them in less prominent positions. No eye contact is made between the
revolutionaries as they look out of the painting. The artist has highlighted the importance of
the two main figures by centring them in the artwork and creating a halo effect around them,
a painting technique also employed in Christian religious art. A white cloud also floats
around the Kims to ensure their dark military clothing stands out from the dark background.
In the painting, Kim Il Sung is elevated in this painting, so the viewer’s eye is drawn first to
his face. He stands confidently with one hand placed on the rock and the other holding a
pistol.
The dark brown military uniform of Kim Il Sung is similar to that worn by Chinese
revolutionaries. Initially, the suit was named the Sun Yat-Sen suit after the Chinese Leader
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Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925) and later the Mao suit after Mao Zedong (1893–1976).80 Shortly
after the founding of the Republic of China (1 January 1912–10 March 1912), Sun Yat-Sen
introduced the style as a form of national dress. The suit though, had a distinctly political and
later governmental implication. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in
1949, the suit became widely worn by males and government leaders as a symbol of
proletarian unity. From this time, the suit was known by the name Mao suit after Mao
Zedong’s affinity for wearing them in public. Thus, the garment became the symbol of the
Chinese leader and the Chinese communist movement. In the North Korean context, Kim Il
Sung is always shown wearing this suit when fighting the revolutionary cause.
In the painting, “Dauntless Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Guards the
Great Leader at the Risk of Her Life” (see figure 4.6), the other male revolutionary soldiers
are dressed in uniforms similar to that worn by Kim Il Sung. 81 The colour of the soldiers’
uniforms, though, is a dull green and the jackets have collars, unlike the style worn by Kim Il
Sung. These men hide behind rocks and the long grass, indicating to the viewer that they are
less important than the two central figures and perhaps less brave then the two Kims. Each of
the soldiers holds a gun ready to defend the country against the enemy. These men are
vigilant and dedicated to the struggle against Japan but appear in this painting in a supportive
role to the Kims. In Women of Korea, it is not common for male revolutionary soldiers to
appear in such revolutionary paintings, as this magazine tends to emphasise the importance of
revolutionary female soldiers and the role of the Kim men in defending the country.82
Kim Jong Suk stands confident in the battlefield and depicts characteristics of
devotion, strength and courage. Her military uniform is a vibrant green colour, a symbol of
the revolutionary heroine, and is a feminised version of the male uniform. This styling
difference ensures viewers know that while equal on the battlefield there are expectations as
to how a North Korean woman should dress and behave. To exemplify further the differences
between genders, Kim Jong Suk wears a knee-length skirt rather than trousers, while fulllength white socks cover her legs. By dressing the female revolutionary solider in a military
skirt, it suggests that this clothing was adopted to mark women’s supportive role to their male
comrades. Kim Jong Suk’s jacket is drawn in tightly at the waist by a belt, showing the shape
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of her body and thus sexualising the figure. Suk-Young Kim argues that feminised military
uniforms signified women’s participation in social and economic structures, but at the same
time, their feminine shape was a constant reminder of the different positions held by men and
women in the public sphere.83
Retaining patriarchal ideals of a male-centred society, North Korea’s leaders have
perceived women’s and men’s dress as separate national projects, forging different corporeal
practices for the two genders.84 In the visual images of female revolutionary soldiers, North
Korean official artists have selected clothing for women which they consider to be
appropriately feminine. Suk-Young Kim argues that North Korean leaders have regulated
gendered bodily practices through the production and consumption of women’s fashion from
the 1960s to the 1970s.85 It was during this formative period in North Korea’s history that
Juche (self- reliance) and national purity governed everyday life under the leadership of Kim
Il Sung.86 While the military uniform in paintings signified women’s participation in social
and economic structures, at the same time it highlighted gender differences on the battlefield
and in the public sphere. The techniques employed by the artists to both gender and sexualise
the female figure remind us that the progress of gender equality in the DPRK is limited
because of the patriarchal practices and structure of the North Korean government. As a
result, paintings such as “Only for the Sake of the Leader” are a reminder of the different
positions held by North Korean men and women in the public sphere.
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Figure 4.6 “Dauntless Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Guards the Great
Leader at the Risk of Her Life”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. “Only for the Sake of the
Leader”, Women of Korea, 2 (70) (1976), pp. 13, 14.

Below I discuss the representation of Kim Jong Suk negotiating domestic
responsibilities and public responsibilities on the battlefield. Close examination of the visual
images reveals that these two domains are not separate but are in fact intrinsically linked as
Kim Jong Suk is depicted performing domestic chores on the battlefield. In the following
three paintings, the representation of Kim Jong Suk as a mother figure, a cook and a tailor is
taken from the domestic sphere to the front line, suggesting a new realm for domestic
labour.87 The visual imagery of Kim Jong Suk marks the transition from the ideal traditional
woman who performs her duty to her family above all else (as seen in the representation of
Kang Ban Sok) to the new role of woman as defender of the country. For Kim Jong Suk the
two spheres are not mutually exclusive but coexist harmoniously and form a feminine virtue
that is much more complicated than the depictions of Kang Ban Sok.88 This complication
arises from trying to meld together the roles of women in and outside of the home. While the
87
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government attempts to encourage ordinary women to join the labour force, it also restricts
them to stereotypical gender roles in the home.
The role of North Korean women as primary food preparers and cooks is seen in the
visual images and articles about revolutionary heroines in Women of Korea.89 The article
“Iron Pot” depicts Kim Jong Suk preparing food for the soldiers of the revolutionary cause.
According to the article, one autumn day in 1934, Kim Jong Suk was preparing lunch in an
iron pot for the revolutionary fighters when suddenly the Japanese enemy attacked. 90 The
food was boiling hot but she did not want to leave it behind, as the soldiers would have gone
hungry. She is said to have placed a handful of dry grass on her head and then the boiling pot
upon it. Kim Jong Suk then climbed up a hill following the revolutionary soldiers, with
bullets flying past her ears, while carrying the boiling pot on her head, and successfully
delivered the food to her fellow comrades. Stories of Kim Jong Suk’s determination and
courage in defending the nation and performing domestic duties on the battlefield are
common in the magazine.91
In the accompanying painting captioned, “Comrade Kim Jong Suk, an Indomitable
Revolutionary Fighter, Climbs Up a Height Carrying a Boiling Gruel Pot on Her Head for the
Sake of Her Comrades-In-Arms” (see figure 4.7), the main figure looks into the distance.92 A
cloud floats behind her and accentuates her importance. This technique also highlights the
body shape of the revolutionary heroine and the feminine characteristics of the figure. In the
distance, an unidentified woman follows Kim Jong Suk. The hairstyle of the main figure is
new and modern, cut short, unlike Kang Ban Sok, who wears her hair long and tied behind
her head. During the colonial period, cutting one’s hair represented a gesture of revolt from
Confucianism as it had previously been banned in any public place as a social offence,
regardless of gender.93 During the twentieth century, short hair for women in many East
Asian countries strongly signalled feminism.
Unlike the earlier painting of Kim Jong Suk (see figure 4.6) as a revolutionary fighter,
here she wears the hanbok, with the skirt (chima) shortened to below the knee and the waist
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drawn in with a belt.94 These modifications would have made it easier to move and work, but
in the visual representation this also highlights the figure’s gendered body. 95 The transition
from the modified longer length hanbok to shorter skirts and longer length jackets (jeogori)
occurred at a slow pace across Korea.96 A number of Korean women viewed the modified
hanbok as a wonderful change and adopted it to wear whilst working but continued to wear
the longer length in the home.97 Korean women living in rural areas continued to wear the
unmodified version of the dress.

Figure 4.7 “Comrade Kim Jong Suk, an Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter, Climbs Up a
Height Carrying a Boiling Gruel Pot on Her Head for the Sake of Her Comrades-In-Arms”.
Date unknown. Oil Painting. “In the Sacred War for National Liberation”, Women of Korea,
3 (107) (1985), p. 5.
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Visual images and stories representing Kim Jong Suk in the role of mother taking care
of young children appear frequently in Women of Korea.98 In the article, “For the Future of
Revolution”, Kim Jong Suk is described as a member of the Committee of the Bagou Young
Communist League and an instructor of the Children’s Corps, who worked in a guerrilla base
camp along the Tuman River and helped to establish a school for children whose parents
were revolutionary fighters.99 At the school, young Korean children were educated in the
words of Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Suk is also said to have fed, clothed, and nursed these
children, taking on the responsibility of nurturing the children in the absence of their own
mothers. Here, the representation of the young Kim Jong Suk fulfils a similar role to Kang
Ban Sok as “Mother of Korea”. While Kang Ban Sok was mother to Kim Il Sung and fellow
revolutionary fighters and thus the entire Korean population, Kim Jong Suk took on the role
of mother figure to the future of the revolution and country. It was as though all hope of
succeeding in the revolution was the responsibility of these women. This responsibility was
then to be transferred to the lives of ordinary women who were expected to care for and raise
their children according to the teachings of Kim Il Sung. Thus, along with their childrearing
responsibilities, the burden of North Korea’s future was now on women, who were to raise
their children according to the revolutionary thought of the Kim family.
The article, “For the Future of the Revolution”, depicts events in November 1935,
when the Korean guerrilla base in Chechangzi (Jilin, China) was dissolved because of
fighting in the area. In this context, the question arose as to how to deal with the Children’s
Corps members and how to move them to a new location.100 Revolutionary heroine Kim Jong
Suk is said to have taken responsibility for the children’s safety and led them to a safer place.
The story of moving the Children’s Corps members to a new location is captured in the
painting “Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Carrying Bullets to
Height Together With the Children’s Corps Members” (see figure 4.8).101 Kim Jong Suk is
represented as the carer and protector of several children, as well as a revolutionary soldier as
she carries bullets for her comrades.102 In the accompanying article, Kim Il Sung is quoted.
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Comrade Jong Suk gave much loving care to children in her lifetime.
Whether she fought in the mountain or she came back to the liberated
country, she lived always for the sake of children.103

This statement confirms the gendered view of the government that the role of women is to
care for children combined with their duty to fight for the revolutionary cause.
In the painting, Kim Jong Suk leads a small group of children through the snow to
safety. She looks back in the direction of the children to make certain all are following her.
The two boys in the lead look forward and out of the picture, while the other children look in
the direction of Kim Jong Suk. In particular, one young girl looks up towards the
revolutionary heroine waiting for further instructions and seemingly pleading with her not to
stop. Kim Jong Suk has placed a hand on the girl’s shoulder to comfort her. It is said that, on
the journey, Kim Jong Suk comforted the children with the warmth of her body while they
slept under a fallen tree, and she picked up dried nuts in the snow to prepare for their
meals.104
The viewer is drawn first to the most important figure in the painting, Kim Jong Suk,
because of her height compared to the children. The clear background draws the viewer’s
attention to her face and body shape. The figures of the children, by contrast, tend to blend in
with their surroundings as they all stand at the height of the forest. Kim Jong Suk does not
wear the ethnic Korean dress or military uniform. Instead, her clothing style appears to be a
mixture of both and consists of a modified jacket and skirt. The jacket does not fit closely to
her body but is large and tends to hide her figure.
During the colonial period, the movement to reform the old-style ethnic clothing into
a more functional dress code was motivated not only by the practical suggestion that
Western-style dress offered better mobility but also by a symbolic order in which wearing
Western clothing was a gesture toward civilising the self in a globalising world.105 Westerninfluenced fashion codes gradually became popular during the period of Japanese occupation
amongst younger Korean women and educated upper-class women, while older women still
preferred to wear the ethnic dress.106 Underwear, slips, socks, and shoes were not replaced
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but remained the same ethnic Korean style.107 However, with the introduction of Western
clothing during the Japanese colonial period many Koreans saw it as compromising national
purity.108 The North Korean government later labelled Western clothing as oppressive and
bourgeois because the so-called “New Women” of the colonial period took part in the new
material culture often through their wealthy families.109 Therefore, in the new North Korean
state, Western-influenced fashion was eradicated from women’s wardrobes as representing
remnants of the colonial past and the cultural traits of the enemy class, the bourgeoisie.
New socialist clothing norms arose as alternatives to the Western-style garments that
had been brought to Korea through what was seen as a corrupting Japanese influence.110
Unlike China, which designed a national dress code for both men and women based on the
clothing worn by their revolutionary leader Mao Zedong, 111 the DPRK did not promote
androgynous clothing. In China from the 1950s to the 1970s women dressed in sympathy
with the proletariat and wore loose-fitting trouser suits, lacking in ornamentation.112 The
difference in clothing between genders was in the styling of the collar and pockets. In the
Korean context, there was a strong return to Korea’s past before colonisation as the
traditional hanbok was approved by the state for women to wear. Korean men, however, wore
modified Western-style suits (similar to the suits worn in Communist China, as noted above).
The longer one examines North Korean artwork representing men and women it becomes
unquestionable that North Korea’s leaders and official artists have perceived women’s and
men’s dress as separate national projects. As in many other colonial and post-colonial
contexts, it is women who are the carriers of national identity through their dress.113
In, “Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Carrying Bullets to
Height Together With the Children’s Corps Members”, the female Korean children wear a
light coloured jacket closely resembling the traditional Korean jacket (jeogori) over a
shortened version of the traditional Korean skirt (chima). The two young girls also wear
scarves as protection from the cold. In comparison, the two young boys are dressed in long
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trousers, jackets, and hats. The boys also wear scarves. The triangular red scarf is said to
represent a corner of the Communist flag, dyed red from the blood of martyrs.114 The clothing
worn by the children resembles uniforms worn by Chinese Young Pioneers. In both North
Korea and China, children were regarded as the hope and future in each respective country.
The clothing styles of these children are clearly gendered, suggesting that gendered
expectations start from an early age in official discourse in the DPRK.

Figure 4.8 “Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Carrying Bullets to
Height Together With the Children’s Corps Members”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. “For the
Future of Revolution”, Women of Korea, 3 (103) (1984), pp. 10, 11.
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Alongside her role as revolutionary fighter, Kim Jong Suk is also represented in
Women of Korea as performing domestic duties such as sewing on the battlefield.115 The
article, “It Is Honourable Either to Live or to Die for the sake of Comrade Commander”,
relates that in autumn 1939, Kim Il Sung assigned the task of making military uniforms for
the male revolutionary soldiers to Kim Jong Suk.116

Upholding the orders of the great leader, she [Kim Jong Suk] together
with some women guerrillas made 600 suits of military uniform with
a single sewing machine within 20 days and brilliantly carried out the
underground political work in the area covered with the forest of
enemy bayonets and secret agents.117

In this story, due to her loyalty to both Kim Il Sung and the struggle against the Japanese
aggressors, Kim Jong Suk went to a secret camp where the tailor corps was located. She
appealed to the women to complete the task of making all 600 military uniforms in less than a
month.118 All women are said to have worked hard to fulfil this request. Only women
compose the tailor corps, and there is no representation in any story or visual image of men
sewing alongside the women on the battlefield. This reinforces the ideology that women
should perform duties that are customarily deemed to be household chores and that North
Korean men do not. Kim Il Sung is quoted as recognising how difficult it was going to be to
make 600 military uniforms in such a short time.119

Needless to say, it is not an easy job for the few tailor corps
members, to make 600 uniforms in a short time. But, in order to bring
the operations to a success, the task should be carried out with fail.120

The success of the fight against the Japanese fell on the shoulders of Kim Jong Suk and other
revolutionary heroines and not just on the men fighting on the frontline. Further, it is implied
that without these uniforms the male revolutionary soldiers would have been unable to
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perform their military duties. Under so much pressure to produce 600 military uniforms, the
women worked day and night but in the final stages, the sewing machine needle broke.121
Faced with this situation, Kim Jong Suk was forced to sew the remaining military uniforms
by hand. It is said that all 600 military uniforms were successfully completed in just 20
days.122
Visual images such as “She Produced Military Uniforms During the March” (see
figure 4.9) ensure women can identify with exemplary women capable of achieving all state
goals.123 The painting captures the story of the tailor corps making the military uniforms on
the battlefield in the middle of a forest. In the centre of the painting, Kim Jong Suk sits at a
sewing machine, with one hand on the fabric and the other on the machine. The viewer’s gaze
is first drawn towards Kim Jong Suk as she dominates the painting by her large scale. In the
background, two female revolutionary soldiers support the work of Kim Jong Suk by
preparing the material for the military uniforms. One woman carries cloth, while the other is
sewing by hand. Each woman wears a feminised version of the military uniform, comprised
of a hat, a jacket, a skirt and long socks or stockings. The uniforms are modest and do not
reveal the female form, conforming to the virtues of modesty and purity. As noted above,
whilst including women in the revolutionary struggle the modified uniforms ensured that
women could participate and be recognised in a male dominated domain. The uniform,
though, also clearly highlights differences in roles based on gender. It can be said that while
men participated in combat, women were defined by duties that were perceived to be
acceptable for women – sewing and cooking. In other words, women were portrayed as
contributing to the revolution by carrying out duties that were typically associated with
women’s work within the home. In the painting, Kim Jong Suk and her female comrades also
have short haircuts, representing modernity. While intended to show to the international
community the success of integrating women in the revolutionary struggle, these images
rather demonstrate the contradictory elements of the North Korean government’s plan to
liberate women from the home while promoting the idea that men and women are equal.
Although women are represented outside the house working alongside their male
counterparts, they are stereotyped to certain gendered roles usually associated with the
domestic sphere.
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Figure 4.9 “She Produced Military Uniforms During the March”. Date unknown. Oil
Painting. “Sewing Machine”, Women of Korea, 4 (112) (1986), p. 16.

Kim Il Sung and his male family members are represented in visual images and
stories which capture ideal masculine qualities of strength and loyalty, ready to defend the
country. Below I discuss the symbolism of Kim Il Sung as a father figure in visual images
published in Women of Korea. The representation of Kim Il Sung went far beyond the
representation of an individual father. Rather, he is depicted as the father of the entire Korean
nation.124
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The “Fatherly General” Kim Il Sung
Since the 1970s, the stereotypical gender roles of men and women have been reflected in the
patriarchal political culture of the DPRK.125 This can be seen in the approved North Korean
visual media such as the magazine Women of Korea, and the representation of Kim Il Sung as
the “Fatherly General” or “The Father Leader” and the WPK as the “Mother Party”.126 The
political power within the DPRK personified the “Fatherly General” and the “Mother Party”
under the justification of a stable patriarchal political system governed by a paternalistic
leader.127 These representations of Kim Il Sung and the WPK impacted on all aspects of
North Korean society including the roles of ordinary men and women.128
In Women of Korea, it is said that North Korean children grow up happily with no
worries under the warm fatherly care of Kim Il Sung and that he never forgot the children of
the revolutionary soldiers in the busy days when he led the anti-Japanese armed struggle to
victory.129 The painting “The Fatherly Leader General Kim Il Sung Embracing the Members
of the Children’s Corps in Mt. Maan-sha’n” (see figure 4.10), represents Kim Il Sung with
young children, similar to Christian paintings and suggests that Kim Il Sung himself is a Godlike figure and saviour or liberator of the Korean people.130 Religious language and painting
techniques are regularly employed when referring to Kim Il Sung and his family members
and many comparisons could be made with depictions of religious figures such as Christ.131
Paintings of Kim Il Sung often represent him surrounded by children, like traditional
religious paintings of Jesus (see figure 4.10) or they show him standing on top of a mountain
or hill bathed in light (see figure 4.6). In “The Fatherly Leader General Kim Il Sung
Embracing the Members of the Children’s Corps in Mt. Maan-sha’n” (see figure 4.10), both
the caption and the painting represent Kim Il Sung as the father figure, rescuer of and
provider for the young children, who symbolise the North Korean people as well as the future
of the revolutionary cause in the DPRK. It is said that the paternal role of Kim Il Sung was
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not merely because the children were lovable but because they were the future of the
country.132
The clothing worn by Kim Il Sung and the Children’s Corps members is clearly
gendered even though they all wear modified ethnic Korean-style clothing, except for Kim Il
Sung who is dressed in a military uniform. The younger male and female children wear
hanbok. The boys wear a jacket or a vest, which has been worn by Korean men since the late
Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897). The jacket has changed little since this time, but the vest was
a new addition based on the Western-style vest.133 The young boys also wear trousers similar
to the traditional ones worn since the Chosŏn Dynasty. In the painting, all male figures
including Kim Il Sung and the young boys wear short hairstyles. In 1895, King Gojong
(1852–1919) (Chosŏn Dynasty) ordered all Korean men to cut their hair short and wear
Western-style clothing.134 By cutting their hair and wearing Western-style clothing, it was
believed that men were taking the first step towards a modern nation.135 In comparison, the
young girls in the painting wear the modified female hanbok. The length of the dress has
been shortened to allow for easier mobility but the sleeves remain long and cover their arms.
Each of the young girls also wears a modern short hairstyle.
Kim Il Sung is seen to be comforting two of the children in the painting. He holds the
hands of the young girl who stands in front of him and embraces another who stands beside
him. Both girls appear happy and safe in the arms of the leader. The other children from the
Children’s Corps stand around him, looking up to the fatherly leader with admiration in their
eyes. These children were groomed to carry on the political goals of Kim Il Sung in
makeshift schools established on guerrilla bases. Concerned about the life of these children, it
is said that Kim Il Sung provided them with gifts of new warm clothes and quilts. In return
for protection and gifts, the children were said to be so deeply moved and grateful for the
great love of Kim Il Sung that they made a winter suit and padded boots, which they
presented to him.136 In the article, “Fatherly Love”, it states that because of the parental care
of the “Fatherly General” (Kim Il Sung) towards the North Korean people, the children
(symbolic of the nation) showed enduring love and devotion towards their leader.137
According to Sonia Ryang, in this “state-engineered process of the production of love
and loyalty discourse” towards Kim Il Sung, the “North Korean people on the whole play a
132

Ibid., p. 8.
Yang, Hanbok, p. 172.
134
Ibid.
135
Ibid.
136
Ibid.
137
“Fatherly Love”, pp. 8, 9.
133

128

stereotypical ‘female’ part [just like] in old-fashioned romantic tales”.138 Ryang adds that
North Korean men and women are represented as being “in love” with Kim Il Sung, adoring
his image, cherishing his figure, admiring his manly beauty and wisdom, and totally
submitting to his command”.139 Kim Il Sung held absolute power over the North Korean
population, not necessarily by way of violence and oppression, but through the representation
of benevolence and fatherly love and the responsibility for each household.140 Ryang suggests
that because of the feminisation of the population gender inequality in North Korean society
has effectively been cancelled because “men and women, young and old” play a feminised
role.141
Alternatively, Immanuel J. Kim states that the North Korean government inevitably
excludes the presence of women, whose sole responsibility is to support the nation through
their motherhood.142 Kim continues that while new gender equality laws, and women’s
participation in the workforce, military, and other social institutions suggest a paradigmatic
shift towards a progressive North Korean state, women’s essential function in society is to
reproduce the next generation of socialist revolutionaries.143 Kim asserts that for women to be
integrated into a state like the DPRK, they have to become masculinised, where women, too,
need to acquire the patriarchal language.144 In other words, gender equality in the DPRK does
not eliminate gender difference but homogenises gender into a single masculine gender.
Therefore, masculine discourse in the DPRK has conveniently eliminated gender difference
and equality, instating the hegemony of males.145 I would argue however, that the North
Korean population has neither been feminised nor masculinised but infantilised. North
Korean men and women have equally been infantilised as they all are represented equally
loving and cherishing the leader Kim Il Sung as their father. There is still, however, a
gendering of societal roles. Women have continued to be represented in stereotypical
feminine roles within the home, while the representation of men in the home is largely absent
due to the masculine role being replaced by Kim Il Sung himself. Therefore, the role of men
has fundamentally been left undefined by the North Korean government and in the pages of
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Women of Korea. Instead, Kim Il Sung has replaced the role of ordinary men as the head of
the household, as the provider and protector of all North Korean families.
The visual representations and the stories of the Kim family in the magazine Women
of Korea fostered and encouraged the idea that this heroic family epitomised national purity
through their resistance to Japanese aggressors.146 This can be seen in the representations of
Kang Ban Sok and Kim Jong Suk, promoted as feminine revolutionary subjects who were
capable of caring for their families and the nation. These women, though, held no significant
decision making power in the government to truly influence the patriarchal structure of the
state or society and instead reinforced the gendered view of the government that women’s
primary roles were in the home. The visual images and stories of Kim Il Sung as the
“Fatherly General” of all North Korean people replaced the nurturing role of ordinary North
Korean men within their family. These gendered representations of the Kim family members
reinforced the gendered assumptions made by the government. These expectations however,
undermined the government’s stated goal of liberating women from their homes and the
provisions included in North Korean laws to ensure women shared equal rights with men.
Further, these representations in Women of Korea of men and women undermined the
government’s goal of promoting a positive and equal society for all North Koreans to the
international community.

146

Kim, “Dressed to Kill”, p. 164.
130

Figure 4.10 “The Fatherly Leader General Kim Il Sung Embracing the Members of the
Children’s Corps in Mt. Maan-shan”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. “Fatherly Love”, Women
of Korea, 4 (72) (1976), pp. 8, 9.

Conclusion
From the 1960s, the magazine Women of Korea featured a series of visual images and stories
about the Kim family – Kim Il Sung, his mother Kang Ban Sok and his first wife, Kim Jong
Suk. The depictions of the revolutionary Kim family present an idealised story of the
liberation of the nation from Japanese colonial rule. While the Kim women are presented as
heroic figures, who nevertheless support the revolution in gendered ways, through cooking,
sewing and looking after children, Kim Il Sung is presented not only as a father figure in the
Kim family, but as the patriarch of the nation. Within the DPRK, these representations of the
Kim women provided heroic models for ordinary North Korean women to emulate, while
also reinforcing the primacy and legitimacy of the Kim dynasty. In an international context,
these representations promote the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. Although the North
Korean government aimed to promote the idea that North Korean women shared equal rights
with men the visual images and accompanying articles reveal the gendered assumptions made
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by the government towards the roles of men and women. North Korean women were to leave
the home and work alongside their male counterparts to rebuild the socialist state. However,
men and women’s roles were gendered and men were to be soldiers and women mothers and
wives, cooks and tailors.
In the next chapter, I discuss the representations of North Korean women in the labour
force as seen in the magazine Women of Korea. From the 1980s, the North Korean economy
began a downward turn as the Soviet Union and its satellites began to collapse. In this
context, the emphasis on revolutionary heroines was slowly replaced with visual
representations and articles on “ordinary” North Korean women. These women performed the
roles of mothers and wives as well as contributing to the North Korean labour force as active
and diligent workers. These exemplary women displayed skills the North Korean government
wanted all women to display – loyalty to the state and hard work in society and the home.
The emancipation of women in North Korea’s policy and laws revealed a backward aspect
from this time, as the state’s patriarchal system was strengthened and women’s status was
significantly undermined by affirmation of customary gender roles in the home and labour
force.147
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5. Work and Family in Women of Korea
We must step up the struggle to wipe out the feudal
conventions of binding women to the home and other
remnants of the old habits so that all of them will not only
help their husbands who are participating in nationbuilding endeavours, bring up their children well and run
their homes thriftily, but also directly contribute to the
nation-building work by their own labour efforts.
Kim Il Sung, 9 May 1946.1

Introduction
From the 1970s, changes to the patriarchal system and the status of women in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) were influenced by both international and
domestic political economic shifts. By this time Kim Il Sung had established a stable
government and was preparing for the transfer of political power to his successor, Kim Jong
Il.2 From this time, the emphasis on revolutionary heroines was slowly replaced in Women of
Korea with an emphasis on the roles of ordinary North Korean women as wives and mothers
who supported their husbands, sons, and families by working both inside and outside the
home.3 In this chapter I examine the representation of ordinary women who performed their
duties inside and outside the home as presented to the international community in the
magazine. From this time the North Korean government promoted a positive image of
women who were said to have shared equal rights with men. While women were encouraged
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to work outside the home, this was in a clearly gendered North Korean labour force. 4 As
Sonia Ryang notes, the status of North Korean women was overwhelmed by traditional
patriarchal values along with the logic of economic exploitation and gender differentiation in
post-war gender politics, which eventually replaced the “woman question” with the “motherworker question”.5
Although the North Korean government promised women the same work privileges,
wages, and social security as men, in practice they were not paid comparable wages for
essentially comparable work, and they were not equally promoted (see chapter 3 for further
details on the North Korean legal system).6 Although the emancipation of women from the
patriarchal family structure was strongly emphasised, their domestic labour was an important
aspect of the national economy.7 Women’s roles in the home were subservient to male labour
in the public sphere.8 In Women of Korea, the representation of protective male providers in
the family unit was largely absent; rather the focus was on women who were expected to
combine duties inside and outside the home. Therefore, any cultural and patriarchal
restrictions that were placed on women were not eliminated simply by their joining the labour
force. Instead, women’s responsibilities increased as they were expected to continue to
perform their work in the home alongside their work in society. Under the surface of claims
made by the North Korean government that women reached equality within society, the
visual images and text rather reveal that discrimination against women continued to persist
socially and culturally.
In this chapter, I analyse the visual and textual representations in Women of Korea of
ordinary North Korean women as mothers and workers in the labour force as promoted by the
state.9 I begin with an outline of depictions of the contribution of ordinary North Koreans to
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nation building in the 1970s national “Hidden Hero” campaign.10 I then go on to analyse the
official rhetoric in the magazine of exemplary North Korean women who were mothers and
wives, as well as workers in the so-called “light industries”. The roles of women in industries
such as the childcare and education sectors,11 and the food industries12 were promoted in the
articles and visual representations in the magazine.13 Women of Korea describes North
Korean women as a major resource in the labour force, who were targeted to fill gaps in the
light industries.14 The magazine reveals, therefore, the assignment of North Korean women to
specific jobs deemed suitable and approved by the state.

The “Hidden Hero” Campaign
From the 1970s, articles and visual images in Women of Korea addressed women’s
participation in the labour force and the socialisation of childcare facilities and the food
industry. The “Hidden Hero” campaign is the background to the visual images and text
published in Women of Korea from the 1970s to 1992.15 The selfless achievements of the
heroes and heroines in the “Hidden Hero” campaign are said to resemble the devotion of Kim
Il Sung to the building of the nation from the time of Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945).16
The campaign was designed to increase the sentiments of nationalism amongst all North
10
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Koreans. According to Immanuel J. Kim, “[i]n as much as collective memory of the Great
Leader is state orchestrated, the Hidden Hero [or Heroine] is another campaign that sustained
the continuity of the past and present”.17 The campaign singled out model citizens of both
genders. The campaign not only encouraged North Korean men and women to participate
actively in society, it also allowed the state to closely monitor their every move. It was
imperative for the North Korean government to find those lacking in nationalism and loyalty
to the Kim family and educate them with correct thought. Surveillance of North Koreans took
place with the justification of finding heroic people amongst the population.18
With the need to advance North Korean society under the Three Revolutions, the
“Hidden Hero” campaign provided a motive for individuals to become involved in society.19
These campaigns, though, never fully addressed or resolved the “woman question” in the
DPRK, as the government understood that to achieve gender equality was to lessen women’s
household duties and allow them to participate alongside their male counterparts in the labour
force. Under North Korea’s economic campaigns, such as the Three Revolutions, women
were targeted to join the labour force. Due to the state’s strong policies and institutional
reform of socialisation of housework, women’s proportion of economic activities continued
to increase until the late 1970s. Kim Il Sung is quoted as saying that it is “of tremendous
significance to mobilise actively the women for the work of nation-building as they make up
half the population”.20 To extol the value of the female workforce, visual media promoted
images of ordinary North Korean women working in various places of employment but most
notably in the food and textile industries and the education sector.
Before moving to representations of North Korean women in the labour force, I
analyse the representations of ordinary men and women in the family unit. The images of
women exemplified skills such as actively contributing to the revolutionary cause by helping
to build a stronger economy, as well as the devotion of women as mothers and wives within
their families. Consequently, women faced inevitable challenges from this time as they had to
juggle both the domestic and public spheres. While the representation of ordinary North
Korean men is largely absent in the magazine Women of Korea there are a few images that I
will refer to.
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Gender Roles in North Korean Families
For at least two decades after the end of the Korean War (1950–1953), women were under
intense pressure to produce more children.21 By the 1980s, however, the fertility rate in the
DPRK was in decline with the average number of children born to women decreasing from
6.5 in 1966 to 2.5 in 1988.22 The tendency to marry relatively late may be one factor affecting
the fertility rates.23 The legal age to marry in the DPRK is 18 for males and 17 for females.
However, since the 1980s, it has become increasingly common to marry in one’s late twenties
or early thirties because of work and military service obligations.24 Maternity and childbirth
have been given “protection” in North Korea’s legal system, as seen in Article 77 of the 1972
DPRK Constitution.

Women are accorded equal social status and rights with men. The
State shall afford special protection to mothers and children by
providing maternity leave, reduced working hours for mothers with
many children, a wide network of maternity hospitals, crèches and
kindergartens, and other measures. The State shall provide all
conditions for a woman to play a full role in society.

The granting of equal rights in law was not enough, though, to liberate women from
patriarchy within the family structure.25 The concept of equality was strongly resisted by
some in North Korean society such as in family relationships,26 which only superficially
changed. For example, domestic work and the nurturing of children continued to be seen as
“women’s work” by both the state and the majority of North Korean people.
Although women’s work outside the home was promoted, the DPRK had a larger
number of women who stayed in the home compared to other socialist countries. There are
many possible reasons, including: tradition still dictates that once married, a woman should
stay at home to serve her husband and care for her children; marriage to high-income earners;
reluctance of employers to retain married women; decline in North Korea’s economy and
economic opportunity outside the official economy; and the government’s lack of concern for
21
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the number of married women staying in the home.27 Once married some women voluntarily
left their jobs but sought ways to generate income while also having the opportunity to stay at
home. This practice was supposed to reduce the “double burden” of housework and economic
employment, while increasing their economic independence.28 Whatever the reason, the
number of homemakers increased to around 60 to 70 per cent by the mid-1980s.29 It should
be noted that work in sideline production teams or neighbourhood work units was not
officially counted as employment.30 The fact that a large number of women remain in the
home suggests that views of gendered roles are strongly rooted despite legal provisions
mandating equality. Confucianism defines women’s roles in the family in relation to male
family members. Women, therefore, are always seen as mothers, wives, sisters, and
daughters.31
Women as mothers appear in Women of Korea from the initial publication in 1966.32
Kim Il Sung is quoted as emphasising that it is women’s natural duty to give birth and to raise
and educate children at home. 33

The mother has to bear the major responsibility for home education.
Her responsibility is greater than the father’s because it is she who
gives birth to children and brings them up.34

This statement reinforces gender stereotypes within families and does not alter the model
whereby men work outside the home and women look after children.35 This attitude is
reflected in the painting “Dandelion” (see figure 5.1).36 The representation of Korean women
as mothers was not new and can be seen from the mid-1920s, as the “wise mother, good
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wife” ideal was promoted.37 As colonial oppression grew stronger in the 1930s in Korea, the
doctrine of dedicated mothering gained even greater traction and many Koreans believed that
their people’s future, including freedom from colonialism, depended on women’s willingness
to sacrifice themselves to stay home and raise good sons and daughters. 38 Becoming a mother
was promoted as the most sacred duty and females who turned away from this role were
accused of being over-sexed and vain.39
In the painting “Dandelion” the mother supports the young child by wrapping her
arms around the child’s waist. The figures stand outside amongst plant life and both gaze at a
flower held by the mother. Both child and mother blow lightly on the flower petals which
float gently through the air. The child appears to be safe and happy with no care in the world.
In this painting, it is difficult to tell the gender of the child as the child is dressed in yellow
clothing, a gender-neutral colour. Further, the child is wearing a hat, so the viewer cannot see
the length of the youngster’s hair, which could have indicated the gender. The mother is
dressed in distinctly Korean clothing designed for women (joseonot/hanbok), which
emphasises modesty, virtue, and feminine beauty. The sleeves of her hanbok though, are
transparent allowing the viewer to see her skin. Suk-Young Kim states that in other North
Korean cultural forms almost all female protagonists are projected in familial relationships,
as mothers, sisters and daughters, to ensure that female characters do not incite erotic
thoughts.40 This is confirmed by the visual images published in Women of Korea, which
predominantly represent women as mothers or wives and surrounded by their children.
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Figure 5.1 “Dandelion”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. Women of Korea, 4 (132) (1991), p. 34.

In the painting “Toddler” (see figure 5.2) the roles of North Korean men and women
within the family are clearly defined and are exemplified in the gendered roles performed and
by the clothing worn.41 Four family members enjoy a day at a park and sit under a tree. The
father and mother figures sit on a park bench watching their small child attempt to walk
towards them, assisted by his older sister. The representation of the family dynamics appears
to show gender-specific roles based on masculine and feminine expectations. Unlike other
socialist states, such as the Soviet Union and China, the North Korean government kept the
nuclear family together to ensure stability in society and the economy. 42 This meant,
however, that gender inequality and the gendered division of domestic labour in the home
were maintained. It was thought that if the North Korean government had challenged the
stereotypical gendered roles within families, it may have led to instability in society, the
41
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labour force, and the basic unit of reproduction of future generations. Instead, the nuclear
family as the basic social unit has remained intact with a gendered division of domestic
labour.43
While the government recognised women’s work in the home as a burden, there is no
discussion of men’s responsibility to participate in domestic chores. On the rare occasion that
the role of men in the home is mentioned in Women of Korea, they are represented in
masculine stereotypical roles. The role of men is said to be centred on the responsibilities of
providing financial support and moral guidance to their family. Men are typically depicted as
responsible for the management of the household.44 Before the 1990s, North Korean
households relied upon the state’s Public Distribution System (PDS) to ensure they had
adequate food supplies and so they had little disposable income.45 Since the famine in the
1990s, however, when people were forced to look for alternative ways to survive, trade along
the North Korean and Chinese borders and marketplaces grew, thus incomes of some North
Korean families also increased.46 In this situation the roles of North Korean men and women
were challenged as women were more likely to work in trade and markets, becoming
financially independent (see chapter 6 for further details on North Korean food crisis and
gender roles).
In Women of Korea, the painting “Toddler” is one of the few artworks to represent a
man in the role of father and protector of his family, as this role is usually reserved for the
national patriarch Kim Il Sung, as discussed above. In this painting, though, the father has
taken on the role of protector of his family as he sits beside his wife on the park bench with
his arm around offering support and comfort. He looks down, observing the young child as he
attempts to take his first steps. Although he looks towards the child, the man does not appear
too concerned with the events taking place before him as compared to his wife. The mother
figure sits on the edge of the park bench and leans towards the child with concern in her eyes.
She holds a child’s rattle, encouraging the youngest child to walk towards her. Even the elder
sister has taken on the stereotypical feminine role as nurturer as she shows concern for the
small child and assists him to walk. This suggests that the caring role of the man is not as
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important in the family structure as the mother who is the primary nurturer of children. This
is confirmed by the fact that the viewer can only see part of the father’s face, which is
obstructed by the female figure.
In this visual image and others in Women of Korea, men are not represented wearing
ethnic Korean clothing. As a way of practising the Juche ideology, which promotes extreme
ethnocentrism, women did not abandon the Korean dress for Western clothing. 47 While this
explains the persistence of ethnic dress, it does not explain why only women had to express
“Koreanness” through their bodies.48 In this painting, the clothing style and colours worn by
the male and female figures are clearly gender-differentiated. While the father figure is
dressed in Western style clothing, the mother is dressed in a light coloured pink and white
hanbok, which modestly covers her body except for her face and hands. In the 1960s, the
colour scheme of the female hanbok symbolised female modesty and chastity.49 The colour of
women’s clothing continued to be an important indicator of the government’s assumptions
about both genders well into the 1980s, as women are shown dressed in soft pastels rather
than vibrant or dark colours. As can be seen in the paintings discussed so far, the female
figures are represented in pale pastel colours symbolising femininity, modesty, and chastity.50
In contrast, the male figure in this painting wears a modern Western-style suit in a dark blue
colour, representing strength and masculinity.
The mother’s modesty in the painting is confirmed by her unmodified hanbok. Unlike
the visual images discussed in the previous chapter, which depicted women clothed in
modified dresses, this version of the hanbok does not reveal the body shape or legs of the
wearer. In later editions of the magazine, the style of hanbok has returned to the traditionally
longer version seen in the earlier representations of the revolutionary heroine Kang Ban Sok.
This could suggest that the government wanted women to return a more modest and
traditional life as personified by Kim Il Sung’s mother. While this clothing style ties women
to Korea’s past, it also places them in a patriotic position compared to men, who are usually
represented wearing Western-style clothing. It was thought that when North Korea men
dressed and groomed in Western ways it was a symbol of progressiveness and modernity, 51
suggesting that the status and roles of North Korean women are confined in the past and have
not progressed towards modern life.
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A young girl is kneeling and looking towards the child with her arms stretched out
encouraging him to walk towards her. The girl is dressed in a blue school uniform, her hair
pulled back with a flower clip on top of her head. She wears a red handkerchief typically
worn by the Young Pioneers Corps.52 The youngest child in the painting looks towards the
older sister. By the hairstyle of the youngest child, it could be assumed that the figure is male.
The young boy is dressed in a red sleeveless shirt, white pants, and red shoes. The viewer’s
gaze is drawn to the child because of the colour of his clothing and because the other figures
look in the direction of the youngster. This painting not only reinforces gendered assumptions
about the role of men and women in the family, it also highlights the importance of children
in North Korean society by drawing the viewer’s gaze to the most important figure in this
painting, the child, a symbol of the DPRK’s future.

Figure 5.2 “Toddler”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. Women of Korea, 4 (136) (1992), p. 22.
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The Socialisation of Household Chores
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the North Korean government has promoted
women’s participation in the labour force.53 Women also, however, remained the subject of
gendered expectations whereby they were predominantly responsible for domestic chores and
the care of children. Kim Il Sung is said to have acknowledged the hard work of women in
building an economically independent nation combined with their roles in the home. In the
article “At Sight of Women Carrying Water Jar on Head” published in Women of Korea, Kim
Il Sung is quoted.

Men eat meals cooked by women, and so, they do not know well
about how painstaking women are. But women, even after they
worked as hard as men did have to fetch water, cook rice and do
washing.54

To ensure women were able to leave the home the government developed policies designed
to lighten their domestic workloads.55 In 1972, at the Fifth Congress of the Worker’s Party of
Korea (WPK), the congress made freeing women from the heavy burden of household work a
major goal of the party. The government committed to providing childcare facilities, the prepackaged food industry, and laundromats to address the burdens of women in the home. Such
a suggestion, however, rests on the belief that the home is not a workplace run by both
genders.56 Although Kim Il Sung had promised timesaving equipment, it did not materialise
for a majority of ordinary women, as items such as washing machines remained the property
of a privileged few.57
The North Korean government strongly encouraged mothers to put their children into
state-run childcare facilities and viewed it as a state responsibility to provide childcare,
teaching and nursing necessities under the principle of the “best thing for the children”.58
Although attendance at nurseries was optional it was available for three months to four year
olds, while attendance at kindergarten was for children aged five to seven years and was
compulsory. Between 1956 and 1960, the number of childcare facilities is said to have
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increased 31 times, accommodating about 700,000 children.59 As of 1966, around 60 to 70
per cent of all the children in the country were said to be at pre-school, cared for by a total of
130,000 nursery and kindergarten teachers.60 It was reported that by 1985, more than 60,000
nurseries and kindergartens had been built accommodating more than 3.5 million children.61
All nurseries and kindergartens are said to be staffed by competent teachers, with food and
adequate furniture.62 State-owned supply offices were established near each nursery and
kindergarten and they were responsible for providing foodstuffs such as milk, meat, eggs,
fruit, vegetables, and sweets as well as nursing and educational equipment, musical
instruments, printed matters, teaching aids.63 No payment was required for the use of the
childcare facilities and they were divided into three types, daily, weekly, and monthly so that
mothers could meet their work commitments.
From the 1970s, the focus of the North Korean government was on developing the
food industry to lessen the time women spent preparing meals in the kitchen. Kim Il Sung is
said to have stated that the “most important thing we can do to lighten the women’s kitchen
chores is to introduce innovations into the food industry”.64 This included the production of
boiled rice, noodles, bread, and other foodstuff. At the same time, factories were established
in towns and workers’ districts to process vegetables, meat, fish, and other food products by
industrial methods so that women could prepare meals quickly and easily in the home.65
There was a network of food take-out services for busy working women to collect premade
food after work and before returning home. However, the variety of food that could be
purchased from stores was extremely limited.66 It is said, though, that people’s dietary needs
improved with the changes in the food industry.67
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The North Korean government emphasised the mass production of consumer goods
centring on light industries as part of the Revolution of Technology.68 In 1972, at the Fifth
Congress of the WPK, Kim Il Sung is quoted as saying that one of the “vital tasks in the
technical revolution is that of freeing women from the burden of kitchen and household
work”.69 Kim Il Sung promised that refrigerators, cookers and other household appliances
would be manufactured and the pre-packaged food industries would be established to make
women’s lives easier within the home.70 Such a suggestion that women need to be freed from
the burden of kitchen and household work rests on the assumption that they are responsible
for the home, and men are not. Nowhere did Kim Il Sung mention men’s duties to undertake
housework or caring for children.71

North Korea’s Gendered Labour Force
From the mid-1970s, the visual images in Women of Korea depicted ordinary women
working outside the home, which coincided with the North Korean government’s emphasis
on women leaving the home to build sustainable light industry. In order to provide suitable
work for women the government transferred men from the light industries to heavy
industries.72 This has resulted in significant occupational segregation between genders with
women being assigned to low-skilled labour and unpopular work73 with lower pay. Men
dominated the higher-paid jobs in mining and heavy industries, and took those with the
highest status, as managers, university professors, and doctors.74 While wages in the DPRK
do not have the same impact on the quality of people’s lives as in capitalist societies, such job
segregation results in not just unequal pay, but also unequal status. 75
By 1970, women accounted for 70 per cent of the labour force in light industries and
60 per cent of those employed in the agricultural sector.76 The 1980 data shows that women
composed 70 per cent of the labour force in the light industry and just 15 per cent in heavy
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industry.77 Specifically, women occupied 56 per cent of the labour force in the agricultural
sector, 45 per cent in the industrial sector, while just 20 per cent in mining, and 30 per cent in
forestry. In education, women accounted for 80 per cent of the elementary school teachers,
while the figures for middle and high school, technical school and college were 35 per cent,
30 per cent, and 15 per cent, respectively.78 Among professionals and technicians, women
accounted for more than 37 per cent in 1989.79 In this respect, women’s proportion of
economic activities was almost equal to men’s, seemingly showing gender equality.
However, North Korean women worked prominently in feminised sectors such as agriculture,
the education and light industries, which are typically paid lower wages, while men
dominated the higher-paid occupations in mining and heavy industries, and managerial
positions.80
The government promised women the same work privileges, wages, and social
security as men but in practice women were not paid comparable wages for essentially
comparable work, and they were not equally promoted.81 By 1980, women earned just 70 per
cent of the average income of males, but continued to contribute significantly to household
earnings.82 Although there was state legislation on equal employment and equal pay for men
and women there remained significant occupational segregation between the genders. 83 More
importantly, even though some women worked as managers or supervisors in female
preferred jobs, the proportion of women in high‐level positions was very low.84 The job
segregation by gender reveals that the external equality of women’s economic participation
did not necessarily guarantee actual equality in social activities.85
As the North Korean government deemed factory work suitable for women they are
described as playing a major role in the Revolution of Technology to increase consumer
goods. This assumption is represented in visual images in Women of Korea, for example, the
poster captioned, “Let Us Produce Mass Consumer Goods More and Better!” (see figure
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5.3).86 A woman stands among consumer products such as food, medical and stationery
products. In her hands, she holds two rolls of fabric and behind her are items of clothing. This
image is to encourage North Korean women to work harder to produce more consumer goods
for society. The woman is dressed in a collared shirt and white apron and her hair falls to her
shoulders. Her hair is covered with a scarf. The factory worker is clothed simply but retains
distinctive feminine traits, such as long hair, and an apron to protect her clothing. The fact
that she is dressed this way suggests that although women are said to participate in the labour
force equally with men they do so in gendered ways.

Figure 5.3 “Let Us Produce Mass Consumer Goods More and Better!” Poster. Women of
Korea, 2 (98) (1983), p. 41.
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In Women of Korea, women are often represented working in the textile industry and
in clothing production but are also referred to by their domestic roles. 87 In the article “From
Zero”, the workers in the textile factory are referred to as homemakers and mothers.88 This
textile factory is said to have been the first established factory in Sakje County (DPRK) with
humble tools such as handlooms and spinning wheels.89 In the factory, ten “homemakers”
were employed. This labelling of women as “homemakers” suggests that women were not
seen as equal workers but instead as mothers first and then as contributors to North Korean
society.
In the poster captioned, “Let’s Hit the Target of Textiles of New Long-Term
Objectives Ahead of Schedule!” (see figure 5.4), a woman stands behind a table in a textile
factory.90 Her hands are placed on machinery and she looks out towards the viewer. The
woman wears a short-sleeved, collared blouse with a white apron covering and protecting her
clothing. A soft flower motif decorates the blouse, symbolising femininity within the work
environment. The clothing worn by the woman is simple and modern but retains distinctive
feminine traits, such as the pattern printed on the clothing and the apron covering her clothes.
The apron, an item of clothing usually associated with the domestic sphere, has been taken
from the home and introduced into the workplace. The woman’s face is framed by a short
bob ending below the ears and she does not wear any jewellery. Images such as this poster
promote to the international community that North Korean women have left their homes to
participate in the national economy. However, on closer examination of Women of Korea
socially accepted gender inequalities are revealed.
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Figure 5.4 “Let’s Hit the Target of Textiles of New Long-Term Objectives Ahead of
Schedule!” Date unknown. Poster. Women of Korea, 4 (100) (1983), p. 41.

The visual images and personal stories in Women of Korea reflect the importance
placed on women to educate the younger generation according to Kim Il Sung’s Juche idea.
In the DPRK, education is considered crucial to the destiny of the country.91 All children,
even those who live on remote islands or in mountainous areas are said to be educated at state
expense and are regarded as the “Kings of the Country” [sic].92 There is said to be a free
universal education system in the DPRK, which consists of a eleven-year program,
compulsory for children to attend (1972 DPRK Constitution, Article 45). By 1980, women

91
92

“Primary importance to education”, Women of Korea, 3 (135) (1992), p. 11.
Ibid.
150

composed 80 per cent of the labour force of primary school teachers and nursery school
teachers.93 This dominance in the sector can be seen in the visual images and articles
published in Women of Korea. For example, the article “Woman Principal in Mountain
Village”, tells the story of a female teacher, Kim Yong Suk, who worked for more than
twenty years at Sodu Senior Middle School, located in the remote area of Paegam County
(Ryanggang Province, DPRK).94 The article states that she went to teach the students because
no other teachers would live in a remote location. From the first day, Kim Yong Suk is said to
have pledged to the students that she would stay in the area and not return to the city to marry
as other female teachers had done previously.95 This claim places great importance on
women’s contribution to educating the future generation rather than fulfilling one’s own
plans, thus sacrificing one’s own happiness for the betterment of the country.
Kim Yong Suk was said to have been so dedicated to her work that even after
teaching the students during the daytime, she would visit the students’ homes at night to
guide them with their homework. However, the students’ work did not improve greatly so she
started walking with them to and from school and taught them along the way. She is said to
have made small plaques with mathematical formulas and foreign languages painted on them
and placed the plaques on the trees along the path where the students walked. Kim Yong Suk
was dedicated to improving the marks of students as they were the future of the revolution.96
All students at the Sodu Senior Middle School were said to have become honour students
because of Kim Yong Suk’s hard work.
The importance of women in the education sector is represented in the visual image
“Children Enter School” (see figure 5.5), which depicts three teachers welcoming their
students into the classroom.97 The large figure of the female teacher in the foreground is
dominant as she towers over the students and wears bright coloured clothing. She looks down
at her students happily. In comparison, the other teachers fade into the background and
appear only in a supportive role to the main figure, the teacher in the foreground. The main
teacher holds in one hand a book and with the other she is greeting a male student as he
enters the classroom. All three teachers wear ethnic Korean clothing. The main teacher is
dressed in a green hanbok with some alterations. While the sleeves of the dress cover her
arms, her legs are exposed below the knees, a more modern form of tradition dress. The
93
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teacher is groomed simply and is not adorned with elaborate make-up or jewellery; she wears
a badge of one of the Kim men on her dress. Her hair is pulled back into a ponytail.98
The children enter the classroom and walk towards the desks. Some students carry
colourful bunches of flowers and one student a hat. There are colourful ribbons on their
schoolbags. The female students wear short dresses and short-sleeved collared blouses. Their
hairstyles are varied in length but all wear light pink flower ornaments. Hair decoration in the
form of ribbons, bows and flowers can be found in most North Korean visual images of
young female children. This helps to feminise the figures and accentuates gender differences.
The male students are dressed in trousers, short-sleeved collared shirts, and hats, with short
hair. There are clear clothing differences between the students suggesting that the gendering
of males and females starts from a young age. In no visual images are young girls depicted
wearing long pants – they are always seen in dresses or skirts. In Women of Korea, working
North Korean women are rarely represented wearing trousers or long sleeved shirts. On the
rare occasion they are represented wearing trousers and jackets, their clothing is oversized
and does not emphasis the feminine body shape (see figure 5.6, “Going to the Farm Field”).99
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Figure 5.5 “Children Enter School”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. Women of Korea, 3 (131)
(1991), p. 22.
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Figure 5.6 “Going to Farm Field”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. Women of Korea, 2 (86)
(1980), p. 39.

The North Korean government places great importance on self-sufficiency and food
production. In the agriculture sector, efforts to increase production included a variety of
experiments with land tenure, farm organisation, and managerial techniques.100 Women were
active members of the agricultural workforce during planting and harvesting, and laboured in
road construction, land reclamation projects, and similar endeavours requiring mass
mobilisation.101 In the images and articles in Women of Korea, women are often represented
working on cooperative farms and producing food to sustain the country. 102 The North
Korean government saw women’s roles in the agricultural sector as an important contribution
to self-sufficiency. Visual images of women working on cooperative farms as food producers
100
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appear regularly in the magazine, for example, “A Nesting Place” (see figure 5.7).103 It is
unusual though, to find depictions of men working alongside women in the agriculture sector
in Women of Korea. In the painting, three people are working on a farm in an unspecified
mountainous region of the DPRK.104 The small work team or perhaps a family work unit is
composed of a man or father figure, a woman or mother figure, and a young woman or child.
The man or father figure kneels beside the birdcage, looking down towards the pheasants that
he is releasing into the wild. The male figure is dressed in Western-style clothing, consisting
of a long sleeved collared shirt, blue trousers and straw hat.
The older woman or mother figure stands beside the man with her hands in the air
releasing one of the birds. The position of the woman within the artwork and the colour of her
clothing draws the viewer’s eye to her. She stands tall and strong and wears the female
hanbok with some alterations. Unlike the visual images discussed in the previous chapter that
depict Kang Ban Sok in a traditionally long ethnic Korean dress, the length of this woman’s
skirt (chima) is shortened. The vibrant pink and white skirt and jacket (jeogori) worn by the
woman is drawn in at the waist, revealing her feminine shape and subtly sexualising the
female figure.
In the painting, the younger girl wears a light pink dress, resembling the Lenin dress
of the Soviet Union.105 The Lenin dress symbolised the national revolution in the Soviet
Union and was typically worn by female government staff.106 The clothing style became
popular amongst Korean women in the early 1940s at the Yan’an revolutionary base
(Shannxi, China). The dress later became associated with the Communist revolutionary
movement in the Soviet Union and East Asia and was worn in support of the movement.107
The young female figure stands in the background watching the man release the birds, while
carrying a cage of pheasants towards him. In Women of Korea, this painting is significant as
it represents the roles that men and women perform together in the North Korean agriculture
sector. The composition of figures in the painting is unusual as it is usually just women who
are depicted in the magazine.
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Figure 5.7 “A Nesting Place”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. Women of Korea, 3 (103) (1984),
p. 24.

From 1989 articles and visual images in Women of Korea, include women’s fashion in
the DPRK,108 traditional Korean food,109 and North Korean arts and literature.110 Below I
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discuss three key issues covered in the magazine: laws that were promulgated to protect the
rights of North Korean women, the rights of South Korean women and the so-called “comfort
women” issue.

The Law on Equality of the Sexes in Women of Korea
In Women of Korea, several articles in the mid-1980s describe the legal measures taken by
the North Korean government to ensure gender equality in the DPRK. Laws such as the Law
on Equality of the Sexes were included in the magazine to argue to those outside the country
that gender equality had been achieved in the DPRK.111 Before the liberation of Korea from
Japanese colonial rule, it is said that Korean women had been subjected to double and treble
exploitations and oppression for a long time.112 There were restraints imposed on Korean
women such as no right to free marriage, confinement to their houses, or being sold like
goods.113 However, one year after the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in
1945, Kim Il Sung made preparations for the promulgation of the law and is said to have
personally drafted the law himself.114 On 30 July 1946, Kim Il Sung is described as
proclaiming to the world:

With the liberation of Korea from the colonial rule of Japanese
imperialism, the social position of women changed. The democratic
reforms being carried out in north Korea have provided conditions for
liberating women form the former inequalities in the political,
economic, cultural and family life.115
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On the same day the Law on Equality of the Sexes was promulgated Comrade Kim Jong Suk
is described as meeting the officials of the Women’s Union to share the joy with them about
the new law.116 Informed that they were going to hold celebrations in the capital and
provinces, Kim Jong Suk is quoted as follows.

The celebrating meetings will be an effective occasion for education
to get the women to know well about the significance and importance
of the Law on Equality of the Sexes and make firm resolution to
repay the favour to General Kim Il Sung who enacted the law.117

Kim Jong Suk is then said to have taught the women how to hold the celebrations which took
place across the country. Kim Jong Suk attended the celebration held in the DPRK’s capital
Pyongyang, where she appealed to the women to take an active part in nation-building to
demonstrate the validity and vitality of the Law on Equality of the Sexes.118
On 1 August 1946, Kim Jong Suk is said to have told the Women’s Union to issue a
declaration supporting the Law on Equality of the Sexes. The declaration was to say:

All the women in our country support the Law on Sex Equality. The
Korean women had not been protected by law in state and public
lives and even in family life for 5,000 years. They had been forced
into slavery and suffered subhuman insult and treatment as a good of
the white slave market for 36 years under Japanese imperialist
occupation. For the equal work women got much lower wages than
men.119

Under the guidance of Kim Il Sung and the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the
Sexes, it is said that the position of Korean women changed radically as the Law granted
equal rights with men in politics, the economy and society. During the early days after the
promulgation of the Law, Kim Jong Suk guided the North Korean women to ensure they got
“rid of the outworn idea of predominance of man over women and equip them with the idea
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of sex equality”.120 It is also said that Kim Il Sung personally gave continuous guidance to the
North Korean people so that the law was thoroughly materialised in all fields of state and
social activities.121
In Women of Korea it is claimed that North Korean women now enjoy a happy life
and have no idea of gender inequality.122 These articles, looking back on the Law on Equality
of the Sexes of 1946, appear around the fortieth anniversary of the Law in 1986. These
articles were also published just after the United Nations International Decade for Women
(1975–1985), and after the enactment of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women in 1979 (see Appendix 1). This suggests that the North
Korean government might have been working with a consciousness of international events.

South Korean Women in Women of Korea
From the mid-1980s, several articles are published in Women of Korea that criticise the
“failure” of women’s rights in South Korea and the lack of protection in the labour force. 123
In the article “Hard Work Place to Death”, Kim Il Sung is said to have taught North Korean
women, that:

[t]he South Korean [female] workers are exploited and oppressed
more cruelly than in the days of Japanese imperialist rule. Far from
enjoying freedoms and rights, they find it difficult even to keep body
and soul together.124

When discussing the rights of South Korean women in contemporary society, articles
published in the magazine refer to the “occupation” of Korea by the United States of America
(USA). All South Korean women’s misfortunes and hardships in the labour force are said to
be entirely due to the USA and its “imperial evil policy of colonial enslavement” in South
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Korea.125 From the 1980s, tensions grew between the North Korean government and the USA
and South Korea due to the former US President Ronald Reagan’s (1911–2004) strong anticommunist stance and more assertive foreign policy.126 It was from this time that articles
published in Women of Korea, began to focus on the situation of South Korean women.
In the article “South Korean Women Groaning under ‘Hell of Labour’”, it is said that
female workers in South Korea are suffering from severe exploitation and oppression and are
“treated virtually as slaves” and paid low wages.127 South Korean women are said to be paid
one-half or one third of the wages male workers receive for the same work performed.128
According to data presented by the DPRK, the average monthly wage of female workers is
about 100, 000 won (146 AUD/ 111 USD) in 1983. Further, 59 per cent of all South Korean
women work over 10 hours a day and those women in public welfare services are forced to
do 10 to 12 hours or more and have no holidays all year, as well as work overtime without
pay.129 South Korean women are said to work in drudgery without taking meals and are in
constant danger of dismissal at defective work places with no labour protection facilities
available to them to access.130
Due to the poor working conditions, it is said that female workers are tortured with all
kinds of occupational and other diseases. According to the article, every year there are several
hundred cases of nervous paralysis in the lower body amongst the female workers. Further,
workers in South Korean factories can lose their eyesight and develop tuberculosis symptoms
because of the poisonous gas, high heat and a foul labour environment.131 The intensity of
labour that the South Korean women are said to be compelled to is said to be far beyond the
limit of their “physical strength”.132 The suffering of South Korean women working in the
factories is said to not be an isolated case as women who work in the fibre, clothes and
leather industries also suffer from injustices.133 In the DPRK, such depictions of the situation
of South Korea would be intended to demonstrate the superiority of the North Korean regime.
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When addressing an international audience, these English-language articles would be an
attempt to claim legitimacy for the North Korean regime and the success of the provisions in
state laws that protect the rights of North Korean women.

The “Comfort Women” Issue in Women of Korea
From the 1990s, there were articles in Women of Korea that explored the issue of the socalled Korean “comfort women”, an issue that was then receiving international attention.134
An article in the magazine, “Volunteer corps” states that the greatest crime committed by
Japan against the Korean people was the drafting of Korean women as “comfort girls” in the
name of the “volunteer corps”.135 The North Korean government asserts that the “volunteer
corps” originated from Japan’s intention to assimilate the Korean nation to Japan and
obliterate the Korean lineage.136 The article continues by stating that the “comfort girl”
system was established on a secret order from the former Japanese Ministry of the Army,
which initiated the system to prevent “the spreading of war weariness” among the troops.137
The draft is described as applying to unmarried women aged from 17 to 20 years but girls in
their teenage years were said to have been “dragged to comfort houses”.138 When they did not
submit they were killed, shot, dismembered and hung.139 According to the article
“Grievances”, in urban areas the comfort houses were managed by civilians under the
guidance of the Japanese military and on the battle front by the Japanese themselves.140
North Korea states that such women were first employed during the Japanese-Chinese
War (or the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945) but numbers are said to have grown
134
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after the massacre in Nanjing (1937–1938).141 After the event in Nanjing, the rape of women
was prohibited by Japan so the so-called “comfort system” was said to have been established.
In the article “Volunteer corps” the number of Korean women draftees in the Pacific War is
estimated at about 200,000.142 In order to prevent the crimes against the Korean people being
divulged during and after the occupation of the country, the North Korean government stated
that Japan kept the matter of the “Volunteer corps” secret and that many documents that
outlined what had happened were burnt.143 However, the crimes committed by the Japanese
military were revealed by public activists, by the people involved in the crimes and by the
victims themselves. The DPRK states that the criminal actions committed by Japan can never
be pardoned nor should history be falsified.144 The North Korean government demands that
the government of Japan apologise for the inhuman crimes committed against countless
Korean women who were sent to sexual slavery by the Japanese military. 145 The North
Korean reporting of this issue suggests a consciousness of international debates. In the
DPRK, the government’s statements on this issue would have been a means of promoting
nationalist and anti-Japanese sentiment. In the international context, this would have been a
means of deflecting certain criticisms of the North Korean regime. In particular, there was
increasing attention in the 1990s to incidents where the North Korean government had
abducted Japanese citizens, something which Kim Jong Il finally admitted in the year 2002 in
a summit meeting with the then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō (1942–).146

Conclusion
Articles and visual images in Women of Korea represent the North Korean government’s
constructed view of masculinity and femininity in society, the workplace and the family unit.
The goal of the North Korean government to liberate women from the home was based on the
assumption that women were primary caregivers and the belief that women had not
previously contributed meaningfully to society as active workers in the labour force. It is
evident in the articles and visual images in the magazine that North Korean women are
141
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assigned to gender specific jobs in the labour force, which are based on their perceived
attributes rather than actual ability. Women are assigned to occupations in the light industries
and service industries such as textile manufacturing, nursing and teaching based on the belief
that they are better suited to this work. Work in these industries is paid less than other
occupations and women have fewer opportunities to progress to managerial roles. This means
that any gender equality laws in the North Korean legal system are undermined by the
segregation of women to gender-specific roles in the labour force.
The North Korean government also promoted the idea in Women of Korea that
women could successfully combine their roles in the home with their responsibilities to work
in building a strong socialist society. In the family unit North Korean women continued to be
represented wearing the ethnic Korean hanbok, while women working in the light industries
were represented in simple and modern, but feminine, clothing. In contrast, North Korean
men in the family and work context are not represented in ethnic Korean clothing but in
Western dress, suggesting that men are able to progress into a modern North Korean society.
The magazine regularly published articles on the Law on Equality of the Sexes, but at the
same time the depictions of women as mothers and as workers reveal the gendered
assumptions behind the allocation of domestic tasks and different occupations. As mentioned
above, from the 1990s, the issue of the “comfort women” or military sexual slavery system
perpetrated by the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy received increased international
attention, and this is reflected in Women of Korea.147 The North Korean government
attempted to mobilise attention to this issue in its international communications, as we shall
see below.
In the next chapter, I focus on the changing economic situation in the DPRK in the
1990s. This provides necessary context for understanding the communications between the
North Korean government and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women in the early twenty-first century, to be explored in chapter
seven.
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6. The North Korean Food Crisis and
Gender Relations (1990s)
The current standard of living of our people cannot be
said to be very high, but it is still higher than it was in the
past. The young generation, not knowing what hardship
is, are enjoying a life in which there is nothing in the
world for them to envy.
Kim Jong Il, 31 December 1994. 1

Introduction
In previous chapters, I have considered the representations of North Korean men and women
as presented to the world by the North Korean government in its official propaganda
publication, Women of Korea. This official publication presented the roles of revolutionary
heroines and members of the Kim family who were defenders of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), as well as more “ordinary women” who were loyal
mothers and wives and who worked in feminised occupations. While North Korean men were
represented as soldiers and defenders of the nation, Kim Il Sung was represented as the
national patriarch. In 1992, Women of Korea ceased to be published due to major economic
and political upheavals. From 2000, however, the North Korean government communicated
with the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(hereafter “CEDAW Committee”), as will be discussed in the next chapter. In this chapter, I
provide the reader with background knowledge of the famine in the DPRK during the 1990s.
This provides a bridge between the discussion of the official representations of gender roles
in English-language publications from the 1960s to the early 1990s and the discussion of the
official representation of gender roles in the communications with the CEDAW Committee in
the early 2000s.
In this chapter I focus on non-governmental organisations (NGO) sources to discuss
the situation in the DPRK in the 1990s, in the absence of official sources. The NGO sources
1
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also provide an alternative view of gender relations in the DPRK, providing a corrective to
official North Korean rhetoric promoted to the international community. I begin by outlining
the collapse of the North Korean economy in the 1990s and the effects on the official Public
Distribution System (PDS). It was during this time that the country also experienced natural
disasters and a shortage of food as agricultural land was destroyed from flooding. I then
discuss the opening up of the DPRK from the 1990s as the North Korean government was
forced to allow NGOs to work within the country to provide aid. I then explain the
consolidation of Kim Jong Il’s power after the death of his father, Kim Il Sung, in 1994.
Finally, I discuss the challenge to men and women’s roles in society and the home because of
the food shortage and economic crisis.
In 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) collapsed and
terminated its aid to the DPRK and China halted trade with its neighbour. Without the heavily
subsidised fuel from the Soviet Union and China, the DPRK was unable to use agricultural
equipment, and as a result the country’s agricultural sector weakened and food production fell
sharply.2 From 1991 to 1996 the North Korean economy contracted by 30 per cent,
coinciding with extreme weather conditions such as droughts and floods across the country.3
In this situation hundreds of thousands of North Korean people suffered from chronic
malnutrition and ultimately death.4 According to the World Food Programme (WFP), the two
main contributors to the substantial food crisis in the DPRK were the stagnant agricultural
sector and the country’s declining economic situation coupled with the natural disasters. This
made an already deteriorating food supply situation much worse.5 Without adjusting the
economic policy to the rapidly changing circumstances, the North Korean government
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instead reduced the daily food rations distributed through the PDS and launched the “Let’s
Eat Two Meals a Day” Campaign in 1991.6 The PDS distributes subsidised rations on a
gram-per-day per person basis, according to a person’s occupation, gender and social class.
This system was established by the North Korean government in the 1950s. By 1997, the
PDS was only able to supply 6 per cent of the population with food.7 Those receiving food
rations were located in the capital Pyongyang or had close connections to the government.
The rest of the population who did not have access to the food distribution system adopted
coping strategies such as foraging for alternative foods like roots, grasses, tree bark, and
stalks. It has been argued that the North Korean government could have avoided the food
shortage by simply making reasonable policy adjustments, such as maintaining food imports
on a commercial basis or aggressively seeking multilateral assistance. Instead, the
government blocked food aid to the hardest-hit areas in the DPRK and restricted commercial
imports as humanitarian assistance began to arrive.8
Amidst the economic collapse and natural disasters, on 8 July 1994, North Korea’s
Great Leader Kim Il Sung collapsed from a sudden heart attack leaving the country in a
fragile political state. It would take his son three years to consolidate his power. Kim Jong Il
(1941–2011) officially took over his father’s post as General Secretary of the Workers’ Party
of Korea (WPK) on 8 October 1997. From this time, the government directed state funds
towards strengthening the military instead of sourcing food and other state resources. It is
understandable, therefore, that the last edition of the magazine Women of Korea was
published in 1992 as the priority of the WPK shifted to stabilising Kim Jong Il’s political
position in North Korean society. Other North Korean magazines such as Korea Today
continued to be published in various languages such as English, Russian, Chinese, French,
Spanish and Arabic and distributed to the world. The English-language version of Korea
Today was published monthly by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Pyongyang
from 1959 to date. Although the content of the magazine does not focus primarily on gender
equality in the DPRK the economic and political achievements of the North Korean
government are promoted for the world to see.
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Faced with a deteriorating economic situation and food shortages, the North Korean
government initially did not want to share openly with the world the full extent of the food
crisis and imposed tighter controls on the population to hide the extent of the disaster.9 This
only exacerbated the effects of the famine and the subsequent food crisis.10 During this time
the North Korean government did, however, allow a number of NGOs to work in the country
to administer food and medical aid to the North Korean people. While these NGOs were
allowed to work in the DPRK they were heavily monitored by the government and were only
allowed into selected areas of the country to distribute aid. Although the work of the NGOs is
relatively limited because of government control, their activities forced the DPRK to open up
to the international community.11

Consolidation of Power by Kim Jong Il
At the time of Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, the most important position held by Kim Jong Il
in North Korea’s political system was in the military, specifically second in command of the
Korean People’s Army (KPA).12 In order to keep control of the government, Kim Jong Il
needed to secure his support base in the military so he deliberately chose to sideline other
aspects of the government in order to assert the importance of the military.13 This included
the abolition of the Central People’s Committee, the state presidency, and sidelining the
North Korean Administration Council, as the KPA became the most powerful organ in the
DPRK.14
On 24 December 1991 at the 19th Plenary Meeting of the Sixth Party Central
Committee, Kim Jong Il was appointed as the Supreme Commander of the KPA and moved
his organisational base from the WPK to the National Defence Commission (NDC). A year
later on 20 April, he received the title Marshal, the DPRK Constitution was revised, and the
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NDC became the leading state body (1992 Constitution, Article 106).15 In 1993, Kim Jong Il
became chairman of the NDC at the Fifth Session of the Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly
(SPA) and was formally elected leader of the Assembly in 1998. He held this position until
his death in 2011. In 1998, the DPRK Constitution was revised as Kim Jong Il took total
political control of the DPRK. The amended Constitution designated Kim Il Sung as “Eternal
President” (Preamble), the NDC was elevation to the highest organ of the state (Article 108),
and Kim Jong Il as its chairperson (Article 107). This meant that Kim Jong Il was elevated to
the highest position in the DPRK. Lacking the war hero credentials of his father, though, Kim
Jong Il shifted the fundamental orientation of the state in his effort to win the support of the
military by bestowing on the NDC policy influence and prestige, as well as a large share of
the national budget, through the Songun (“Military-First”) Policy.
Once Kim Jong Il came to power, the “Military-First” Policy became the major
ideology of the DPRK. Under this policy, the KPA was elevated to primary position in the
North Korean government and society. The policy also prioritised the defence force in the
affairs of the state; defence was allocated the majority of state resources, such as food and
money, as well as acting as a guide for international relations.16 Although, Kim Il Sung’s
Juche ideology continued to function in the DPRK, Songun soon replaced the older ideology
as Kim Jong Il consolidated his power over the government, military and the North Korean
people.17 One reason why the “Military-First” Policy was promoted by Kim Jong Il after
1994 was the desire to increase the DPRK’s military strength within the region. 18 In this
context, Songun has been perceived as an aggressive, threatening move to increase the
strength of the North Korean military at the expense of other parts of society. 19
On 7 April 1997, the “Military-First” Policy was mentioned for the first time in
Rodong Shinmun (Workers’ Daily) under the headline “There Is a Victory for Socialism in
the Guns and Bombs of the People’s Army”.20 The article defined the ideology as “the

15

Dae-kyu Yoon, “The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications”, Fordham International Law
Journal, 27 (4) (2003), p. 1299.
16
Vorontsov, “North Korean Military-first policy”; Jae Kyu Park, “North Korea since 2000 and prospects for
Inter-Korean Relations”, North Korea International Documentation Project (Washington, DC: Woodrow
Wilson Center, 17 January 2006, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/north-korea-2000-and-prospects-for-interkorean-relations (accessed 21 April 2014).
17
Soyoung Kwon, “State Building in North Korea: From a ‘Self-Reliant’ to a ‘Military-First’ State”, Asian
Affairs, 34 (3) (2003), p. 294.
18
Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: The New Press, 2004), p. 102.
19
Vorontsov, “North Korean Military-first policy”.
20
Kyo Duk Lee, The Successor theory of North Korea (Seoul: Korean Institution for National Reunification,
2004), p. 9.
168

revolutionary philosophy to safeguard our own style of socialism under any circumstances”.21
In 1998, Songun began appearing in conjunction with other terms, including “military-first
revolutionary idea”, “military-first revolutionary leadership”, and “military-first politics”,
expanding the concept of the policy into even more aspects of North Korean governance.22
On 5 September 1998, the DPRK Constitution was amended to state that the NDC, the
highest military force in the DPRK, was the supreme body of the state (Article 100 to Article
113). This date is considered the official beginning of the Songun era and means that by this
time Kim Jong Il had consolidated his power over all aspects of North Korean society.23

The North Korean Food Crisis
Since 1946, the DPRK has been dependent on financial and agricultural assistance from the
Soviet Union and China. One of the causes of the North Korean famine and food crisis in the
1990s was changes to this assistance. After the DPRK’s bilateral trade with the Soviet Union
dropped more than ten-fold from $2.56 million in 1990 to $1.4 million in 1994, the DPRK
became dependent on China for assistance.24 However, the DPRK’s bilateral trade with China
also fell from US$900 million in 1993 to $550 million in 1995, while food imports fell by
half between 1993 and 1994.25 The seasonal arrival of extreme rains in July and August in the
DPRK in 1995 compounded by soil erosion led to flooding that destroyed the yearly harvest.
These events contributed to a period of food insecurity and ultimately the starvation of the
North Korean people. This period has been referred to as the Arduous March by the DPRK.26
Between 1996 and 1999, it is estimated that between 450,000 and 2 million people starved to
death.27
Since the North Korean government was forced to make an unprecedented appeal to
the international community for food aid and assistance,28 the state opened up to the world to
some extent.29 The international community responded to the food shortage in the DPRK
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with generosity and committed more than two billion dollars over a decade.30 However, this
has resulted in the DPRK becoming increasingly dependent on international assistance
instead of the government addressing economic and agricultural issues. The United Nations
(UN) responded to the food shortage in 1995 when the United Nations Disaster Assessment
and Coordination (UNDAC) team was sent to the DPRK to try and obtain reliable
information.31 The UNDAC team consisted of representatives of the World Food Programme
(WFP), World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations International Children’s
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). The
functionality of UNDAC in the DPRK was limited, though, as its mission was primarily in
the development sector as opposed to humanitarian operations. The one exception was the
agricultural sector, where relief and rehabilitation work were conjoined.32 An important
consequence of UNDAC’s visit to the DPRK was that several organisations became
permanently established in the country.33 The WFP established an office in Pyongyang in
November 1995, UNICEF in January 1996 and WHO in late 1997. These organisations have
continued their limited roles in the DPRK to date.
NGOs working in the DPRK have faced many challenges when delivering aid as
North Korean officials often monitor their operations. There are a limited number of NGOs
who are able to monitor the distribution of aid in the DPRK, as they are strictly controlled by
the government and often excluded from places that are deemed to represent the country
negatively to the world. Initially, NGOs were blocked from visiting the northeast provinces
of Chagang, South Hamgyong, North Hamgyong, and Ryanggang, as well as parts of
Kangwon, South Hwanghae, and North and South Pyongyang. 34 It could be assumed that
these areas were the worst hit by natural disasters and famine and the North Korean
government did not want to reveal the full extent of the food crisis to the world. Between
1995 and 2000, the international community concentrated mostly on easing the food shortage
and on providing medical treatment for the North Korean people.35 The North Korean
government, though, insisted that NGOs use the PDS to distribute aid to recipients but NGOs
demanded to be able to monitor the distribution of aid themselves. The government, however,
did not listen to this request and did not allow NGOs to perform random visits to sites. As
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these conditions restricted the operation of NGOs, it was difficult to assess how much of each
donation actually reached its intended recipients and how much was diverted for resale in
private markets or to the military.36 It is precisely for this reason that humanitarian aid to the
DPRK poses moral dilemmas.
There were also concerns from NGOs about the reliability of data provided by the
government on the number of North Korean people suffering from the food crisis. To address
this issue UNICEF provided capacity-building programs to the DPRK Central Bureau of
Statistics.37 Reliable statistical information is still difficult to obtain from the North Korean
government. For example, figures on the number of North Koreans who died during the food
crisis are difficult to obtain and estimates between 1991 and 1998 vary widely ranging from
220,000 to 3.5 million, out of a pre-famine population of approximately 22 million (between
2.7 and 4.5 per cent of the total population).38 Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights
& Refugees (Good Friends) states that during the most acute phase of the famine between
August 1995 and late July 1998, an estimated one to two million people died of starvation,39
and hundreds of thousands of people crossed the North Korean border to China to obtain
food. Over time though, some smaller NGOs did obtain better access and monitoring than
much larger international organisations, giving them some assurance that aid was reaching
the right recipients.40
NGOs such as Médicins Sans Frontières, Oxfam, Action Contre La Faim, CARE, the
United States Private Voluntary Organisation Consortium and Médicins Du Monde, though,
have withdrawn from the DPRK, citing inadequate access to people and the consequent
inability to account for the use of their aid supplies.41 As discussed above, the monitoring of
aid distribution has often been problematic and visits to certain areas require prior permission
from the North Korean government.42 Médicins Sans Frontières has stated that restrictions on
access made it impossible to deliver aid in a “principled and effective” manner.43
Organisations that withdrew from the DPRK requested donor governments to review their aid
policies towards the DPRK, to exact greater accountability, to ensure that aid agencies were
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able to assess needs impartially and have direct access to the population. Several sources
have even asserted that the North Korean government distributes international aid to those
who are loyal to the state, while some of the most vulnerable groups have been neglected.44
Other NGOs, such as German Agro Action (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe) have
continued to provide humanitarian aid in the DPRK, as these organisations believe that slow
improvements in access and monitoring justify their continued involvement.45 Despite
concerns about access, other larger humanitarian organisations such as the WFP, the FAO
and UNICEF have all continued working in the DPRK. However, most of the food supplied
by the WFP, the biggest humanitarian organisation present in the country, is distributed
through the PDS. North Korean officials’ insistence that food aid be distributed through this
distribution system is to “provide a vehicle for control over distribution of the resources
provided by the international community, reinforcing the existing institutional, regional,
social biases of the North Korean system”.46

Challenging Gender Roles in North Korean Society
Before the North Korean food crisis, gender roles and the division of work in the home were
strictly fixed. Since the economic instability of the country combined with natural disasters,
however, gender roles have been challenged.47 Since the 1990s, the North Korean PDS
system has failed to operate effectively and the government is unable to provide food and
other necessities to its citizens. Faced with a failing economy and food shortages the North
Korean government emphasised the importance of the “socialist extended family” in the
Family Law (1990, Articles 1 and 3). This provision intended the integration of state and
society by focusing on family groups,48 meaning that, when faced with difficulties, the state
passed the economic burden of supporting individuals (through the PDS) to the family
(Family Law, Articles 35 and 36). In this situation, the financial responsibility of the family
became the primary responsibility of women, as most North Korean men lost the ability to
support their families because food coupons were not distributed through their workplaces on
a regular basis.
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As state factories and enterprises closed, households decided that it was more
important for North Korean men to remain in state employment, meaning far fewer men left
their official workplaces compared to women.49 With men staying in the official economy, it
allowed households to meet security requirements and access residual social services
provided through the work unit, however inadequate. In contrast, North Korean women who
had worked in state-owned workplaces left their official employment and gravitated towards
employment in the marketplace.50 Some women in the official economy were dismissed and
sent home to help relieve the economic burden.51 By reducing the number of women
employed in the official economy, the government was able to decrease the amount
distributed through the PDS. Thus, in economically uncertain times many women were
forced to become active players in the unofficial North Korean economy.52
One of the unintended consequences of this avoidable food crisis was the widespread
emergence of informal markets. As the PDS was no longer able to provide rations or minimal
food amounts the North Korean government was unable to exercise the level of control over
the establishment of markets that it had once had.53 Prior to the mid-1990s, the North Korean
government maintained a centrally planned economy and markets were suppressed,54 but
from the mid-1990s, the importance of the market grew. The government’s inability to fulfil
its economic obligations unleashed an unplanned, bottom-up marketisation of the economy
resulting in the alteration of social and political relations among the population. Although the
North Korean government initially tolerated markets during the food crisis, the state
controlled the items traded, the actual size of the marketplace, and the operation period of the
markets.55 The present market system in the DPRK was established as agricultural markets in
1950, under the management of the People’s Council in each province, city, and county.
Agricultural products or commercial and industrial products were traded. In August 1958, the
agricultural markets were given the new name “Farmers’ Market”. Items were restricted to
vegetables and subsidiary food and industrial products were prohibited. By 1992, the
government intensified its control by closing unauthorised markets and adjusting the
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frequency of activities in the markets from every day to every ten days.56 As the food crisis
worsened by the mid-1990s though, markets reopened daily and official control over trade
items was relaxed to some extent. From this time, markets became an essential element in
North Korean society, functioning as an alternative source of income and food for many
families.
It was North Korean women who engaged in peddling and trade in the marketplace
order to buy food for their families, as men shied away from these kinds of activities as they
were often looked down upon.57 Women living mostly in the northeastern regions of the
DPRK saw China as their best strategy for survival.58 Control on freedom of movement was
loosened, to some extent, as large numbers of people attempted to escape from the DPRK and
others sought to obtain supplies from China to trade. As more North Koreans travelled back
and forth to China, they saw for themselves the relative prosperity of their neighbour and
received information about the Republic of Korea (ROK), which was vastly different from
the official propaganda.59 In this context, the North Korean leadership made numerous efforts
to rein in the markets and constrain freedom of movement within the country and across the
border. These measures met with various levels of resistance. It is estimated that informal
economic activities reached 78 per cent of total income for North Korean households a
decade after the famine of the mid-1990s.60
There were also unforeseen consequences for North Korean women who left their
homes to participate in the unofficial economy as cases of violence against them increased
both in the home and by government officials in marketplaces. Women were often forced to
submit to North Korean officials who asked for sexual intercourse in exchange for permission
to continue their economic activities.61 This also occurred for women who travelled in the
DPRK and across the border to China to obtain items to sell. Women not only faced abuse by
North Korean officials but by ordinary men on public transport and in the marketplaces. The
North Korean government does not acknowledge that women are exposed to these kinds of
violent acts and has not made any public comment concerning the need to monitor and
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reprimand those who commit such crimes against women.62 Violence against North Korean
women, in many forms, will be discussed in detail in chapter 7 in the context of reports to the
CEDAW Committee.

Challenging Gender Roles in North Korean Families
Although many North Korean women became financially independent because of their
activities in the marketplace or by trade, they did not deny the authority of the patriarchal
head of the family and continued to respect the superiority and authority of their husbands or
fathers.63 Also, while the financial provider in the family unit was challenged because of the
food crisis, women continued to be primarily responsible for raising children.64 Customary
practices continued to exist in North Korean homes, although some men tried to support their
wives in childrearing responsibilities and the collection of food.65
During the food crisis, North Korean official rhetoric continued to emphasise
women’s place within the home as wives and mothers. As part of their perceived
responsibilities, women were to take care of their own or their husband’s parents and as a
revolutionary comrade to actively assist and support their husbands in revolutionary
projects.66 This role as a dutiful wife and caring mother is taught to young girls in the school
and family environments. However, these teachings perpetuate the cultural assumption that
women are not independent beings but rather subordinate to the patriarchal head of the
family. From the fourth grade girls are taught a separate subject, “Training for Women” on
the role of women within the home. This subject covers topics such as cooking, sewing and
menstruation.67 Information about birth control methods, sexual hygiene, and sexually
transmissible diseases, however, is not provided. The absence of appropriate sex education
led many North Koreans to have misperceptions about contraception methods.68 As North
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Korean women and men are not exposed to different contraception measures, women tended
to rely on abortions if they had an unwanted pregnancy.69
North Korean women reported to the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human
Rights (NKHR) that before the food crisis care for infants and children was well organised by
state organisations and available to all people but this changed during the instability of the
1990s.70 As a result, women began relying on their in-laws or their older children to take care
of younger children while they went out to look for work. Mothers who worked in the
markets or traded on the borders often kept their daughters out of school to take over their
domestic work.71 Helping in the house, and attending to a family business or farm affected
both boys and girls but girls mostly did household chores such as baby-sitting or attending to
the house garden. It is evident that women and girls have continued to be exposed to various
types of stereotyping and customary cultural practices in the family and North Korean
society.
During the 1990s, incidences of family breakdown and divorce increased as family
members separated in search for food or ways to earn money.72 Women who travelled for
their livelihood returned to their home just once or twice a month, consequently weakening
family ties, sometimes leading to divorce.73 Before the food crisis, obtaining a divorce was
difficult as the North Korean government tried to keep families together. In the early years of
the DPRK with the growing influence of the Korean Democratic Women’s Union (KDWU,
Women’s Union) in the 1960s, women were only encouraged to divorce their husbands in the
case of an ideological difference or if the husband was accused of a political crime.74 During
the food crisis though, it became easier for ordinary people to bribe judges with cigarettes or
alcohol to obtain divorce papers.75 Many women resorted to illegal means such as bribery to
escape their situation, as there were no other appropriate legal channels for women to turn to
for help.76 Judges usually grant divorce when a woman alleges continuous domestic violence
or a husband’s alcoholism.77 The North Korean government has also practised breaking up
families by forcing couples to divorce because of one family member’s undesirable
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background.78 If either husband or wife commits a political crime and is sentenced to prison,
then their partner has no choice but to divorce him or her, otherwise they are forced to join
their family in prison.79 When an individual is sentenced to a political prison camp, families
generally accompany them because they are believed to be guilty by association. 80 This
practice is utilised extensively against the so-called “hostile class”.
Since the food crisis, women have indicated to NGOs that domestic violence,
including verbal and physical abuse has increased significantly. 81 There is a general
perception, though, that domestic violence is not a crime and that the government should not
intervene in private family matters.82 For those who witness domestic violence or are victims
and want to report the incident to the police, they reported to NKHR that the police
completely disregard them and send them back home.83 With women working in markets and
trade activities, their economic situation improved, allowing some to flee from violent
situations.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided background to the food crisis in the DPRK during the 1990s
by examining the information collected and provided by NGOs working in the country.
During this time, the food crisis affected the roles of North Korean men and women in the
home and society. The most notable change was the challenge to customary practices in the
family unit, as women became the primary providers. Many women were forced to carry out
survival strategies such as trade activities along the border with China to save themselves and
their families.84 In a situation where the PDS collapsed and men were not able to provide
financially for their families, women also became active players in local markets in the
DPRK. This created new opportunities for them as well as new challenges for those who
sought to protect gendered roles.85 The new role that women played gave them at the very
least some economic power but even though these women improved their economic situation,
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it is likely that many remained subordinate to that of the household head as patriarchal values
remained embedded in North Korean society. Although gender stereotypes have been
challenged, it has also added to women’s burdens, as they are now in many cases primary
financial providers.
In the following chapter, I return to the theme of how the North Korean government
presents itself to the international community in an analysis of a brief period when the DPRK
engaged with the CEDAW Committee between 2001 and 2005. These reports reveal for the
first time issues not previously discussed by the North Korean government with the world. In
particular, the reports focused on discrimination against women in all forms, verbal and
physical, and in all parts of society from family life to employment, as well as addressing
women’s access to education, health and employment. The reports also provide examples of
customary discrimination practices in the DPRK that the government acknowledges need to
be addressed. Close examination of the DPRK’s reporting, however, reveals the extent to
which gendered stereotypes still underpin the government’s views of the roles of men and
women, even while it promotes a commitment to achieving gender equality to the
international community.
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7. North Korea and the CEDAW
Committee (2001–2005)
Women should not only be given equal political and
economic rights with men but also be attentively cared for
as they shoulder [the] heavy maternal burden [sic].
Kim Il Sung, 9 May 1946. 1

Introduction
As discussed above, due to the food crisis of the 1990s, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK, North Korea) opened up to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to ensure
food aid reached North Koreans in need. This communication with the outside world exposed
the DPRK to the international community and its negative views of the regime and the human
rights of its citizens. Pressure from the world grew from the 1990s for the North Korean
government to follow the United Nations (UN) human rights instruments it had acceded to
and to sign on to the other human rights treaties and conventions. From 2000 to 2005, the
relationship between the North Korean government and the UN developed positively and
communication flowed. During this time, state reports were submitted by the DPRK on four
of the key conventions to which the country is a party: the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2000, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 2002, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2002 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) in 2003.2 This shows a degree of conformity by the DPRK to treaty obligations
never seen before or since.3
1
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In this chapter, I focus on the DPRK’s communication regarding CEDAW. The
DPRK acceded to CEDAW in 2001 and over a four-year period from 2001 to 2005 there was
an exchange of reports between the North Korean government and the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereafter “CEDAW
Committee”). In the reports, the government maintains that discrimination against women in
all forms, verbal and physical, was abolished after the revolutionary struggle against Japan
(1910–1945) and with the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946. In this
chapter, I argue that a close examination of the DPRK’s reporting reveals the extent to which
gendered stereotypes still underpin the government’s views of the roles of men and women,
even while it promotes its commitment to gender equality to the international community.
The DPRK’s reporting to the CEDAW Committee is important as it demonstrates
how the North Korean government presents itself to the world, and how it negotiates the gap
between official views of gender equality and the actual conditions in the DPRK. Reports
exchanged between the DPRK and the CEDAW Committee are one of the few official
sources available for gaining some indication of the stance of the North Korean government
on women’s rights and include the few-recorded cases where the government acknowledges
gender discrimination in the country. In response to the DPRK the CEDAW Committee
requested additional information, to which the North Korean government responded.4 The
correspondence between the CEDAW Committee and the DPRK provides the primary
sources for this chapter. I also refer to shadow reports by two NGOs: the Citizens’ Alliance
for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) and Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human
Rights and Refugees (Good Friends).5
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The DPRK and the CEDAW Committee
In February 2001, the North Korean government agreed to the guidelines and procedures
outlined in CEDAW (see Appendix 1). The North Korean government continued
communication with the CEDAW Committee until 2005. There are several possible reasons
for the limited relationship between the DPRK and CEDAW Committee, although they are
not discussed in the reports. These reasons may include the censorship of information by the
government, travel restrictions placed on officials, or the lack of state funds to send
representatives to meetings. The interruption in the communication with the CEDAW
Committee could also be because of the position of the DPRK in the world. In January 2002,
the then United States (US) President George W. Bush (1946–) described the DPRK, Iran and
Iraq as the “Axis of Evil”. The Bush administration initiated an overtly hostile and accusatory
policy toward each of these countries after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001
(“9/11”), alleging that they were involved in illicit activities relating to nuclear weapons. 6
Undeterred by lack of evidence and the failure to find a nuclear weapons program (or any
weapons of mass destruction) in Iraq, the Bush administration remained relentlessly focused
on the nuclear weapons ambitions of the DPRK and Iran, all the while ignoring or minimising
non-confrontational diplomatic efforts.7 As noted above, in 2002 the then leader Kim Jong Il
admitted that the North Korean government had in the past abducted Japanese citizens, a
continuing source of tension between Japan and the DPRK.8 In 2003, the diplomatic hostility
of the Bush administration towards the DPRK resulted in the North Korean government
withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).9 This was the impetus for the
Six-Party talks held between the DPRK, South Korea, China, the United States, Russia, and
Japan, which aimed to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns in the region,
particularly in regards to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Little progress was made
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until the fifth round of talks (9–11 November 2005), when the DPRK agreed to shut down its
nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid.10
The North Korean government has offered no reason as to why communication stalled
with the CEDAW Committee and the Committee has not explained the absence of
correspondence with the DPRK since 2005. However, the CEDAW Committee continues to
request further information from the DPRK regarding gender equality. The Committee has
also requested that the North Korean government sign the Optional Protocol to CEDAW but
to date the country has neither signed nor ratified the Optional Protocol (see Appendix 2).11
The DPRK’s Coordination Committee of the Implementation of CEDAW
On 10 September 2001, the DPRK formed the National Coordination Committee of the
Implementation of CEDAW. The Committee is composed of representatives from the
Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly (Presidium of SPA), the Cabinet, the Ministry
of Labour, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Central Court and Central Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as other state
organs.12 In total, there are seventeen members on the National Coordination Committee.13
Initially, the North Korean government believed that the implementation of the Convention
should be carried out by women, and at first included only two men in the membership of the
Committee. Later the government is said to have realised that the elimination of
discrimination against women also depends on the attitudes of men and decided that both
women and men must carry out the implementation of CEDAW.14 By 2003, eight men had
been elected members of the Committee.
The duties of the National Coordination Committee include the administration and
implementation of CEDAW, the drafting of reports and the examination of how the
requirements of the Convention are embodied in state legislation.15 Among the Committee’s
most important tasks was the preparation of the initial report to the CEDAW Committee. The
10
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National Coordination Committee is said to have collected data from government bodies and
NGOs concerned with the various sectors of the country. The drafters of the report included
officials from the judicial, legislative, and administrative bodies of the North Korean
government.16 The leader of the country and trusted members of the Workers Party of Korea
(WPK) typically revise any information released to the international community. 17 Therefore,
the draft report was submitted first to the government bodies for their review, and then to the
Presidium of Supreme People’s Assembly, at which time women deputies are said to have
offered their views. The Presidium represents the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) when
the SPA was not in session.18 The National Coordination Committee also works to examine
how the requirements of CEDAW are embodied in state legislation. The Committee
established a system for the supervision of the implementation of the Convention by
coordinating with the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Labour and other
government organs concerned with the rights of women. The North Korean government
suggests in the report to the CEDAW Committee that officials in the sectors of law,
education, and public health improved their views towards women because of the
Convention.19
The National Coordination Committee participated in a study tour on CEDAW to the
Philippines in February 2002. The Committee stated that it was necessary for officials to have
more opportunities for international training.20 To address critical gaps in data collection and
knowledge, the UN organises study tours for countries with new human rights protection
systems to learn from those with more advanced systems.

The DPRK Reports to the CEDAW Committee
An initial report for consideration to the CEDAW Committee was submitted by the DPRK on
11 September 2002.21 The report was in accordance with the CEDAW Guidelines Regarding
the Form and Content of the Initial Reports of States Parties (Article 18).22 Under this Article,
state parties submit to the UN Secretary-General a report on the legislative, judicial,
administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of
16
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CEDAW.23 Progress made by state parties is reported within one year after the Convention’s
entry into force and thereafter every four years or when the Committee requests. To date the
DPRK has submitted an initial report in 2002 but not the required follow-up reports in 2006,
2010, and 2014. The DPRK’s initial report was divided into two parts. Part One, titled
General Survey, provided an overview of the political structure of the DPRK, the legal
framework whereby human rights are protected and the inclusion of human rights
conventions in domestic legislation. Part Two, titled Substantive Provisions, provided an
overview of efforts made to eliminate discrimination against women, the development and
advancement of women, and the rights of women to access education, employment, and
health care in North Korea. When preparing the report, the North Korean government claims
to have discovered that the basic requirements of the Convention had already been fulfilled in
a number of sectors of the country.24
On 9 February 2005, the CEDAW Committee issued the North Korean government
with a list of questions with regards to its initial report. 25 The 33 questions were organised
according to the Articles of the Convention. The Committee was concerned with several
issues in the DPRK’s report, including direct and indirect discrimination against North
Korean women, and recommended that awareness campaigns be carried out on the meaning
and scope of indirect discrimination – aimed at legislators, the judiciary and the legal
profession.26 Questions on the lives of women from rural and urban areas and violence
against women were also raised. Two months after the CEDAW Committee issued a list of
questions, the DPRK replied on 15 April 2005.27 The responses focused on conditions that
might affect women differently from men, as well as challenges specific to gender equality.
Information was provided on poverty and the famine, as they were said to have been causes
for conditions of existing inequality and further discrimination against women. A number of
questions were not answered, but the DPRK made some crucial admissions that had not
previously been acknowledged, as discussed below.
Three years after the DPRK submitted its initial report to the CEDAW Committee,
two meetings were held between North Korean representatives and the Committee on 18 July
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2005.28 These meetings were held in two sessions at 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. at the United
Nations Headquarters in New York. The North Korean delegation included: Ho O Bom, Pak
Kum Bok, Pak Tok Hun,29 Hong Ji Sun, and Han Chae Sun.30 While three men and two
women represented the DPRK, a male delegate, Ho O Bom, answered the majority of
questions. There were twenty-one members representing the CEDAW Committee, with a
total of twenty females and one male participating. At the first meeting, the 699th, issues
discussed included discrimination against women in the home, domestic violence, and food
allocation through the Public Distribution System (PDS).31 At the 700th meeting, issues
raised by the CEDAW Committee included women’s representation in the North Korean
government, the education of female children, and the allocation of women to certain
occupations.32
On 22 July 2005, the CEDAW Committee released a report of concluding comments
for the North Korean government to consider.33 The recommendations and conclusions of the
Committee were based on the DPRK’s initial report and the meetings held with North Korean
officials at the UN Headquarters in 2005. Concerns and recommendations of the CEDAW
Committee include the withdrawal of reservations to the Convention, the revision of the Law
of Sex Equality to include provisions of CEDAW, and the lack of effective remedies for
female complainants whose rights have been violated.

Non-Governmental Organisation Shadow Reports
In response to the DPRK’s initial report to the CEDAW Committee, two South Korean
NGOs submitted shadow reports. The UN invites NGOs to follow the work of the CEDAW
Committee, which includes participation at the pre-session working groups to provide
country-specific information on state parties whose reports are being considered.34 This
ensures that the CEDAW Committee is well informed about the country submitting the
28
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periodic reports. NGOs submit their reports to the Committee prior to or at the session. NGOs
submitting shadow reports or other country-specific information prepare a list of issues and
questions for the reporting country. The Committee then sets aside time at each of the
working sessions, usually at the beginning of the first and second week of the session, to
enable representatives of NGOs to provide information.
The two NGO reports submitted to the UN outline concerns about the status of
women in and outside the DPRK. In June 2005, Good Friends submitted a shadow report
with concerns regarding food shortages in the mid-1990s and the impact on women.35 Their
report mentions the trafficking and prostitution of women, their right to access healthcare,
and the situation of North Korean women in China. In July of the same year, NKHR
submitted a shadow report to the CEDAW Committee.36 Concerns raised by NKHR include
discrimination against women in society and the home based on gender, violence against
women in North Korean society and the sexual exploitation and trafficking of women.
Below I discuss the communication between the DPRK and the CEDAW Committee,
as well as the shadow reports and what they reveal about official North Korean attitudes to
gender equality. The discussion is organised according to the themes which arise in this series
of communications.

The DPRK’s Reservations to CEDAW
The CEDAW Committee permits ratification of the Convention subject to reservations made
by governments.37 Reservations are made if governments see the Convention as not being
compatible with national law, tradition, religion, or culture. The DPRK has entered two
reservations regarding Article 2 (f) and Article 9 (2) of CEDAW.
The North Korean government states that since the promulgation of the Law on
Equality of the Sex in 1946, equal rights for women have been provided for in all spheres of
economic, social, cultural, and political life, including the right to free marriage and
divorce.38 However, the law includes a difference in the minimum age for marriage, which is
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17 years for females and 18 years for males so the government made a reservation to Article
2 (f) of CEDAW, which states:

State Parties are to take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs,
and practices, which constitute discrimination against women.39

The North Korean government has also made a reservation on Article 9 (2) of
CEDAW, which states, “State Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect
to the nationality of their children”.40 The North Korean Citizenship Law (1995) stipulates:

DPRK citizenship will be granted to a child born between North
Korean citizens, a child born between a North Korean citizen residing
in the DPRK and a foreign citizen or a stateless person, a child born
between stateless persons residing in the DPRK and a child born in
the DPRK but whose parents are unidentified (Article 5).41

Further, the law provides that the citizenship of a child under the age of 14 born between a
North Korean citizen residing in a foreign country and a foreign citizen is determined in
accordance with the express intention of the parents (Article 7).42 The Citizenship Law does
not give preference or differentiate between father and mother over their opinion of the
nationality of the child.
Chin Kim suggests that the promulgation of the Citizenship Law in 1995 was political
rather than being designed to protect the rights of either parent living abroad or a child born
abroad to parents of differing citizenship.43 The reservation was made to CEDAW in
accordance with the North Korea’s Nationality Law (1963), which ensures the child the
freedom to visit the DPRK freely (Article 3) and have the political and legal protection of the
DPRK irrespective of their residence (Article 2).44 The Articles of the Nationality Law
contain political implications and are designed to provide a rational basis for the North
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Korean government to extend control over Koreans living abroad, especially those residing in
Japan.45
The CEDAW Committee requested further explanation as to why the North Korean
government entered the two reservations and whether there has been any consideration of
amending state legislation in order to withdraw these reservations.46 The North Korean
government responded that a reservation was made on Article 2 (f) of CEDAW because
Article 9 of the Family Law provides that the minimum marriage age is 17 for girls and 18
for boys as discussed above. The DPRK claims that nobody considers this age difference
discriminatory against women so a reservation was entered provisionally until due legislative
amendments are enacted to avoid any misunderstanding of the age difference in current
legislation.47 The government states that a reservation was made to Article 9 (2) because of a
concern that a child born to a foreign citizen and a North Korean citizen may have double
nationality if parents differ in their opinion. The National Coordination Committee is said to
have discussed the reservations while preparing the initial report and decided to recommend
amendments to related laws and legislation bodies.48 To date these reservations have not been
withdrawn by the DPRK and the laws have not been amended.
In its concluding comments the CEDAW Committee states that, while appreciating
the North Korean government’s willingness to amend national legislation and consider lifting
the reservations, the Committee considers that the reservations made are contrary to the
objective and purpose of CEDAW.49 The Committee urges the DPRK to accelerate its efforts
towards the withdrawal of the reservations in a concrete timeframe.50

Customary Discrimination in North Korean Society
The North Korean government understands that discrimination against women can be based
on whether one is married or not; can occur in political, economic, social, civil, public and
private life; when someone consents to or is tolerant of inequality either on purpose or by
negligence; and the different treatment of men and women, which includes distinction,
exclusion, restriction, ignorance, impairing and violence.51 In comparison, Article 1 of
CEDAW states that the term “discrimination against women” means:
45
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any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.52

In the initial report to the CEDAW Committee, the DPRK stated that following the
liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the North Korean interim
government “thoroughly carried out the democratic reforms to free people from all forms of
imperialist and feudalistic yoke and fetters”.53 As part of the reform process:

[p]olitical,

economic,

traditional

and

customary

bases

of

discrimination against women have fundamentally been eliminated
and the overall institutional, administrative, organisational and
educational measures adopted to prevent its occurrence or
continuance.54

The DPRK continues that the Constitution, laws, regulations, and rules:

comprehensively and concretely provide for the rights and freedom
that citizens ought to be endowed with and enjoy in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil and all other fields.55
The DPRK states that “the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
the stereotyped roles of men and women have nearly been eliminated” so “discrimination
based on the outmoded customs is no longer a big issue of social concern”. 56 Then again, the
North Korean government admits that customary discrimination exists in society and
households.
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Calling a man the outer householder and a woman the inner
householder in a family, a man becoming the head of a family, the
community employing mostly females in the jobs like restaurant
reception, switchboard operation, typing and the like, regarding a
hard or big work as a man’s job and an easy or sundry task as a
woman’s job etc.57
The term “inner householder” references Korean women’s roles in the past when they lived
within the inner walls of the home and were not allowed outside to participate in society. In
comparison, Korean men were allowed to move freely from the home to outside the building,
therefore they were referred to as the “outer householder”. The North Korean government
claims to have tried to change this view by enhancing “the consciousness of respecting
women among the new generations and to thoroughly prevent the discriminatory conception
and happening occasionally witnessed among the old generation”.58 The DPRK says that it
encourages the active education of the population in the idea of respecting and caring for girls
and women through mass media, such as the magazine Chosŏn Yŏsŏng (Korean Women).
The North Korean government explains that discriminatory action against women is a
“matter not only of prejudice and custom but also [because] of the national situation of
economic development”.59 Therefore, to overcome these discriminatory practices in society
the country aimed to overcome the economic and technical backwardness of old Korean
society. It was in this setting that the government established the Three Revolutions at the
Fifth Congress of the WPK in November 1970 (as discussed in chapter 5). The government
stated in the initial report to the CEDAW Committee that when the Three Revolutions are
fulfilled and technical advancement realised then discrimination caused by customary
stereotyping of gender roles will be eliminated.60 In the initial report, the DPRK stated that a
great deal of harsh and heavy labour has been abolished and the Three Revolutions
successfully achieved,61 suggesting that the burden that women carry within the home has
also largely been eliminated. In reality, North Korean women continue to be burdened with
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caring for children and the home, which is demonstrated in the gendered language employed
by the government.
Based on Articles 1 and 2 of CEDAW, the Committee requested the DPRK to provide
further information on measures undertaken to combat gender discrimination based on the
perceived notion of women as inferior and men superior.62 In response, the DPRK states that
through the reform process after the liberation of Korea in 1945, the social, economic and
legal basis of the “outmoded concept” of women as inferior has “nearly been eliminated”.63
The government is said to have actively unfolded educational activities against the idea of
women’s inferiority and taken “the steps of preferential treatment of women by law and
policy”.64 The North Korean response listed various legal measures taken through the
Constitution and laws which provide provisions for gender equality. 65 The North Korean
government also, however, refers to occasions where men and women are treated differently
because of the role of women in reproduction and childrearing. It is because of this role that
the DPRK provides women with “special protection” in the 1998 DPRK Constitution:

guaranteeing maternity leave before and after childbirth, reducing
working hours for mothers with many children, and expanding the
network of maternity hospitals, nurseries and kindergartens (Article
77).66

Answering gender equality with the preferential treatment of women in state laws does not
address the customary attitudes of some North Korean people. It could be said that gender
equality in the DPRK therefore, has largely been unsolved, as the government has not
addressed the cultural construction of gender entrenched in North Korean society.
In 2005, during the meetings in New York the North Korean delegate Hong Ji Sun
explained historical attitudes to gender in Korea.

The inferiority of women was a concept deeply rooted in the culture
of the DPRK, which had been a feudalist society for 2000 years and
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had been subjected to Japanese colonial rule. Under the old regime,
boys and girls could not sit together once they turned seven years of
age.67

The North Korean official reiterates that soon after the independence of Korea from Japan in
1945 the North Korean interim government promulgated the Law on Equality of the Sexes in
1946 with the aim of eliminating all forms of discrimination against women.68 In other words,
the government assigns discrimination against women to the colonial period and the
liberation of women to a newly-established socialist North Korea. However, Hong Ji Sun
states that the Law on Equality of the Sexes is not fully implemented or recognised as some
men have continued to be regarded as responsible for affairs outside the house, with women
assigned to chores within the household.69
The CEDAW Committee notes with concern the persistence of gendered assumptions
and attitudes in respect to the roles and responsibilities of women and men, which are
primarily discriminatory against women and influences all areas of their lives.70 It notes the
perception of women as caregivers and homemakers and their assignment to areas such as
education and employment on the basis of spheres suitable to their “characteristics”. The
Committee is concerned that such expectations of North Korean women have serious
consequences, preventing them from accessing rights and entitlements on an equal basis with
men and creating a dependency on male family members for housing, food entitlements, and
other services.71

Gender Roles in North Korean Families
In the DPRK’s initial report, it did not mention the stereotyping of gender roles within family
homes. We know from academic research and reporting by NGOs, however, that the promise
to ease the domestic burdens of women through the Three Revolutions failed to materialise
for many.72 Modern conveniences such as clean running water in homes, refrigerators and
washing machines failed to materialise or remained the property of a privileged few. As
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discussed in chapter 6 above, gendered roles remained until the mid-1990s when the
differentiated roles of men and women in the home were challenged because of the food
crisis. With the end of the state food rationing system men’s capacity to provide economic
support deteriorated, and many North Korean women had to become primary financial
providers to their families in place of their husbands.73 However, this did not mean that the
strict gendered roles in the home were significantly undermined. According to Jung and
Dalton, the sharing of housework between husband and wife continued to be uncommon.74
Further, most women continued to respect the superiority and authority of their husbands and
their lives were still shaped by their husbands’ social position and status.75 Since the food
crisis, reductions in state welfare, provisions, and facilities resulted in even higher demands
on women to provide additional support such as healthcare and education to their families.76
Due to the lack of information offered by the DPRK in its initial report and based on
Article 5 of CEDAW, the Committee requested further information on measures undertaken
by the government to combat the stereotyping of women’s roles in the home.77 In response,
the North Korean government acknowledged that women assumed more of the family burden
due to the customary roles of household chores assigned to them.78 From the 1970s, though,
the government claims to have addressed this issue by defining the emancipation of women
from household chores as part of the task of the Three Revolutions, as explained above. The
DPRK claims that women in both urban and rural areas now use modern facilities and
electrical kitchen appliances to alleviate their duties in the home.79 However, the North
Korean government acknowledges that due to the economic difficulties within the country
“both women and men are hampered from enjoying their legal rights to the full”.80 Evidence
suggests that since the mid-1990s basic shortages in food and fuel, and the breakdown of the
water supply systems have disproportionately influenced the workload of women and girls.81
The capacity for women to take advantage of measures designed and legislated to protect
them is frequently superseded by the need to survive. For example, the extensive piped water
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supply systems put in place during the early 1980s are in ailing condition due to low levels of
state investment, the shortage of electricity, and the destruction caused by natural disasters.
The United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports that according to the
2008 DPRK Census, 22 per cent of the population spends time fetching water from sources
other than piped water in their homes.82 UNICEF found that of the population that collect
water there is a clear gendered inequality involved, as only 32 per cent of those responsible
for this activity are men compared to 68 per cent women. 83 While the North Korean
government claims that the burdens that women carry have lessened because of the Three
Revolutions, UNICEF claims that the number of women in comparison to men forced to walk
to alternative water supplies is higher.84
At the meetings between the DPRK and CEDAW Committee in 2005, Ho O Bom
states that “[the government has] established a plan of action to root out outmoded customs,
attitudes and stereotypes that discriminated against women, but such attitudes were deepseated and the process would take a long time”.85 It is said that public organisations and
institutions work to educate people and overcome gender stereotypes. Hong Ji Sun states that
men and women of the new generation have attitudes very different from the older
generation, who still hold stereotypical views. The North Korean delegation states that the
division of labour in the home has changed in recent years, due to the increased awareness of
CEDAW.86 The delegation continues that husbands are now equipped with the knowledge of
the Convention and are doing some cooking and other household chores such as taking care
of children so women have been freed from the home to participate in society.87 The DPRK,
however, offers no evidence in its initial report or during the meetings in New York on the
attitudinal changes of the younger generation or how men access information about CEDAW.
Even though there have been changes in the North Korean legal system the actual effects of
these amendments in society are less obvious. Many have argued that changes that have
occurred in society and family life are rather a result of the government’s mismanagement of
its economic policies combined with natural disasters. This created a situation where people,
and typically women, have been forced to find alternative ways of supporting their family’s
survival.
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The CEDAW Committee notes with concern the persistence of stereotyped
assumptions and attitudes in respect to the roles and responsibilities of North Korean women
and men.88 The Committee is concerned that such expectations of women have serious
consequences, preventing them from accessing rights and entitlements on an equal basis with
men as well as creating dependency on male family members.89 The Committee urges the
DPRK to increase its efforts to address stereotypical attitudes about the roles and
responsibilities of women and men, including the hidden patterns that perpetuate direct and
indirect discrimination against women and girls in all areas of their lives.90

Marriage and Family Breakdown
The DPRK’s initial report states that marriage is “entered into on the basis of true love, free
choice, and full consent”.91 Marriage that is entered into against the will of either male or
female, by money, coercion, allurement, and outdated customs is strictly forbidden. Article
11 of the Family Law states that marriage is legal after registration at a registry office and is
not recognised if it is not registered.92

A marriage that is not based on the free consent of the parties, a
marriage under the minimum age for marriage (18 years for males
and 17 years for females), a marriage with a person who already has a
registered husband or wife, and a marriage between blood relatives ...
is null and void (Article 13).93

Although the legal age of marriage is 17 years for women and 18 years for men, the average
age for women to marry is 24 to 26 years and for men 26 to 28 years.94 The government has
conducted a campaign to persuade people that early marriage is not good for women’s
health.95 Jung and Dalton suggest that later marriage may be a result of work and military
service obligations.96 Articles 15 and 19 of the Family Law state that a husband and wife are
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duty-bound to ensure their family is harmonious, cheerful, and supported by their partner
should he or she lose the ability to work.97
The DPRK’s initial report in 2002 states that the average annual number of divorces is
about 2,000 cases.98 The government states that the comparatively small number of divorces
in the DPRK is not due to any legislation that makes divorce difficult but because, since the
“olden times, it has been a traditional national custom peculiar to the Korean people for a
married couple to live together until they die”.99 Article 21 of the Family Law (1990) states
that divorce may be granted if a marriage cannot be continued because one party has been
found guilty of gross infidelity and mistrust or for some other reason. 100 Further, Article 5 of
the Law on the Equality of the Sexes states that women have the equal right to submit to the
courts an application for a divorce.101 The government does not permit a married couple to
live apart or with another partner without a legal divorce.
At the dissolution of the marriage, there is no special consideration except for the
interest of children involved. Article 22 of the Family Law states that the custody of children
is “decided according to mutual agreement between the two parties, in consideration of the
interests of the children”.102 When no mutual agreement can be reached, the custody of the
children is decided by the court. If the child is less than three years of age then the child is
“brought up by the mother, unless there is a compelling reason for this not to happen”.103 This
assumes though, that women are the primary carers of children rather than the responsibility
of both parents. If a person is not the primary carer of the child, then this person pays the
other parent the expenses for raising the child until the child reaches working age. The
amount payable to the carer is fixed by the court and is usually within the range of 10 to 30
per cent of the monthly income of the contributor, and according to the number of children.104
The Family Law also states that during divorce proceedings property owned before the
marriage or property that was given to a person by inheritance is owned by that individual
(Article 39).105 Family property bought during the marriage is divided among the parties
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through mutual agreement. If the couple cannot reach an agreement on the division of
property, the matter is settled by the court.106
The CEDAW Committee acknowledges that while divorce is not a favoured option, it
is sometimes necessary. It requested further information on the rights of divorced North
Korean women to the custody of children and to a share of marital property.107 The
Committee expresses concern that if a woman could only take the amount of property that
she brought to the marriage, then many women would have serious difficulties after the
divorce if they did not have a job. Concerns are also raised on whether food rations are
distributed according to the job held by a person as this might mean that an unemployed
divorced woman would not receive food rations.108 Finally, information is requested on
whether the number of divorces in the DPRK is rising or declining since the mid-1990s.109
In response, the DPRK states that the people’s power organ that supervises law
enforcement conducted a comprehensive analysis of court judgments in divorce cases and
found that nearly all of the judgments contained the sharing of property between couples.110
The government maintains that women are not given less than a man simply because of
gender.111 The principle is that the property individually owned by each spouse before
marriage goes back to the owner, while the property acquired during a marriage should be
disposed of by agreement. If a party asks for the division of property by law, the court
intervenes.112 The DPRK maintains that no woman receives less property than a man simply
because she is a female. In fact, a woman with children is given more property in the view of
her support of children. However, this enforces the gender stereotyping of women to the role
of carer of children. The North Korean government also maintains that the distribution of
food supplies is to all households, including divorced women.113
Ho O Bom, a North Korean delegate sent to meetings in New York in 2005, states
that both men and women can apply equally for a divorce and that the rate of divorce is going
down after a rise in the mid-1990s.114 However, scholarly research suggests that as women
were frequently absent due to trade or business and the number of dual earner couples

106

Ibid.
CEDAW, “List of issues”, qt. 30, p. 5 and qt. 31, p. 5.
108
CEDAW, “700th meeting”, para. 30, p. 6
109
Ibid., para. 31, p. 6.
110
Ibid.
111
CEDAW, “Responses”, resp. 30, p. 20.
112
Ibid.
113
CEDAW, “List of issues”, para. 35, p.7.
114
CEDAW, “700th meeting”, para, 31, p. 6.
107

197

increased, it caused disharmony in marriages and family breakdowns,115 ultimately leading to
the number of divorce cases increasing.116 It is within the DPRK’s unstable economic
environment and the challenge to gendered roles that North Korean courts encouraged
couples to have counselling sessions before divorce proceedings, ensuring couples are kept
together when possible. The DPRK wishes to “protect the basic social unit, which is the
family”.117 Keeping families together, however, could be detrimental to the welfare of
women and particularly for those who are victims of domestic violence. It also indicates that
a person’s wish to determine their own life in the DPRK is less important than the
government’s desire for family unity. Divorce from spouses branded “reactionaries” or “bad
elements” is granted comparatively easily to either gender and, in fact, is strongly encouraged
by the state.118 The protection of the family unit by the state has prolonged the stereotyping of
men and women to gendered roles within the home. Kang argues that the family group and its
culture are “an important mechanism of social control and regime maintenance”. 119 In the
case of the DPRK, this is particularly true since the mid-1990s when the North Korean
government passed the economic burden of supporting individuals to family groups (Family
Law, Articles 35 and 36).
The CEDAW Committee expressed concern about the practice of encouraging
conciliation among spouses who apply for divorce, with the aim of protecting the family unit,
which could be detrimental to women who are victims of domestic violence and other forms
of abuse.120 The Committee recommends that the DPRK conduct a comprehensive analysis of
divorce cases and encourage judges to review the utilisation of conciliation to ensure that the
rights of women are duly protected.121 The Committee recommends gender-sensitive training
for legislators, the judiciary, and public officials. It also recommends the establishment of
counselling services for victims of domestic violence and the implementation of awarenessraising campaigns and public education programmes.
Childrearing Responsibilities
The DPRK’s initial report states that parents have equal rights and responsibilities relating to
their children. Articles 27 and 28 of the Family Law state that both parents “have the same
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obligation to educate and care for the health and growth of their children” and failure to do so
is a punishable criminal act (Criminal Law, 1987, Article 136).122 The North Korean
government maintains that it is a social and moral custom to respect the opinions of husband
and wife, and rationally combine the requirements of the family and society in deciding the
number and spacing of children.123 It is said that the healthcare system counsels women on
the number and spacing of births and dispenses contraceptives free of charge.124 The title of
“Maternal Heroine” though, has been assigned to women by the government to promote the
idea of women’s roles as mothers and increase the birth rate. More than 60 per cent of women
use contraceptives, mainly the intrauterine device, while contraceptive use among men is
rare. It is expected to change as the government, in close cooperation with the World Health
Organisation (WHO) and other international organisations, distributes condoms to men.125
The size of North Korean families tends to be small, with most households consisting of
between four and five people.126 Since the immense hardship associated with the food crisis
of the 1990s, family size has been affected and many women prefer to have only one child.127
NKHR, however, states that, according to the testimonies of North Korean refugees, the
government limits the number of children a family has or encourages mothers to give birth to
more children according to the government’s political, social, and economic situation.128
Preference for sons is a cultural trait common to both North and South Korea. 129 Sons
are desired more than daughters because of cultural attributes including patrilineal kinship
relations, relying on sons to carry on the family name, responsibility to live with and care for
elderly parents and perform key religious ceremonies.130 Until the early 1980s, a wife’s
inability to bear a son gave a husband grounds for divorce in the DPRK. The North Korean
government acknowledges in the initial report that “on rare occasions, grandparents demand
childbirth until they have a grandson”.131 This means that women are sometimes compelled to
give birth until a male child is born indicating that the preference for boys continues.132 This
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means that there is fundamental discrimination against females in North Korean society,
which begins from birth.
In accordance with Articles 15 and 16 of CEDAW, the Committee requested further
information on measures taken by the North Korean government to change the attitude of
preference for a son.133 In response, the DPRK states that the attitude of son preference is
based on the “outdated and unreasonable notion of family inheritance or clan prosperity” and
that some older people still have this attitude.134 The government maintains, though, that the
new generation does not follow this attitude and that many people prefer daughters. The
government does not feel it necessary to adopt special measures to alter the attitude of son
preference which, it claims, has somehow been resolved.135 The CEDAW Committee does
not offer any recommendations to the DPRK on how to address discrimination against female
children. However, as discussed above, Articles 15 and 16 of CEDAW outline state
responsibilities to eliminate discrimination against women within families and marriages. As
the DPRK is party to this Convention it has a responsibility to fulfil these provisions.

Domestic Violence
There is no mention of domestic violence against women in the DPRK’s initial report to the
CEDAW Committee. The NKHR shadow report states though, that violence against North
Korean women in the home is rooted in the patriarchal family structure and the principle of
women’s subservience to men.136 The deeply-rooted cultural concept of men being superior
to women has been strengthened by the North Korean government and has allowed for
further degradation of women’s status. Therefore, the common abuse of power by men is not
viewed as a social problem. Due to the economic hardships and instability of the mid-1990s,
domestic violence against women has been aggravated. NKHR states that husbands often
punish their wives for failing to provide food.137 In addition, as growing frustration and
alcoholism rates increase among men it has resulted in widespread domestic violence. NKHR
believes that future economic hardships and instability of the DPRK will only aggravate the
problem of domestic violence against women further if not addressed by the government.
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The CEDAW Committee presumes that such violence occurs in the DPRK, as
domestic violence against women is a worldwide phenomenon.138 The Committee states that
as the North Korean delegation had described the characteristics of women as being gentle
and caring, it implied that men’s characteristics were opposite and if this is the case when
couples disagreed it could lead to acts of violence.139 Therefore, the Committee asked
whether the family courts that administered the Family Law were specialised in the area of
domestic violence and whether the law had any provisions on domestic violence. If the law
did not include provisions to protect women against domestic violence, the Committee urged
the North Korean government to consider amending state laws.140 The CEDAW Committee
requested further information regarding the measures taken by the DPRK in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention to prevent and combat violence against women.
In response, Ho O Bom states that the government is aware of the existence of
domestic violence, and research on the issue is ongoing.141 He continues by stating that
“[h]usbands sometimes treated their wives roughly when they were drunk” but he did not
know of any case where “domestic disputes had ended in the murder of a spouse”.142 The
government does acknowledge, though, that when domestic violence occurs between couples
it generally leads to divorce.143 In fact, some women who sought a divorce raised the issue of
abuse by their husbands.144 In the DPRK, domestic violence cases are brought before the
court and dealt with as a crime under Articles 151 and 154 of the Criminal Law. When
dealing with these cases, it is said that these judges are trained to consider and rely on
international human rights instruments, including CEDAW. However, the North Korean
delegate Ho O Bom states that in his experience:

[m]ost of the complaints brought [to the courts] by women did not
relate to gender based discrimination, but rather to the quality of
services offered by certain providers and to the excessive
bureaucracy of State organs.145
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Husbands who are found guiltily of domestic violence before the courts are supposedly
educated by the power organs concerned and in grave cases punished by the socialist lawabiding life guidance committee established in each power organ.146 To discourage men
further from mistreating their wives, the North Korean government established educational
programmes conducted by the Korean Democratic Women’s Union.147 It is unclear, though,
who attends these educational programmes, and if they are compulsory for men who are
known by authorities to be perpetrators of domestic violence.
The DPRK reports that in most domestic violence cases, women do not wish to
discuss their private matters in public so many cases are not reported to authorities.148 The
North Korean delegate Han Chae Sun states that the DPRK’s National Coordination
Committee was very willing to pay greater attention to the question of domestic violence in
order to ensure that women were not just “keeping quiet about it”.149 The delegate Ho O Bom
states that the number of incidents of domestic violence has decreased in recent years and he
does “not believe that the phenomenon pose[s] a threat to the society”.150 Alternatively,
NKHR reports that female refugees admit that violence in the home is common, but women
do not ask for help because of social constraints and simple lack of institutional assistance.151
Male defectors have admitted to NGOs that in South Korea if they had been reported for
domestic violence they would have been approached by the police, while in the DPRK men
feel safe because women do not report incidents and arrests for violent behaviour are
unlikely.152
The CEDAW Committee expressed concern that the North Korean government is not
aware of the extent of domestic violence against women and that, as a result, there was a lack
of specific legislation to deal with all forms of violence.153 The government at this stage had
not instituted prevention and protection measures for victims of violence. The Committee
urges the DPRK to find ways to make visible the existence of domestic violence, for example
by training health workers to identify signs of abuse. It also recommends that the North
Korean government adopts specific legislation on domestic violence to ensure that violence
against females constitutes a criminal offence, that victims of violence have access to
immediate means of redress and protection and that perpetrators are prosecuted and
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punished.154 The Committee requests the government to conduct research on the incidence,
causes, and consequences of all forms of violence against women and to include the results in
its next report.155 To date the DPRK has not submitted a second report and therefore has not
provided updated statistical information on violence against women.

Sexual Violence against North Korean Women
The DPRK’s initial report made no mention of marital rape, rape or the murder of North
Korean women. In accordance with Article 6 of CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee requested
further information on whether the North Korean government had any information on sexual
violence against women. In particular, the CEDAW Committee wanted to know further
information on the number of rape cases brought before the court, and the number of men
convicted of committing sexual crimes against women, including spousal rape and homicide
and whether any man has had sex with an underage female. 156 In response, the North Korean
government states that the sexual abuse of women in the form of rape has occurred on rare
occasions and if it occurs, the case is dealt with under Article 153 of the Criminal Law.157
The DPRK denies that any man has had sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 15 or
obliged a woman who is his subordinate to have sexual intercourse.158 The government states
that it became aware of marital rape by studying CEDAW.159 Previously the government had
never discussed marital rape but now the DPRK’s National Coordination Committee for the
Implementation of CEDAW and different governmental departments were considering the
issue of rape within marriage.
When questioned about statistical information regarding rape cases, the DPRK
provided the following information on the number of rape cases, rape and murder cases, and
rape and burglary cases in the years 2003 and 2004 (see Table 7.1).160 It is unclear whether
the information represents women who were married and were violated or all women who
were violated in North Korean society.
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Table 7.1 Statistics of Rape Cases (2003–2004)

Year

2003

2004

Rape

2

1

Rape and Murder

2

2

Rape and Burglary

4

3

Crime

Source: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), “Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the
initial report”, resp. 12, pp. 8, 9.

It is evident from the Table 7.1 that the reported number of cases of rape, rape and
murder, and rape and burglary in the DPRK in the years 2003 and 2004 is extremely low.
NKHR states however, that rape and sexual assault of women is common in North Korean
society, detention centres and political prison camps.161 This table suggests that the North
Korean government is in denial of sexual violence against women. The data provided by the
state could be seen as an attempt to deliberately hide cases of sexual abuse against women or
could reflect the fact that women do not have an avenue to report incidents. Due to the
cultural value placed on women’s purity or chastity, most North Korean women who have
been victims of sexual assault and harassment are reluctant to report the incident to the
authorities.162 Up until this point, the DPRK had not promulgated legislative avenues for
victims of sexual or violent abuse to receive assistance by counselling services or legal
advice. However, where women have achieved some financial independence, it may be easier
to leave abusive husbands.163
The CEDAW Committee did not submit recommendations to the DPRK on how to
addresses the rape or murder of women. However, as discussed above, Article 6 of CEDAW
outlines state parties’ responsibilities to eliminate the sexual exploitation of women. As the
DPRK is party to this convention, it has a responsibility to fulfil these provisions.
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Women in the Labour Force
In the DPRK’s initial report, the government states that the key to promoting women’s rights
is to bring women into the labour force. The government’s target to increase female labour
participation began as early as 1958, although actual codification of major standards came
about with the enactment of the Labour Law in 1978.164 Article 31 of the Labour Law
stipulates, “[t]he State shall provide all conditions for women to take part in social labour”. In
the North Korean legal system women are also guaranteed the right to employment
opportunity, the right to free choice of profession, the right to equal pay and the right to safe
working conditions as discussed above in chapter 3. While the government states that
“[w]omen are free in the choice of employment in conformity with their technology,
knowledge, aptitude and wish”, it also states that it allocates female graduates to jobs.165 This
statement indicates a contradiction in the wording and actions of the state because if a person
has the freedom to choose his or her occupation then there would be no need for the
government to allocate anyone to an occupation.
The working age of men and women in the DPRK is 16 to 55 years and if a person
older than 55 years wishes to work, they can do so.166 Workers devote eight hours a day to
their jobs, eight hours to study (of the Juche idea) and eight hours to rest and sleep.167 By
1998, women accounted for 48.4 per cent of the labour force. 168 By the early 1990s, though,
women, especially those married to high-income earners, tended to quit their jobs after
marriage or were the first to be laid off due to the stagnant economy.169 As more married
women became full-time housewives, a clearly gendered view of the role of women was
emphasised by the government.170 The state emphasised the role of women as mothers and
passed the responsibility of caring financially for the family to the family members
themselves. The state was no longer capable of supporting all North Koreans with the
collapse of the PDS and the redistribution of sources to certain areas in society such as the
military and loyal followers.
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The North Korean government is said to have provided social infrastructure to
facilitate the entry of women into the labour force.171 Article 31 of the Labour Law and the
Law on Nursing and Upbringing of Children (1976) provides for local government bodies,
enterprises and social cooperative organisations to develop nurseries, kindergartens,
children’s wards, and public service facilities for the convenience of working women.172
Article 77 of the 1998 Constitution also provides for the government to establish rice-cooking
houses, food processing factories, morning and evening shops and other public welfare
facilities in the residential districts.173 In addition to these legal measures, the government has
also stressed the technological development of time-saving domestic appliances to ease the
domestic burden of women. All of these facilities, along with kindergartens and nurseries,
were built under the assumption that women are the primary caregivers and therefore need to
be freed from household chores so they could join the public labour force. The North Korean
government claims that women and men receive equal remuneration in respect of work of
equal value.174 Article 7 of the DPRK Constitution states that citizens “work according to
their abilities and are paid in accordance with the quantity and quality of their work”. Salaries
in the DPRK are supposedly determined under the principle of compensation for the physical
and mental consumption of labour and in consideration of various facts including the
worker’s technical skill, labour intensity, and work conditions.175
With reference to Article 11 of CEDAW, the Committee requested an explanation on
the process by which the North Korean government “allocates” female graduates to the
employment sector.176 As women are traditionally employed in health care, education and the
commercial and light industrial sectors, the Committee requested the DPRK to provide
detailed information, disaggregated by gender, regarding the salaries of employees working
in various sectors and the wage gap between genders.177
In response, the DPRK states that the allocation of work is decided by the labour
administration organ, institution, enterprise or organisation concerned in view of an
individual’s wishes.178 It is up to one’s own mind whether to accept the decision and a person
may lodge a complaint with the people’s power organ, the institution or enterprise concerned,
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if a decision on employment is unacceptable.179 When the institution, enterprise, or
occupation of their choice has no vacancy, people temporarily work in other places until a
place is available. The DPRK provided the following statistical information about the gender
segregation of several sectors in the years 2003 and 2004 (see Table 7.2).

Table 7.2 Employment Sectors and Gender Segregation (2003–2004)

Employment Sector

Gender

2003

2004

Industry

Male

1,965

1,979

Female

2,146

2,206

Male

1,644

1,701

Female

1,672

1,687

Construction and

Male

340

352

Geological Survey

Female

105

107

Transport and

Male

274

296

Telecommunication

Female

111

117

Commerce and

Male

152

159

Procurement

Female

363

371

Education, Culture,

Male

347

355

and Health

Female

514

527

Land Management

Male

153

161

and City

Female

107

112

Agriculture

Administration

(Unit: 1,000)

Source: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), “Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the
initial report”, resp. 20, p. 4.
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The data provided in Table 7.2 suggests that the ratio of men to women in most
employment sectors changed only slightly from 2003 and 2004. The table, however,
demonstrates the feminisation of some sectors, such as healthcare, culture, and education,
which tend to be paid lower than other sectors considered heavy industries, which are mostly
occupied by men.180 In the DPRK, salaries depend on occupational classification, rating,
technical skill, functions, and work conditions. The DPRK reports:

The principle in paying salary is to recover the physical and mental
energy consumed in the work and ensure the life of a person, and this
principle is not altered if the worker is a woman.181
Therefore, if a person works in an occupation considered “hard labour” where more energy is
required they would receive a higher salary than those in the so-called “light industries”.
Further, a person who performs technical or intellectual work receives a higher salary than
those performing simple labour. In 2001, the minimum monthly salary was 2,200 NKwon
(3.20 AUD/ 2.45 USD), the average salary 5,000 NKwon (7.25 AUD/ 5.55 USD), and the
highest salary level 8,000 NKwon (11.60 AUD/ 8.90 USD).182 The government claims that
the minimum salary is enough to procure staples, subsidised food and daily necessities, as
well as saving 800 to 900 won.183 Table 7.2 suggests however, that a gender hierarchy within
occupations exists in the DPRK as men occupy positions which are perceived as higher
skilled (and thus more lucrative) positions than women do.184 Eun-young Shin states,
however, that it is debatable whether the gendered division of labour is necessarily a
disadvantage to women as the government transferred men from the light industries to heavy
industries in order to provide jobs for women.185 Shin suggests that this can be viewed as a
special consideration to protect women rather than to discriminate against them.186 The
government states that it has taken measures to encourage more women into sectors in which
they are underrepresented.187
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In the meetings held in New York between the DPRK and CEDAW in 2005, Ho O
Bom states that the National Coordination Committee for the Implementation of CEDAW has
developed a 10-year plan for the advancement of women, with the primary objective “to
promote women’s participation in the country’s economic and social life”.188 He
acknowledges that women account for 80 per cent of the total number of employees in the
education and public health sectors, while representing less than 20 per cent of the workers in
certain other sectors. Ho O Bom’s colleague, Hong Ji Sun states that it “is true that women
tended to go into fields of medicine, commerce and light industry and were similarly heavily
represented in administration posts relating to those areas”.189 She explains that women’s
“presence in the caring professions seemed to be related to the nature of women”. This
statement suggests that attitudes towards roles performed by men and women in North
Korean society have not changed significantly, as certain occupations are seen to be better
suited to women because of their “nurturing” characteristics. Han Chae Sun describes the
process of allocating graduates to jobs. First teachers explain what job opportunities are
available to graduates and then communicate each graduate’s choice to the labour
administration department of municipal and district people’s committees, which discuss the
graduate’s choice with the respective enterprises.190 After that, the committees meet the
graduates and jobs are allocated. There is no system for advertising jobs in the DPRK so
notification of job opportunities is made through schools and people’s committees.
The CEDAW Committee was concerned that there are many instances of indirect and
hidden discrimination against women in the employment sector and that the prevailing
perception is that the public and social spheres are “men’s spheres”.191 The Committee urges
the DPRK to recognise and analyse the persistence of indirect and hidden discrimination as
an obstacle to the implementation of CEDAW, including measures to identify where
discrimination occurs, to raise awareness and to be proactive in its elimination.192

The Trafficking of North Korean Women
The North Korean government claims in its initial report to the CEDAW Committee that the
“traffic in women and prostitution [of women] are regarded as the most shameful crime” and
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that there has been no reported case for many years.193 The government instead points to the
colonial period when women were forced into prostitution and states, “[t]here used to be the
systems of licensed or unlicensed prostitution, Kisaeng, and traffic in women in the days of
the Japanese colonial rule”.194 According to the DPRK, the Japanese imperial army forced
200,000 Korean women into prostitution as so-called “comfort women”.195 Historians
estimate however, that between 100,000 and 200,000 women were enslaved in this system.196
While many of the women who were forced into sexual slavery were young Korean women,
there were also women of several other nationalities.197 Women were recruited in many ways.
Some women were promised work in factories or military hospitals and some women were
kidnapped. Immediately after the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the
North Korean interim government promulgated strict legal prohibition against the prostitution
and trafficking of women.198
The DPRK states that as a precautionary measure to prevent the sexual violation of
North Korean women, the government promulgated the Criminal Law and Criminal
Procedures Act in 1974, revised in 1987 and 1992 respectively.199 Article 152 of the Criminal
Law states:

A man who rapes a woman by using violence or threat or by taking
advantage of her when she is helpless, or a man who has sexual
intercourse with a girl under the age of 15 shall be punished gravely.

The Article does not explain in detail, though, what the punishment of the perpetrator would
be if a woman or girl is sexually violated. The Law continues, “[a] man who obliges a woman
who is his subordinate officially or by duty to have sexual intercourse with him shall be
punished” (Criminal Law, Article 154). Again, the Article does not specify the punishment of
the perpetrator. Articles 151 and 152 of the Criminal Law address the punishment of a
perpetrator by stating:
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[a] person who illegally as well as discriminatively restricts the
liberty of a woman, or insults or impairs the honour of a woman is
committed to a reform institution for up to two years.200

However, the law does not explain in detail the punishment of perpetrators in each different
form of abuse against women and domestic violence is unaddressed.
Due to the difficult living conditions in the DPRK in the 1990s, many people were
pushed to cross the border to China. Good Friends states that “a majority of [North Korean]
women who crossed the national border to China said that their decision was based on the
severe economic difficulty in the DPRK”.201 Though some North Korean women chose to
cross the border to marry Chinese men, other women were forced into marriages through
trafficking.202 An important factor stimulating the trafficking of North Korean women is the
gender imbalance in China caused by the state’s one-child policy and parents’ general
preference for male offspring. The gender gap in rural areas of China has grown because of
the continued economic boom and modernisation of cities, which sees more and more
Chinese women leave the countryside in search of employment in the better-paid urban
industrial sectors.203 As a result, the North Korean bride market and the placement of women
into the Chinese sex industry have grown over the years. NKHR states that the trafficking of
women continues to flourish in China as North Korean women choose to go to China for
survival reasons. 204
Since the food crisis in the mid-1990s, women have turned to prostitution in desperate
circumstances to secure money for food for their families.205 Good Friends states that
according to the countless testimonies it has collected from North Koreans, prostitution has
grown drastically after the food shortage.206 Prostitution in the DPRK though, is different
from other societies, as it is not conducted in the public sphere. It is instead prevalent, for
instance, as a bribe to officials or police officers for favours or it is employed solely as a
survival strategy.207 Since the food crisis, prostitution in the DPRK has become “not only
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more pervasive, but also more widely accepted by the general public as a survival
strategy”.208
The CEDAW Committee noted the concerns of the Special Rapporteur on violence
against women who reported on the trafficking of North Korean women and girls to China as
brides or prostitutes.209 In accordance with Article 6 of CEDAW, the Committee requested
the DPRK to indicate what legal and programmatic measures are in place to identify, prevent
and combat the trafficking of women.210 The Committee also urged the government to
indicate whether any cases of trafficking had been brought before the courts under Article
153 or 154 of the Criminal Law.211
In response, the North Korean government maintains, “there has not been any report
of trafficking in women or prostitution”.212 Therefore, the DPRK asserts that there has been
no need for amendments to the Criminal Law to include provision for the punishment of
trafficking in women and prostitution. The North Korean legal system has considered some
proposals to include these provisions in the Criminal Law for preventive effect. The
government states, “it is unlikely that [North Korean] women and girls are sold to China as
prostitutes or brides, some went over to China in the northern areas for the needs of life or
trade”.213 It is said that these women then came back to the DPRK with the things they had
procured in China. The government is said not to have punished them as their “deeds were
related to the current economic difficulties”.214 The DPRK reports that recently there have
been reports of “disorderly crossing over the borderline under the pretext of economic
difficulty”.215 It is in this circumstance that the immigration office strengthened its legal
requirements and concluded bilateral agreements with the neighbouring countries to control
illegal immigration. The DPRK did not indicate what countries it discussed control of illegal
immigration with but one could assume that it was China because of the issues outlined
above.
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During the meetings in New York in 2005, Ho O Bom stated that the government had
looked into the situation of women crossing the border into China and found that women
mostly crossed in search of food.216 However, as many of them bypassed the proper legal
formalities for leaving or re-entering the country, both the DPRK and China had intensified
monitoring by their border guards. The delegation did not address the increase in numbers of
women entering prostitution as a survival tactic. It instead referred to the colonial period and
stated that gender equality was never achieved before the North Korean government came to
power because the Japanese Imperial Army had “forced 200,000 Korean women into
prostitution as ‘comfort women’ for the military, on threat of death if they refused”.217
The CEDAW Committee is concerned that North Korean women may become
vulnerable to trafficking and other forms of exploitation, such as prostitution.218 It calls on the
DPRK to train law enforcement officials, migration officials and border police on the causes,
consequences and incidence of trafficking and other forms of exploitation so as to enable
them to render support to women who might be at risk of becoming victims of trafficking or
commercial sexual exploitation.219 It also recommends that the government conduct a
nationwide awareness campaign on the risks and consequences of trafficking of women and
girls. The Committee urges the government to intensify its efforts to deal with this
phenomenon through increased international, regional, and bilateral cooperation.

Conclusion
In this chapter, the gap between how the North Korean government promotes gender equality
to the international community and the actual conditions within the DPRK have been
considered through the communication between the state and the CEDAW Committee. In the
DPRK’s initial report to the CEDAW Committee the North Korean government emphasised
the efforts of the state in eliminating all forms of discrimination against women by stressing
the importance of preferential treatment of women in state laws and policy. Referring to
“preferential” treatment of women, though, exposes the gendered lens of the government.
Often the language employed in the laws assigned women to stereotypical feminine roles. For
example, measures taken by the government to “protect” women within families and society
actually reinforced stereotyping of men and women to certain roles in families, and forced
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women to adapt themselves to the role of mother and carer. Therefore, the realities faced by
many women fall short of the ideals outlined in the state laws and policies.
Further, laws and policies designed to emancipate North Korean women have not
been amended to incorporate modern problems, such as women who are victims of domestic
violence and trafficking. The government explained that these issues are not of great social
concern or have not occurred since the occupation of Korea by Japan. Instead, the gendered
view of the North Korean government is to assume that women perform the majority of
household chores and to address this through the promulgation of laws to help lessen their
burdens. These laws, however, only confirm the government’s perception that women are the
primary carers of children and responsible for cleaning and cooking for their families.
Further, once women left the home to work in the national reconstruction project they were
assigned by the government to work deemed suitable for them to perform. These jobs were
typically paid less than those monopolised by men because women were deemed more
physically and mentally suitable for light work. Therefore, in the DPRK’s communication
with the CEDAW Committee official state rhetoric has presented to the international
community a positive image of life for North Korean women.
In the next chapter, I examine communication between the DPRK and the UN from
2006 to 2011 and focus on the government’s deployment of historical issues such as the
sexual enslavement of Korean women by Japan when answering questions regarding gender
equality. The North Korean government asserts that in order to overcome customary
discrimination within the country issues of past crimes against Korean women, including the
issue of so-called “comfort women”, need to be addressed and completely resolved. The
government has taken the position that the sexual exploitation of Korean women was
fundamentally tied to the colonial occupation of the country and was thus a historical rather
than contemporary issue. The North Korean government denies that sexual violations against
women continued to occur after the liberation of the country. Along with the DPRK’s
continued communication with the UN, there was international pressure for the North Korean
government to amend existing state laws and establish new laws to include provisions for the
greater protection of women’s rights. In 2010, the state adopted the Women’s Rights Act,
which was the first law to directly address the rights of women since the promulgation of the
Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946. For the first time, provisions addressed issues such as
domestic violence, female infanticide and the protection of pregnant women who face
execution. In the following chapter, I consider the years from 2006 to 2011, including the
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Women’s Rights Act and the DPRK’s communication with the UN. The year 2011 also
marked the end of the rule of Kim Jong Il.
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8. North Korea and the United Nations
(2006–2011)
The Japanese confined each girl in a cell of about two
square metres. My room was No. 8. I had to ‘serve’ 20
Japanese soldiers on a daily average, and more on
Sundays. The Japanese beat, even stabbed, ‘comfort girls’
if the latter cried with pain.
Ri Kyong Saeng, 1992.1

Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK,
North Korea) and the Committee to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(hereafter “CEDAW Committee”) held their last meeting in New York in July 2005. 2 This
was the last time that the North Korean government and the CEDAW Committee directly
communicated about the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW). After 2005, the North Korean government continued to communicate
with the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, General Assembly) and other United
Nations (UN) bodies. In its communications, the DPRK often addressed concerns raised by
the UN and the CEDAW Committee relating to the status of North Korean women.3 These
concerns involved the continued stereotyping of women in the home and in the labour force,
and women’s access to food, health care, and education. At every possible opportunity, the
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UN, as well as the international community, emphasised the importance of improving the
situation for women in the DPRK.
In this chapter, I examine communications between the DPRK and UN from 2006 to
2011, including the DPRK’s deployment of the historical issue of the sexual enslavement of
Korean women by the Japanese Imperial Army when discussing gender equality.
Specifically, I refer to two North Korean press releases issued in response to items discussed
during UN General Assemblies in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, the DPRK participated in the 63rd
session of the UNGA and issued a press release in response to Item 56 “Advancement of
Women”.4 The press release addressed the issue of achieving gender equality and the
elimination of customary discrimination within the DPRK. The government asserted that in
order to overcome customary discrimination issues of past crimes against Korean women,
including the issue of so-called “comfort women”, needed to be addressed and completely
resolved. Then, in 2010, a North Korean delegation, including the Ambassador Deputy
Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the DPRK to the UN, Pak Tok Hun,
participated in the 65th session of the UNGA and issued a press release in response to
Agenda item 28 “Advancement of Women”. The press release outlined the DPRK’s concerns
about achieving gender equality within the country and the issue of “comfort women”.5
During these years, there was pressure from the international community for the
North Korean government to amend existing state laws and establish new laws to include
provisions for the greater protection of women’s rights. Between 2006 and 2010, two pieces
of legislation that stand out were the amended state Constitution in 2009 and the Women’s
Rights Act in 2010. In this chapter, I specifically examine provisions that address the issues
of gender stereotyping, violence against women and the trafficking of North Korean women.
This information will be compared to the findings of the non-governmental organisations
(NGO), Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), and the Korea Institute
for National Unification (KINU).6 The information collected by these organisations includes
testimonies of North Korean refugees which offer an alternative look at North Korean society
in recent years. In this chapter, I argue that despite international pressure for the North
Korean government to address the rights of women in its dealings with the UN and through
amended laws and policies, the DPRK has still not addressed the stereotyping of women to
4
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gendered positions in society. This is evident in the DPRK’s deflection of the contemporary
issue of the trafficking of Korean women to the historical issue of the sexual enslavement of
Korean women by Japan as will be discussed further below.
I begin by outlining the relationship of the DPRK and the UN between 2006 and 2011
to ensure the reader has an understanding of North Korea’s relations with the world during
this period.

The DPRK and the United Nations (2006–2011)
Since the DPRK’s and CEDAW Committee’s last meetings in New York in 2005, the North
Korean government has continued to correspond with the UNGA, the United Nations Human
Rights Council (UNHCR)7 and other UN bodies, such as the Committee on the Rights of the
Child (CRC)8 and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).9 At times relations between the
DPRK and UN have been strained, usually because of actions taken by the North Korean
government. This can be seen on 9 October 2006, when the North Korean government
authorised a nuclear weapons test in Sangpyong-ri, about 15 km from the coastal city of
Kimchaek and about 50 km west of Musadan-ri, DPRK. In spite of this, the UN kept
communication channels open to ensure that the DPRK continued to interact with the
7
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international community, build upon already established relationships, and not isolate itself
further from the world.
The DPRK was not always forthcoming with information, however, and did not
submit several periodic reports to the various UN bodies. Specifically, North Korea did not
submit the following reports: the third periodic report of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) due January 2004, the second and third periodic reports of
CEDAW due March 2006 and March 2010, and the third periodic report of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) due June 2008. The DPRK has
always been a key topic of discussion in the UNGA and other UN bodies though, and at
every opportunity, the UN has questioned the DPRK on the human rights of the North
Korean people. Below I examine several issues that occurred between the DPRK and the UN
between 2006 and 2011.

The United Nation Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006)
Five days after the DPRK’s nuclear weapons test on 14 October 2006, the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC, Security Council) issued Resolution 1718 in response.10 This
resolution provided context for the decision by the Security Council to impose sanctions. The
resolution cited the DPRK’s violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the
country’s subsequent withdrawal from the Treaty on 10 January 2003, 11 the DPRK’s refusal
to participate in another round of the Six-Party Talks and its failure to address other security
and humanitarian concerns raised by the international community.12 UN bodies also took
further action on human rights issues through resolutions of the UN General Assembly, and
reports from the UN Secretary-General and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the DPRK.13 North Korean funds that were controlled or owned directly or indirectly
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by a person or entity engaged in the nuclear weapons program were frozen and travel bans
applied to persons tied to the program.14 The Security Council determined that other UN
member states were empowered to inspect cargo to and from the DPRK to enforce the ban on
trafficking in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.15 The Security Council made clear
that these sanctions did not include stopping or withholding humanitarian aid to the North
Korean people.16
In response to the UN Security Council Resolution 1718, the DPRK was
uncooperative. A UN press release regarding the resolution quoted a North Korean
representative, Pak Gil Yon, as stating that the DPRK government “totally rejected” the
resolution, saying that it was “gangster-like” of the Security Council to adopt such a coercive
resolution against the country, while neglecting the nuclear threat posed by the USA against
the DPRK.17 The statement continued that the Security Council had completely lost its
impartiality and was applying double standards.18 Although the DPRK had conducted a
nuclear test, “due to American provocation”, the North Korean delegate stated that “it still
remained unchanged in its will to denuclearise the Korean peninsula through dialogue and
negotiation, as that had been President Kim Il Sung’s last instruction”. 19 The delegate stated
that the DPRK had clarified more than once that:

[i]t would have no need for even a single nuclear weapon as long as
the [USA] dropped its hostile policies towards the country and as
long as confidence was built between the two countries.20
Instead, the USA is said to have “manipulated the Security Council” into adopting a
resolution putting pressure on Pyongyang.21 Two months after the DPRK tested nuclear
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weapons and the UNGA instituted Resolution 1718, the General Assembly approved two
subsequent resolutions. As part of these resolutions, reports were commissioned by the UN
Secretary-General and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK.
The two resolutions and four reports of the Secretary-General and the Special Rapporteur are
discussed below.

The United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 61/174 and 62/167 (2006–2007)
Concerning the human rights situation in the DPRK, the UNGA approved Resolution 61/174
and 62/167 in December 2006 and December 2007 respectively.22 The resolutions covered
concerns similar to those outlined previously by the General Assembly, but added concerns
regarding “the violations of economic, social, and cultural rights, which have led to severe
malnutrition and hardship for the population in the [DPRK]”.23 The UNGA urged the North
Korean government to end the “systematic, widespread, and grave violations of civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights in the [DPRK]”.24 Specifically the resolutions
requested the DPRK to consider the:

[c]ontinuing violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms
of women, in particular the trafficking of women for the purpose of
prostitution or forced marriage and the subjection of women to
human smuggling, forced abortions, gender-based discrimination and
violence.25

The General Assembly suggested that, when addressing these human rights violations, the
DPRK should “tackle the root causes leading to refugee outflows and criminalise those who
exploit refugees by human smuggling, trafficking and extortion, while not criminalising the
victim”.26 This was particularly significant for North Korean women, as the North Korean
government had not addressed the trafficking of young girls and women to China in the
CEDAW report in 2002 or any state legislation up until this point. The UNGA also requested
that the DPRK extend access and cooperation to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
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human rights in North Korea, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other UN
agencies and humanitarian actors.27
In Resolution 61/174, the General Assembly continued to examine the situation of
human rights in the DPRK at its 63rd session, which was to take place in September 2008. It
also requested the UN Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the situation in
the DPRK and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea to
continue to report the findings and recommendations.28 This was the first time the SecretaryGeneral was requested to report to the UNGA about the human rights situation in the DPRK.
By September 2007, the UN Secretary-General had finished the report, outlining the
UN’s history in dealing with the DPRK’s human rights issues. 29 The report identified the
conditions that led to the General Assembly Resolution 62/167, including the DPRK’s failure
to cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and with the
Special Rapporteur.30 The report also summarised the work and findings of various UN
bodies on the status of human rights in the DPRK.31 Based on the information in the report,
the Secretary-General noted that little progress had been made in implementing any of the
international treaties or resolutions of the UNGA, the UN Commission on Human Rights or
other UN bodies.32 The UN Secretary-General urged the North Korean government to
“safeguard fundamental rights and freedoms and show visible signs of domestic legal reform
so as to fulfil its treaty obligations and comply with international standards”. 33 At the time,
the DPRK had not submitted its second periodic report concerning the implementation of
CEDAW, which was due by March 2006.34 While information provided by the DPRK was
sometimes limited, the Secretary-General requested that the Commission on Human Rights
continue its efforts to engage in constructive dialogue with the country, as well as the
international community continuing to support the DPRK through humanitarian efforts.35 The
North Korean government was urged by the Secretary-General “to sustain cooperation with
United Nations agencies and other humanitarian actors”.36
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The United Nations Special Rapporteur Reports (2007–2008)
From February 2007 to February 2008, the then Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in North Korea, Vitit Muntarbhorn (Thai representative), issued three reports on human
rights concerns in the DPRK.37 The first report, issued in February 2007, outlined the
DPRK’s refusal to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur and highlighted the ongoing human
rights violations in the country, including food shortages and malnutrition, a lack of basic
freedoms, the mistreatment of prisoners and the exploitation of refugees.38 The report also
discussed the responsibility of the North Korean government to protect its population and the
obligation of the international community to take collective action should the country fail to
fulfil its obligations to protect its people. The Special Rapporteur concluded by calling for the
DPRK to abide by its international human rights obligations, facilitate humanitarian aid,
improve food security, reform its prison system and improve the treatment of refugees. 39
Six months later, in August 2007, the UN Secretary-General presented the Special
Rapporteur’s second report to the UNGA.40 While the DPRK continued to refuse to provide
the Special Rapporteur access to the country, the report noted that there were some
improvements in North Korea’s relationship with the international community, in particular
the progress made through recent six-round Six-Party Talks (19 March–22 March, 18 July–
20 July 2007).41 Despite the appearance of some improvement, the Special Rapporteur
reported that many of the same problems and human rights abuses highlighted in the first
report of February 2007 continued in the DPRK. The North Korean government was urged to
“protect the rights of women, children and other groups, particularly by addressing their
vulnerable positions and ending discrimination”.42 This was particularly important, as the
DPRK had not addressed the elimination of discrimination against women and girls since its
reporting to CEDAW in 2005. The Special Rapporteur also reiterated the previous
recommendations for the DPRK to cooperate with the UN and for the international
community to continue to provide food aid and put pressure on the North Korean government
because of human rights violations.
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In February 2008, the Special Rapporteur issued the third report to the UNGA.43 The
report noted that there had been some progress made since the fifth-round (third phase) of the
Six-Party Talks in February 2007, when the North Korean government agreed to disable its
controversial nuclear plant.44 This was advanced by the participation of the DPRK in the
second session of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing from 27 to 30
September 2007. The participants at the meeting reached agreement on the “Second-Phase
Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” of 19 September 2005.45 The goal of
the joint statement was the verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful
manner. North and South Korea participated in the second inter-Korean Summit held in
Pyongyang from 2 to 4 October 2007.46 At the meeting, representatives of both parties agreed
to adopt and sign the Declaration on the Advancement of North–South Korean Relations,
Peace and Prosperity, aimed to strengthen cooperation between North and South Korea and
replace the Armistice, which ended the Korean War (1950–1953), with a permanent peace
treaty.47
The Special Rapporteur’s report stated that, given that the human rights situation in
the DPRK “remains grave on several fronts, it is essential to press for concrete actions to
address the various challenges set out in this report”.48 Therefore, both the North Korean
government and the international community were urged to “address the impunity factor,
which has enabled such [human rights] violations to exist and persist over many years”.49 In
this situation, the Special Rapporteur requested the DPRK to take the “softer entry point to
deal with the misdeeds of local officials” and make them accountable at the national level.50
The Special Rapporteur cautioned that care should be exercised to assess such actions against
international standards and the rule of law in the DPRK.51 However, given the nonindependent nature of the judiciary within the country, it was difficult to ensure that “justice
is done and seen to be done”.52 The international community was urged to continue to
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advocate for accountability for human rights violations in the DPRK, whether in terms of
state responsibility or individual accountability. The Special Rapporteur noted that the
international community had advocated to apply the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine
to the situation in the DPRK (see Appendix 9).53 To conclude, the Special Rapporteur stated,
“The question remains whether the issue of violations in the [DPRK] will be taken up at some
stage at the pinnacle of the system, within the totality of the United Nations framework”.54 A
few months after the UN expressed concern for the human rights of the North Korean people,
the North Korean government reported to the CRC Committee on the status of children in
January 2008, even though the report had been due the month before in December 2007.55

The DPRK and the 63rd United Nations General Assembly (2008)
On 16 September 2008, two days before the 63rd session of the UNGA, the North Korean
delegation to the UN issued a press release in response to Item 56 “Advancement of
Women”.56 Item 56 entails discussions about the advancement of women in society, the
implementation and outcomes of the Fourth World Conference on Women (September 1995,
Beijing, China) and of the 23rd special session of the General Assembly (June 2000). The
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing marked a significant turning point for the
global agenda for gender equality. Participants discussed how women’s lives had changed
over the decade after the United Nations Decade for Women (1975–1985) and the steps taken
to keep issues of concern to women high on the international agenda.57 The Beijing
Declaration and the Platform for Action were adopted unanimously by 189 countries at the
conference. The Platform advocated for women’s empowerment and is considered the key
global policy document on gender equality. The governments which attended the 23rd special
session of the UNGA (June 2000) reaffirmed their commitment to the goals and objectives
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contained in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World
Conference on Women in 1995.58
In 2008, the North Korean press release stated that the DPRK had constantly
reinforced legal and practical measures for women to realise gender equality, by upholding
“man-centred [sic] Juche ideas, as its guiding principles”.59 The DPRK also paid tribute to
the Law on Equality of the Sexes (1946), stating that women were guaranteed the same rights
as men to participate in all areas of social life – political, economic and cultural. So much so,
that today woman are said to fully exercise rights on equal footing with men. The North
Korean government maintains that it has continuously taken legal and practical measures for
gender equality and the advancement of women in conformity with the evolving development
of North Korean society.60 The DPRK states that it has “faithfully honour[ed]” its obligations
to both the CEDAW and CRC Conventions.

The Government of the DPRK stands unshakable in implementing its
policies to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and
realise gender equality, upholding man-centred Juche ideas, as its
guiding principles.61

To achieve gender equality it is claimed that the DPRK has taken measures to improve and
enhance the function and role of the North Korean National Coordination Committee for
CEDAW and CRC.62 Both Coordination Committees continue to contribute to the protection
and promotion of women and girls’ rights in the DPRK and as a result, females exercise their
rights to the full in all spheres of state and social life.63
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Below, I discuss the growing tensions between the DPRK and the northeast Asian
region due to the attempted satellite launch by the North Korean government in 2006. This
will set out clearly the context in which the state communicated with the world. Although the
DPRK’s relationships in the region were strained, the UNSC and other UN bodies continued
to communicate with the state during 2009 to ensure the country did not isolate itself any
further from the international community.

The DPRK and the United Nations Security Council (2009)
On 5 April 2009, the North Korean government announced the launch of a satellite, despite
international pressure not to do so. The UNSC condemned the DPRK’s actions even though
the satellite launch was a failure, landing in the Pacific Ocean. Seven days after the launch on
13 April 2009 at the 6106th meeting of the UNSC, the Council considered the item entitled
“Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.64 At the meeting, the President
of the Security Council made the following statement.

The Security Council bears in mind the importance of maintaining
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia as a
whole. The Security Council condemns the 5 April 2009 (local time)
launch by the [DPRK], which is in contravention of Security Council
resolution 1718 (2006).65

The UNSC urged the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council
Resolution 1718 (2006) and not conduct any further launches. The Council also advised the
DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks and called for an early resumption. All participants in
the Talks were urged to intensify their efforts on the full implementation of the Joint
Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, South Korea, the
Russian Federation (Russia) and the United States of America (USA).66 The Joint Statement
aimed to achieve the verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful
manner and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia.
64
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The UNSC also called upon all UN member states to comply fully with their obligations
under resolution 1718 (2006), which entailed sanctions against the DPRK, as discussed
above. The Security Council expressed its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the
situation and welcomed efforts by Council members and member states to facilitate a
peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.67
In response, the DPRK rejected the “unjust actions” taken by the UNSC, saying the
Council’s vote to condemn the launching of the satellite and the tightening of sanctions was
an “unbearable insult” to the North Korean people.68 The DPRK expelled the UN nuclear
inspectors from the country and ordered them to remove surveillance devices and other
equipment from the Yongbyon nuclear plant. On 14 April 2009, the North Korean Foreign
Ministry published a press release stating that the DPRK:
flatly reject[ed] the brigandish ‘presidential statement’ which the US
and its followers finally released by abusing the UNSC to condemn
the DPRK’s launch of satellite for peaceful purposes.69
From this time the North Korean government stated that there would be “no need to hold SixParty Talks” as the talks had now become a platform for infringing upon the sovereignty of
the DPRK. Therefore, the North Korean government would “never participate in the talks any
longer nor will it be bound to any agreement of the six-party talks”.70 Finally, the government
stated that it would “bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defence”.71
While the DPRK’s relationships within the northeast Asian region were strained the
North Korean government continued communication with the UN. This can be seen with the
DPRK’s submission of a report to the Universal Periodic Review Committee (“UPR
Committee”) in 2009.

The DPRK and the Universal Periodic Review (2009)
Before the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process in August 2009, the DPRK submitted a
report to the UPR Committee outlining from its own perspective the human rights situation in
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the DPRK.72 On 7 December 2009, the DPRK underwent the UPR, a process that involves a
review of the human rights records of all 193 UN member states once every four years.73 The
DPRK was a country of special interest to the UPR Committee because of several reports
submitted to the UN by NGOs concerning human rights violations such as torture, forced
labour camps, public execution, and violence against children and women.
During the three-hour review process, the working group noted a number of positive
achievements of the DPRK, which included the decision to participate in the UPR, the policy
of providing eleven-years of compulsory and free education, and universal medical care.
They also acknowledged the North Korean government’s concerted efforts aimed at building
a progressive and prosperous nation by the year 2012.74 Issues and questions raised by the
working group concerned reports of “grave and systematic violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms” in the DPRK.75 For example, concerns were raised about the control
mechanisms which ensured inhumane conditions for detainees held in prisons and in
particular camps holding political prisoners, the need for independent monitoring systems to
ensure victims’ rights were protected, and questions about whether there were plans by the
government to effectively implement obligations under the international human rights treaties
to which the DPRK had acceded.76
At the review, thirteen North Korean representatives participated. The delegation
consisted of representatives from the Department of Legislation of the Supreme People’s
Assembly, the Legal Bureau of the Central Court, the Ministry of Public Health, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.77 The North Korean delegate Ri Tcheul, Ambassador and
permanent representative of the DPRK to the UN in Geneva, spoke on behalf of the
delegation. He stated that the “review of the human rights situation of the [DPRK] was taking
place under circumstances different from others” as North Korea had been singled out for
72
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discussion every year. The delegate believed that the purpose and motivations of the UNHCR
and the UNGA were irrelevant to genuine human rights concerns. Therefore, the DPRK
neither recognised nor accepted the resolutions of these two bodies, categorically rejecting
what they called the “extreme manifestation of politicisation, selectivity, and double
standards” in the area of human rights.78 The DPRK, however, had come to this session of the
UPR as it valued the review mechanism, which was impartial to all UN member states.
The North Korean delegate Ri Tcheul stated that some of the comments and
recommendations by the members present were made out of “misunderstanding of the reality
of the country, or based on misinformation”.79 The delegate denied the existence of public
executions and prison labour camps.

The conditions of prisoners are provided by the living standards of
common people…To the issue of public execution, I must tell you
that executing people in public is not our principle.80

Further, the delegate commented on violence against children and women.

In my country, children and women are accorded all sorts of special
protection. Children are valued as the kings of the country, and
women are valued as the flowers of the country.81

Instead of addressing the customary discrimination practices in society, the North Korean
delegate confirmed the government’s gendered view that women and children need “special
protection”. Further, the language employed by the delegate only further promotes gendered
difference between children as they are referred to as “kings”, a position held by males and
usually associated with power and strength, while women are referred to as “flowers”, an
object associated with delicacy and fragility, qualities stereotypically associated with females.
Such gendered language naturalises the gendered roles accorded to men and women in
society. Although positive progress was made between the DPRK and the UN with the
submission of a report to the UPR Committee, actions taken by the North Korean government
over the subsequent year stood to further threaten its international standing.
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The DPRK and the United Nations Security Council (2010)
From 2010, tensions grew between North and South Korea, until finally the DPRK authorised
an attack on a ROK naval ship in March 2010. Three months later on 9 July 2010, at the
6355th meeting of the UNSC the hostilities between North and South Korea were discussed
amongst the delegation. The President of the Security Council stated that a letter was
received on 4 June 2010 from the permanent representative of the ROK and from the
permanent representative of the DPRK on 8 June 2010.82 The Security Council noted the
responses from parties, including the DPRK, which had stated that it had nothing to do with
the incident.83 The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group led by the ROK with the
participation of five nations (Australia, Sweden, Canada, the United Kingdom and the USA),
concluded that the DPRK was responsible for sinking the South Korean navy ship, the
Cheonan. The UNSC deplored the North Korean sinking of the ROK naval ship, which had
resulted in the loss of forty-six lives.84 The Security Council called for “appropriate and
peaceful measures to be taken against those responsible for the incident” in accordance with
the United Nations Charter and all other relevant provisions of international law.85
On 23 November 2010, the DPRK fired upon the South Korean islands of
Yeongpyeong in the Yellow Sea. The attack resulted in the deaths of two South Korean
marines and two civilians, and the wounding of fifteen marines and at least three civilians.86
South Korean forces retaliated by firing at least eighty shells in the direction of the DPRK. At
the same time hostilities increased with neighbouring countries but the North Korean
government continued to communicate with the UN on the status of women within the
country.
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The DPRK and the 65th United Nations General Assembly (2010)
In September 2010, the North Korean delegation, including the Ambassador Deputy
Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the DPRK to the UN, Pak Tok Hun,
participated in the 65th session of the UNGA. In response to Agenda Item 28 “Advancement
of Women”, the North Korean Ambassador issued a press statement outlining the DPRK’s
commitment to gender equality.87 Agenda Item 28 outlined the elimination of all forms of
violence against women, the trafficking of women and girls, and the United Nations
Development Fund for Women.88 In the press release, Pak confirms that the DPRK is
committed to eliminating all forms of discrimination against women and faithfully fulfils its
obligations to CEDAW. The North Korean delegate points to the promulgation of the Law on
Equality of the Sexes in 1946 as steps taken by the DPRK to provide the legal basis for
women to enjoy the same rights with men, free from all sorts of social inequality and
discrimination.89 The DPRK acknowledges that elimination of discrimination and violence
against women are major agenda items of the UN and other international forums. However,
the global effort for elimination of discrimination against women and for advancement of
women including assurance of gender equality still faces many difficulties and challenges.90
Pak states that the North Korean government has continuously taken legal and practical
measures to ensure gender equality and the advancement of women. As a result, North
Korean women today are said to exercise their rights to the full in all spheres of state and
social life.91
In the following section, I discuss North Korea’s claim that gender equality in the
DPRK will only be successful once the Japanese government acknowledges its past crimes
against Korean women.

The DPRK on Military Sexual Slavery
The enforced military sexual slavery of Korean women by the Japanese military in wartime
has always been of concern to the North Korean government and at every possible
opportunity the DPRK has raised the issue with the UN. For instance, several years after the
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DPRK reported to CEDAW, it attended the 63rd session in 2008 and the 65th session in 2010
of the UN General Assemblies. At these Assemblies, respective North Korean delegations
raised the issue of the forced sexual enslavement of Korean women by the Japanese Imperial
Army and Navy during the occupation of Korea.
At the 63rd UNGA, the North Korean press release stated that in spite of the
intensified efforts of the international community to protect and promote women’s rights
through the elimination of discrimination, many difficulties and challenges have persisted in
the DPRK.92 In order to overcome these “deep-rooted difficulties and challenges and achieve
the advancement of [North Korean] women”, the delegation asserted that the “issues of the
past crimes [against women] behind the black curtain should be completely resolved”. 93 This
statement refers to the Japanese colonial period in Korean history (1910–1945). The DPRK
asserted that without recognition of enforced sexual slavery of Korean women in wartime by
the Japanese military, the ongoing gross violations of women’s rights will never be
eliminated on the Korean peninsula.
The 2008 North Korean press release states that the Japanese government drafted
200,000 Korean women into the so-called “comfort women” system, which is a crime against
humanity and yet to be settled once and for all.94 The North Korean press release at the 65th
UNGA, however, states the figure of “comfort women” slightly differently as it
acknowledges that the estimated number of 200,000 women included both Korean women
and women of other nationalities. The press release strongly advocates for Japan to
acknowledge its legal responsibility for all past crimes such as the forcible drafting of 8.4
million Koreans as workers and the massacre of one million Koreans, and make a sincere
apology and compensation to its victims.95 Other historians, such as Jeongwon Choi, estimate
that there were around 200,000 women of different nationalities forced into the military
prostitution/military sexual slavery system across Asia.96 The later press release continues
that the Japanese army “inflicted unimaginable and immeasurable sufferings and damages on
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hundreds of thousands of women from Korea and other several Asian countries” [emphasis
added].97
The North Korean government claims in the 2008 press release that all victims of
forced prostitution during the colonial period have been rehabilitated.98 The possibility that
all North Korean women that were forced into sexual slavery have been rehabilitated is
unlikely. Many women of other nationalities who were also subjected to the same forced
prostitution practices by the Japanese military during World War II (1939–1945) continue to
live with the memories of “violence containing not only the physical pain but also the
emotional trauma of the social shame”.99 These women live with low self-esteem due to the
loss of their virginity, being unable to have conventional families because of childlessness
and chronic pain associated with past physical injuries and sexual abuses endured during their
enslavement.
The North Korean delegation at the 63rd session of the UNGA stated that Japanese
authorities not only deny state responsibility for their crime but also refuse to make a sincere
apology and monetary compensation to victims. The DPRK urged Japan, “to face up to the
attitudes of other countries that are making sincere apology and reparation of their past
crimes even today when half a century has passed since the end of the 2nd World War
[sic]”.100 The press release continues that the 1996 UN Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, Radhika Commaraswamy, defined “comfort women” as “military sexual
slavery” and as a crime.101 The Special Rapporteur had recommended that the Japanese
government accept legal responsibility, make an official apology and compensation for the
victims immediately, reflect the truth of the history in the educational curricula and punish
the criminals.102 The North Korean press release asserted that this recommendation has not
been implemented until now, “due to intentional and stubborn objection on the part of the
Japanese government”.103 The 2010 North Korean delegation reminded Japan, “[e]ven the
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Parliaments of some western countries adopted resolutions demanding repentance and
apology for the crimes related to ‘comfort women’”.104
The 2010 North Korean press release of the 65th UNGA stated that the Japanese army
recruited young Korean women because it was in line with a policy of “obliterating the
Korean nation”.105 By “obliterating the Korean nation”, Pak Tok Hun is referring to the
assimilation program carried out by the Japanese government in colonial Korea. In 1937,
during the occupation of the Korean peninsula, Japan began an active assimilation program,
which included the “Pledge of the Imperial Subjects”, hoisting the Japanese national flag,
worshipping the Japanese emperor and attendance at Shinto ceremonies.106 Other polices
required Koreans to change their names to Japanese names. The Japanese government also
established the legal grounds for mobilising Koreans for war and in 1939 began to enforce
the systematic mobilisation of both Korean men and women for the war effort. 107 Koreans
were sent to Japan and many parts, where their descendants live to this day.108 The 2010
delegation stated, “Japan should settle its crimes committed against mankind above anything
else before “clamouring about ‘peace’ and ‘human rights’” on the Korean peninsula.109 The
North Korean government, in its commentary on human rights issues, brings up this
unresolved historical issue in order to delegitimise any criticisms waged by the Japanese
government. As noted above, there is ongoing tension between Japan and the DPRK on the
issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens by the North Korean government.
Until 2010, the DPRK claimed that most issues to do with gender equality had been
resolved by the Law on the Equality of the Sexes in 1946, as discussed in detail above. There
were, however, some amendments to the North Korean legal system in the 2000s. Next, I
outline North Korean laws updated and promulgated between 2006 and 2010, focusing on the
amended 2009 DPRK Constitution and the provisions of the Women’s Rights Act of 2010.
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North Korean Laws (2006–2010)
From 2006 to 2010, under intense international pressure, the North Korean government
reviewed the state legal system to include new legislation and amend existing laws. In the
book, Creator of Happiness, the North Korean historian Seong-gil Oh states:

[t]here is no other place like North Korea, a nation that continuously
establishes laws and provides social services for women. North Korea
is just like a utopia for women as the nation assumes a great role in
the upbringing of children and household chores that allows women
to devote their abilities fully to the workplace and society.110

Laws amended and promulgated since 2006 include the state Constitution in 2009 and the
Women’s Rights Act in 2010. Below I consider the importance of some provisions included
in these laws, which were not previously recognised by the DPRK when communicating with
the UN or the CEDAW Committee. I also draw attention to the gendered language that the
DPRK has continued to employ in its legal system.

The DPRK Constitution (2009)
The North Korean government adopted the revised state Constitution in April 2009. The
amended Constitution continued to emphasise and affirm the mobilisation of female workers
by protecting the rights of working mothers.111 To ensure women could leave the home
Article 77 guarantees facilities such as “expanding the network of maternity hospitals,
nurseries, and kindergartens, and by implementing other measures”. The rights of women in
marriage are “protected” in Article 78 of the Constitution, stipulating that marriage and
family “shall be protected by the state. The state shall take deep interest in consolidating the
family, the basic unit of social life”. The Constitution, though, does not outline why marriage
and family are awarded special protection. According to Jin Woong Kang, family units in
North Korea are “an important mechanism of social control and regime maintenance”. 112 The
consolidation of the family unit was particularly important for the North Korean government
from the mid-1990s, as the state passed the economic burden of supporting individuals to
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family groups (Family Law, 1990, Article 35 and Article 36). By passing the responsibility of
financial and food security to the family unit, the state tried to ensure the stability of the
country under the leadership of the Kim family.113

The Women’s Rights Act (2010)
Several years after the DPRK submitted its initial report to the CEDAW Committee in 2001,
the North Korean government promulgated the Women’s Rights Act on 22 December 2010
(see Appendix 8).114 The Act reflected some of the concerns expressed in the concluding
observations of the CEDAW Committee in 2005.115 The inclusion of the Act suggests that the
DPRK has responded to the international attention by the UN, who have focused on its poor
human rights record towards women.116 While the Act reiterates women’s equal right to
marriage and divorce (Article 44 and Article 42 respectively), and the rights of working
mothers (Article 26 and Article 37) it also attempts to address the need to stop discrimination
against women in other forms such as the prevention of violence (Article 46).
Under the Women’s Rights Act the North Korean government, “shall establish a basic
plan to guarantee women’s rights and execute it [the Act]” (Article 4). Article 4 continues
that women’s rights are to be “achieved through the Municipal People’s Committees
establishing detailed plans on a yearly basis according to the state’s basic plan to guarantee
women’s rights”. The responsibility of the Municipal People’s Committees is to guarantee
women’s rights as an important assignment and take measures to ensure the rights of women
in the area of jurisdiction (Article 6). The NKHR report highlights unexplained issues with
this Article. Firstly, Article 6 fails to mention in detail which governmental departments
would establish the initial basic plan, what areas of women’s rights would be covered in the
plan, whether there would be any framework for monitoring the implementation of the plan,
and finally what timeframe should be given for the implementation of the plan.117 Therefore,
the Act should be interpreted as a starting point.
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Article 8 of the Women’s Rights Act states that it is the responsibility of legal
institutions to enforce “legal control in order to prevent women’s rights from being violated
by any act of crime or violation of law”. Any item related to women’s rights which is not
regulated by this law is to be governed by relevant laws and any international convention to
which the DPRK is party (Article 10) and this would include CEDAW. Crimes against North
Korean women that are not covered by provisions of the Act, however, include marital rape,
workplace harassment, and stereotyping of women to gendered roles. Theoretically, because
the Act does not cover these issues specifically, CEDAW should be taken into consideration.
To ensure the North Korean community is aware of their responsibilities under the
Women’s Rights Act the Korean Democratic Women’s Union (KDWU, Women’s Union) is
authorised to promote the protection of women’s rights. The KDWU duties include the
support and strengthening of the government’s ideology through the education of people and
the organisation of public works and events.118 Article 53 of the Women’s Rights Act states
that the Women’s Union is to “organise and execute enterprises of various forms and
methods to raise social awareness on women’s rights and to raise the status of women”.
However, if the Women’s Union is a mouthpiece for the government then it leaves no avenue
for women to complain or advocate for change in North Korean society.

Gendered Roles in North Korean Families
In the Women’s Rights Act the language employed by the North Korean government towards
the role of men and women has not changed significantly, as the government continues to
stress the importance of women’s roles in the home. This can be seen in Article 3 of the Act,
which stipulates, “women play an important role in the welfare of the family and the
development of the society”.119 NKHR states that the wording of this Article implies that the
role of women is first within the family and then in society, 120 suggesting that the language
employed by the North Korean government towards gender equality has not changed since its
accession to CEDAW in 2001. The fact that it is the “Women’s Rights Act” rather than, say,
the “Gender Equality Act” reveals that the North Korean government still does not question
men’s roles in society or the home.
The rights of women in marriage (Article 44) and divorce (Article 42) have continued
to be protected under the Women’s Rights Act. The DPRK addresses violence in families for
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the first time in Article 46 of the Women’s Rights Act, which stipulates that there “must not
be any form of domestic violence against women in the family”. Although the Article
attempts to act as a preventive measure against domestic violence, it does not criminalise
domestic violence or provide any legal protection for victims against spousal violence. 121 The
inclusion of this provision in state law is a step forward in the North Korea’s legal system, as
previous laws did not address violence within homes. Instead, violence in the home was seen
as a private matter.122 The Korean Institute for National Unification reports that many
defectors have testified in recent years that incidents of domestic violence are widespread in
the DPRK.123 It is difficult to clarify the number of cases of domestic violence though, as the
North Korean government has not provided statistical data to the UN in its reporting. When
domestic violence cases are reported to the Municipal People’s Committees, institutions,
corporate associations, and organisations, it is usually not investigated because it is
considered a “family matter”.124 However, if the case is investigated authorities usually issue
a personal warning to the perpetrator, who is required to write a letter of self-criticism.125 On
rare occasions, husbands who have physically abused their wives have been arrested and sent
to labour-training camps as punishment.126
Article 49 of the Women’s Rights Act stipulates that “a woman has equal rights and
responsibility to protect underage children with her husband”. The Article continues by
stating that if the husband is deceased, has lost legal capabilities to protect the children, or for
any other unavoidable reasons cannot be guardian of the children, the woman has the sole
right and responsibility to protect the children. This Article places the responsibility of
protecting and raising children on women and does not mention what responsibility men have
within the family if the roles are reversed and the woman is incapable of caring for a child. In
previous state laws such as the Family Law (Article 27 and 28), both parents had the same
obligation to educate and care for the health and growth of children.
The Women’s Rights Act maintains that women “have the right to give or not give
birth to children” (Article 50). Article 50 continues, however, that “[n]ationally it is
encouraged by the state that women give birth to and raise many children”. Although the state
encouraged North Korean women to have multiple children this was an unrealistic
expectation. Since the food crisis in the mid-1990s, most women struggle to find food for
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their existing family members without adding further mouths to feed. For most women, their
work in the home has increased tremendously since the food crisis, due to the state’s inability
to deliver on its promise of socialising housework and childrearing. 127 Just as food security
was unstable, childrearing facilities promised by the state no longer operated to their full
potential. In this context, the government saw North Korean women as being primarily
responsible for carrying the burden of family chores and rearing of children. This meant that
women who no longer worked in the official economy took on the responsibility of caring for
their children all day, a responsibility once belonging to the state.
In the DPRK’s initial report to the CEDAW Committee, there was reference to the
older generation still preferring male children over female. 128 To address the CEDAW
Committee’s concern about son preference the North Korean government explicitly mentions
this issue in the Women’s Rights Act. Article 38 of the Act prohibits female infanticide by
stipulating that it is “prohibited to kill a newborn infant because she is a female and to
mistreat or show contempt for women who give birth to a female child or are pregnant, ill,
disabled or old”. Provisions in the Article also address discrimination against other marginal
groups such as those who are ill, disabled or old.129 This is the first time the North Korean
government has addressed female infanticide in any state law and is a positive step. On the
other hand, it highlights that gender discrimination continues to exist in the DPRK and that
the state needs to legislate against gender discrimination and violence.

Gendered Roles in the North Korean Labour Force
In the DPRK, labour within the official economy is the responsibility of all people, because it
is not seen as an individual benefit but is based on the collectivist principle to benefit
everyone.130 Therefore, the right to work is not a right but a duty to respond to the
mobilisation of labour, and the North Korean government has long promoted the participation
of women.131 The Women’s Rights Act states that women have equal rights with men in the
labour force and that Municipal People’s Committees and relevant organs are to guarantee
the equal rights of women to take part in labour (Article 26). Article 37 states that to ensure
women are able to leave the home relevant institutions, corporate associations, and
organisations should establish day-care centres, kindergartens and other facilities. This idea,
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however, rests on the belief that women are primarily responsible for the care of their
children. For women who do not have access to these facilities because they work in the
unofficial economy this is an added responsibility. Further, it is evident that the government’s
thinking on women’s roles has changed little since the promulgation of the Law on Equality
of the Sexes or the state’s accession to CEDAW in 2001.
It has been a long-held practice for the North Korean government to assign women
between the ages of 16 and 55 years to specific positions in the labour force. Therefore,
discrimination against women in the workplace has emerged in the forms of differentiated
pay scales and the type of work women are assigned to. Article 28 of the Women’s Rights
Act highlights this view by stating:

Institutions, corporate associations and organisations, except for
those professions or departments that are not appropriate for women,
are not allowed to not take in women or restrict them for reasons such
as gender, marriage, pregnancy, and childbirth.
The exception made in the Article to “professions or departments that are not appropriate for
women” shows that the North Korean government still deems some occupations unsuitable
for women. This perceived unsuitability is based on assumptions about the physical and
mental capabilities of women. This results in men being assigned to important and higher
paying jobs, while women are assigned to relatively less important and lower paying jobs,132
in the light industry such as agriculture, communications, health and education.133
The Women’s Rights Act states that workplaces must pay full attention to the
protection of female workers by providing safety and hygiene facilities in accordance with
women’s physical attributes; and that women cannot be assigned to work that is not
appropriate (Article 29). The Act does not elaborate on what occupations are considered “not
appropriate” but Article 30 states that the “supervising organ for labour administration
determines which fields and professions are prohibited for women”. Institutions, corporate
associations, and organisations must not make women work in prohibited fields or
professions, and cannot make a woman work at night if she is pregnant or has an infant
(Article 30). The concept of work as “not appropriate” for women reveals the government’s
assumption that women are naturally suited to certain occupations in line with feminine
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qualities. This does not give women the right to choose their own profession or employment
but confirms the stereotyping of women in gendered roles.
Article 31 of the Women’s Rights Act states that the working hours for a woman with
three or more children are reduced to six hours a day, and her living expenses paid by the
government. The Article implies however, that a woman’s primary place is as a mother
within the home caring for children, perpetuating gender stereotypes. Article 33 of the
Women’s Rights Act stipulates:

[the] [s]tate provides women workers with maternity leave of 60 days
before childbirth and 90 days after, regardless of the length of service
and in addition to regular and complementary holidays. Women
cannot be made to work during maternity leave.

Further, workplaces are not to dismiss female workers for reasons such as marriage,
pregnancy, maternity leave, and breastfeeding (Article 34). The NKHR reports that while the
Article protects women against unfair dismissal, it does not address other types of potential
workplace discrimination based on harassment because of one’s gender.134 Women during the
periods before and after childbirth are provided for in the Act but there are no provisions to
protect women in other times during their working lives or for women who have no children.
In addition, the Women’s Rights Act only protects women if they continue to work in the
official state labour force so if a woman leaves their official state employment after marriage
or due to workplace instability then she is not protected by the Act. While North Korean men
continue to go to their official workplaces distribution of food coupons and wages are
provided irregularly or not at all. Some men who are able to pay a financial bribe to cover
their absence at work pursue activities in the unofficial economy, such as petty crime or
transporting goods.135
In recent years, the North Korean government has not tightened restrictions on
women’s economic activities in the unofficial market economy. Previously government
regulation of the unofficial economy restricted the operation of markets to women younger
than 55 years old. However, the state has shifted the responsibility of securing food and
money for families to women regardless of age. This has had both positive and negative
implications for women and their families. For example, women have become financially
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independent but also have been punished for crossing the border to China to trade goods and
have been exposed to prostitution, trafficking, and sexual abuse.136

Sexual Assault, Prostitution and Trafficking of North Korean Women
Due to the difficult living conditions in the DPRK since the 1990s, there have been reports of
increased cases of sexual assault against North Korean women, increased numbers of women
turning to prostitution as a means of survival and the trafficking of women to China. KINU
reports that the sexual assault of women has become widespread as women have assumed the
role of financial providers in the family and left their homes to work in the unofficial
economy. Compared to the past, sexual assault to gain Party membership or promotion in the
workplace has declined while assault cases in public places have increased.137 More
specifically, individuals such as security agents at the market, safety conductors on the train,
and soldiers have demanded sex from women who committed minor violations. There are
also reported cases of sexual assault inside guard-post detention facilities.138 It is not clear
how many North Korean women have experienced sexual assault as the North Korean
government has not provided statistical data to the international community, the UN or other
UN bodies such as CEDAW but NGOs have collected numerous testimonies of victims. The
Women’s Rights Act includes no protection measures against the sexual assault of women. In
communication between the North Korean government and UN, as discussed above, the
government still argues that sexual violation against women is something that occurred in the
past.
Since the food crisis, women have turned to prostitution as a means of survival.139
The North Korean government has addressed this practice in the Women’s Rights Act.
Article 40 of the Act states that anyone who engages in prostitution or anyone who organises,
promotes, or coerces someone into prostitution will be punished in accordance with the law.
The Women’s Rights Act elaborates on Article 7 of the Law on Equality of the Sexes, which
only briefly addressed prostitution and relegated it to the colonial period.140 NGOs point out,
however, that prostitution in the DPRK has not only become more pervasive, but also more
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widely accepted by society as a survival strategy. 141 Some women enter the commercial sex
trade as a means of earning for their basic survival and those organising the trade usually
receive protection from collaborating North Korean Security Agents.142 KINU states there
have also been reports of cases of under-aged prostitution and parents coercing daughters into
prostitution for economic reasons.143 If caught engaging in prostitution, male customers are
usually released by bribing officials, but the woman is punished.144
There has also been an increased number of women trafficked to China and into the
sex industry or to marry Chinese men.145 Family breakdown contributed to an increase in
trafficking of teenage girls whose parents could no longer fulfil their parental
responsibilities.146 For the first time since the Law on Equality of the Sexes, the North
Korean government addressed the trafficking of women in state law. Article 37 of the
Women’s Rights Act stipulates that it is prohibited “to illegally restrict the liberty of women,
damage the body of women by violent and non-violent means, and search the body of
women”. Further, no one may kidnap, trade, rape or gang rape women (Article 39).
Therefore, relevant organs are to establish plans to prevent kidnapping, trafficking, rape and
gang rape of women, and punish anyone who has committed such acts, in accordance with
the law (Article 39). This Article builds upon Article 7 of the Law on Equality of the Sexes,
which only briefly states that the prostitution is prohibited.147 However, the Women’s Rights
Act does not clearly outline the punishment of the perpetrator or the prevention plans to
ensure these practices do not continue.

Conclusion
Since the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946, North Korean rhetoric
has argued that the role of women was to turn to productive work in society to help build an
independent socialist country. In its correspondence with the UN and CEDAW Committee,
the North Korean government emphasised its efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination
against women by taking a two-pronged approach. The government stressed the importance
of “protecting” women in state laws and policy and attributed gender discrimination and the
trafficking of women to the historical timeframe of the occupation of Korea by Japan. In the
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international climate of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the North Korean
government continued its criticism of the Japanese government for these historical wrongs,
deflecting attention from the contemporary tensions between Japan and the DPRK. Press
releases addressed to the UN General Assembly in 2008 and 2010 raised this issue. In the
context of increasing criticism of human rights abuses in the DPRK and the dire situation of
women who crossed the border into China, some modifications were made in the 2009 DPRK
Constitution, and the Women’s Rights Act was passed in 2010. Due to international pressure
both the Constitution and the Act went beyond existing North Korean laws, mentioning for
the first time issues such as domestic violence and prostitution. However, the government’s
gendered language and the stereotyping of men and women to certain roles continued to be
employed by the state in these laws. Therefore, although these laws can be seen as a step
forward for addressing gender equality in the DPRK, they also expose the fact that not much
has changed in North Korean society since 1946 and the promulgation of the Law on
Equality of the Sexes. Twelve months after the North Korean delegation participated in the
65th session of the UNGA in September 2010, the then leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong Il
passed away in December 2011. Within the same month of Kim Jong Il’s death leadership of
the DPRK passed to his son Kim Jong Un (1983–).
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9. Conclusions
Due to the profound interest of our Party, our women, as
proud masters of the country along with men, are now
making an active contribution to the revolutionary
struggle and constructive work.
Kim Il Sung, (date unknown).1

In this thesis I have explored the use of gendered rhetoric in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’s (DPRK, North Korea) communications with the outside world, focusing
on the periods of rule by Kim Il Sung (1912–1994; ruler from 1946 to 1994) and Kim Jong Il
(1941–2011; leader from 1994 to 2011). I have focused mainly on the period from 1964 to
2011, analysing the English-language magazine, Women of Korea, from 1964 to 1992; the
DPRK’s communications with the Committee to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (hereafter “CEDAW Committee) between 2000 and 2005; and the DPRK’s
communications with the United Nations (UN) between 2006 and 2011. In order to
contextualise these texts, it has also been necessary to survey the North Korean legal system
and laws and policies on gender issues from 1946 to 2010. Further context has been provided
by non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs’) reports from the 1990s to the present, which
provide a different picture of life and of gender relations in the DPRK. My main
methodology has been critical discourse analysis. That is, I have been interested not so much
in the factual claims made by the North Korean government, but rather the gendered
assumptions revealed in the rhetoric of the DPRK, whether in official English-language
propaganda magazines, or in communications with the CEDAW Committee and other organs
of the UN.
Scholarly works to date have offered surveys of different aspects of North Korean
society, the North Korean legal system, and the representation of North Korean women in the
media. This thesis contributes to the field of gender and International Relations (IR) by
answering the question of how the North Korean government has presented to the
international community its goal of achieving gender equality and how it employs positive
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portraits of relations among North Korean men, women and children to demonstrate its
success in realising many of these goals. I have chosen to focus on these issues in the
DPRK’s reporting to the UN, CEDAW Committee and in English-language magazines as
they have been sources not yet examined in depth by other scholars. These sources offer a
greater understanding of the North Korean government’s assumptions about gender equality
and gender relations, as well as providing the few admissions by the North Korean
government of the existence of gender discrimination in society and the family. The primary
aim of the North Korean government has been to present a positive picture of gender equality
and gender relations. Gender has played a vital role in the DPRK’s communications with the
outside world, whether in promoting the success of the socialist answer to the “woman
question”, or whether criticising other countries for their mistreatment of women.
Over the years, the North Korean government has maintained that it has taken
practical legal measures so that all North Koreans regardless of gender can realise their
rights. The government, though, often interpreted this as meaning specific measures for
women to ensure they were able to leave their homes to join the labour force. North Korean
laws such as the Law on Equality of the Sexes (1946), the Law on the Nursing and
Upbringing of Children (1976) and the Women’s Rights Act (2010) promote the idea of
gender equality but also define women as mothers who are responsible for the home. North
Korean policies socialised childcare and housework to ensure more women were able to join
the labour force but were also based on the assumption that these activities within the home
were not equally shared between both genders.2 It could be said that often the rights of North
Korean women have been held back to assure a harmonious society and a stable family and
work units.3 Despite the rhetoric of commitment to gender equality, notions of gendered roles
persist in the DPRK,4 as assumptions by North Korean government about appropriate gender
roles and what is considered masculine or feminine all inform the practices of North Korean
men and women.
The wording of North Korean laws, as well as the DPRK’s rhetoric in its reporting to
the UN and in English-language magazines, restrict men and women to gendered roles in and
outside the home. In no North Korean law and policy or government rhetoric is it mentioned
2

United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Analysis of the Situation of Children and
Women in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Pyongyang: United Nations International Children’s
Emergency Fund DPRK, 2003), p. 21.
3
Maxine Molyneux, “Mobilization Without Emancipation? Women’s Interest, State, and Revolution”, in
Richard Fagen, C.D. Deere, and J.L. Coraggio (eds), Transition and Development: Problems with Third World
Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986), p. 299.
4
Jin Woong Kang, “The ‘Domestic Revolution’ Policy and Traditional Confucianism in North Korean State
Formation: A Socio-cultural Perspective”, Harvard Asia Quarterly, 10 (2) (2006), p. 40.
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that North Korean men should perform duties in the home equal to that of women or even to
ease the burden that women carry. The North Korean government claimed that once women
had left the home to work outside the home they had achieved liberation from the shackles of
a feudal society and colonial aggressors, but did not address the roles of men.5 The visual
images and texts published in the magazine Women of Korea represent the government’s
constructed view of masculinity and femininity from the 1960s to the early 1990s. This is
particularly evident in the clothing styles assigned by the government to North Korean men
and women – men clothed in modern suits and women in the traditional feminine hanbok.
In Women of Korea, North Korean women are represented as revolutionary heroines
and as ordinary women as part of the “Hidden Hero” campaign. Since the initial publication
of the magazine the Kim family have been represented in the visual images and stories. Three
prominent Kim family members appear in most issues of the magazine, Kim Il Sung, as
father of Korea, his mother Kang Ban Sok, as the “Mother of Korea” and his first wife, Kim
Jong Suk, as a loyal and devoted wife to her husband and the revolutionary cause. The
depictions of the revolutionary Kim family present an idealised story of the liberation of the
nation from Japanese colonial rule. Both Kim women are presented as revolutionary heroines
who support the revolutionary cause by cooking, sewing, looking after children and being
loyal to their husbands, while Kim Il Sung is presented as a father figure and patriarch of the
Kim family and the entire Korean nation. In these representations of the Kims there is an
unequal relationship that is not challenged by the government between the masculine
characteristics of Kim Il Sung as a strong and dominant figure and the two Kim women who
display appropriately feminine characteristics. This occurs even though Kim Jong Suk takes
up arms to defend the revolutionary cause as she is predominantly represented as performing
domestic chores on the battlefield rather than standing equal to her husband. In the DPRK,
these representations of the revolutionary Kim family provide models for ordinary people to
emulate, while also reinforcing the primacy and legitimacy of the Kim dynasty. In an
international context, these representations promote the legitimacy of the North Korean
regime and the idea that gender equality has been achieved by women leaving the home to
participate in society.
The visual images and text published in Women of Korea also reveal that once women
left their home to join the labour force the North Korean government assigned them to
occupations deemed suitable based on their gender. Typically women were allocated to

5

Ibid., p. 59.
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positions in the so-called “light industries” by the government, which was composed of
occupations predominantly in the food and textile sectors, or in education, nursing, and
service industries. Although the North Korean government promised women the same work
privileges, wages, and social security as men by law, in practice women were not paid
comparable wages for essentially comparable work and they were not equally promoted.6
Further, cultural and patriarchal restrictions placed on North Korean women were not
eliminated simply by joining the workforce. Instead women’s responsibilities increased as
they were expected to continue to perform their work in the home with their work in society.
Through the representations of ordinary women the North Korean government continued to
emphasise the importance of women’s work in the home combined with their contribution to
the labour force and nation building.
In Women of Korea, the visual representations of the revolutionary heroines and of
ordinary women as part of the “Hidden Hero” campaign also reveal that the ideal clothing
styles of North Korean men and women are clearly gendered. While there is an emphasis on
femininity in everything worn by women,7 men are no longer portrayed wearing ethnic
Korean clothing and instead are seen in Western-style suits or military uniforms. In the visual
images revolutionary heroines and ordinary North Korean women are mostly represented
wearing ethnic Korean clothing (hanbok), composed of the chima (jacket) and jeogori (skirt)
or simple and modern clothing that retains distinctive feminine traits, consisting of dresses or
blouses and skirts. Unlike other socialist states which glorified masculine clothing for
revolutionary women, fashion in the DPRK has instead expressed feminine clothing for these
heroines, seemingly contradicting the revolutionary spirit often associated with masculinity.8
In the 1990s, the superficial rhetoric of the government on achieving gender equality
was challenged by the economic crisis and food shortages. 9 The most notable change that
occurred from this time was the challenge to customary practices within the family unit,
which resulted in North Korean women becoming the primary providers for their families.
Many North Korean women were forced to implement survival strategies to save themselves
and their families, such as trade activities along the Chinese border.10 In a situation where the
state’s Public Distribution System collapsed and North Korean men were not able to provide
financial support to their families, women became active players in local markets, trade
6
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activities and as scavengers of food and medical supplies. Although gender stereotypes were
challenged within the family unit and women became somewhat economically independent, it
also added to the responsibilities of women, who were already expected to perform the
majority of household chores.
Since the 1990s, the North Korean government has communicated with the
international community, the UN and various UN bodies such as the CEDAW Committee,
due mostly to food shortages and the need for international humanitarian aid. Between 2001
and 2005 the government engaged with the CEDAW Committee about achieving gender
equality in the DPRK. The reports exchanged between the North Korean government and the
CEDAW Committee revealed for the first time issues about gender relations within the
country that had not previously been discussed with the international community. The reports
focused on discrimination against North Korean women in all forms, verbal and physical, and
in all parts of society from family life to the labour force. The North Korean government also
addressed women’s access to education, health and employment in its reporting. Examining
the DPRK’s reporting, however, reveals the extent to which gendered stereotypes still
underpin the government’s view of the roles of men and women, even while it promotes a
commitment to achieving gender equality to the international community. In North Korea’s
reporting women are represented as mothers who are capable of performing domestic duties
while contributing to the social reconstruction of the country. While the government has
assumed that many North Korean women perform the majority of household chores, it has
addressed this issue through the promulgation of laws to help lessen their burdens within the
home. The government’s rhetoric in its reporting to the CEDAW Committee confirms its
perception that women are the primary carers of children and responsible for cleaning and
cooking, while men do not carry this burden. Further, once women left the home to work in
the labour force they were assigned by the government to certain jobs in the so-called “light
industries”, which were typically paid less than those monopolised by men. The North
Korean government repeatedly stated in its reporting to the CEDAW Committee that it
supported the principle of women’s rights but many aspects of gender equality have not
adequately been addressed by the DPRK.
Although the DPRK communicated with the CEDAW Committee for the last time in
July 2005, the North Korean government did continue to correspond with the United Nations
General Assembly and other UN bodies about achieving gender equality. In its
communications, the UN often raised concerns with the DPRK about the status of North
Korean women in society, and access by women to education, healthcare and employment.
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The UN also raised issues such as domestic violence, prostitution and the trafficking of North
Korean women to China. At every possible opportunity, the UN and the international
community emphasised the importance of improving the situation of North Korean women.
Since 2005, the North Korean government has emphasised in its correspondence with the UN
its efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women by taking a two-pronged
approach. First, the government has stressed the importance of gender-specific treatment of
women in North Korean laws and policy and secondly, the government has answered the
question of women’s rights by assigning gender discrimination and the trafficking of women
to the historical timeframe of the occupation of Korea by Japan from 1910 to 1945. In its
emphasis on the Law on the Equality of the Sexes in 1946, and its continued emphasis on
colonial exploitation by the Japanese until 1945, the rhetoric of the DPRK has often seemed
to be frozen in an early postcolonial and early Cold War framework.
In the DPRK’s communication with the UN, it has taken the position that the current
prospects of achieving gender equality within the country cannot be separated from the
historical issue of the sexual exploitation of Korean women by Japan during the colonial
period and wartime. North Korea states that if the Japanese government does not recognise its
past crimes against Korean women, then gender equality cannot be fully achieved on the
peninsula. The DPRK does not acknowledge or address the current situation for North
Korean women, who are victims of modern forms of trafficking. Instead the North Korean
government insists that the state’s legal system has eliminated the trafficking of women
within the country. As in so many other situations, the question of the exploitation of women
has been mobilised by the DPRK in order to delegitimise the Japanese government at
sensitive moments in international relations. It is clear that even though the DPRK has taken
the initial step of agreeing to the guidelines set out in UN conventions, it does not mean that
the North Korean government has always made sufficient legal changes to existing state laws
to ensure the requirements of CEDAW are met. Any changes that have occurred to the roles
of North Korean men and women since the mid-1990s and the DPRK’s accession to CEDAW
in 2001 have taken place independently of the state and the North Korean legal system.
Rather, changes to gender roles are an effect of the ongoing socioeconomic transformation of
the DPRK.
Finally, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the knowledge of gender
studies in the DPRK by employing the theoretical framework of gender and IR when
critically analysing North Korean sources. By employing literary and visual analysis when
examining the magazine Women of Korea and the communication between the DPRK and the
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CEDAW Committee, I have contributed to gender and IR by introducing critical discourse
analysis into this field. As gender and IR is still a fairly new area in academic research the
interdisciplinary focus employed in this thesis will contribute to the development of the field.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women
PART I
Article 1. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “discrimination against
women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or
any other field.
Article 2. States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination
against women and, to this end, undertake:
To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate
means, the practical realisation of this principle;
To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against
women;
To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis
with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and
other public institutions the effective protection of women against
any act of discrimination;
To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination
against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions
shall act in conformity with this obligation;
To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women by any person, organisation or enterprise;
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To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women;
To

repeal

all

national

penal

provisions

which

constitute

discrimination against women.
Article 3. States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic
and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to en sure the full
development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise
and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.
Article 4. 1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating
de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined
in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of
unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. 2. Adoption by States Parties of
special measures, including those measure contained in the present Convention, aimed at
protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.
Article 5. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women;
To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of
maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common
responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development
of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children
is the primordial consideration in all cases.
Article 6. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress
all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.

PART II
Article 7. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to
women, on equal terms with men, the right:
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To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for
election to all publicly elected bodies;
To participate in the formulation of government policy and the
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all
public functions at all levels of government;
To participate in non-governmental organisations and associations
concerned with the public and political life of the country.
Article 8. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal
terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their
Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international
organisations.
Article 9. 1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or
retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor
change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the
nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. 2.
States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their
children.

PART III
Article 10. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and
in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to
studies and for the achievement of diplomas in educational
establishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas; this
equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general, technical,
professional and higher technical education, as well as in all types of
vocational training;
Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff
with qualifications of the same standard and school premises and
equipment of the same quality;
The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and
women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging
coeducation and other types of education which will help to achieve
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this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school
programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods;
The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study
grants;
The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing
education, including adult and functional literacy programmes,
particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest possible time, any
gap in education existing between men and women;
The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organisation
of programmes for girls and women who have left school
prematurely;
The same Opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical
education;
Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the
health and well-being of families, including information and advice
on family planning.
Article 11. 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men
and women, the same rights, in particular:
The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
The right to the same employment opportunities, including the
application of the same criteria for selection in matters of
employment;
The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to
promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service and
the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including
apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training;
The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal
treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of
treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;
The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement,
unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity
to work, as well as the right to paid leave;
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The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions,
including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction.
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity
and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures:
To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the
grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in
dismissals on the basis of marital status;
To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social
benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social
allowances;
To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social
services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work
responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through
promoting the establishment and development of a network of childcare facilities;
To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of
work proved to be harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this Article shall be reviewed
periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised,
repealed or extended as necessary.
Article 12. 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning. 2.
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this Article, States Parties shall ensure to
women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal
period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during
pregnancy and lactation.
Article 13. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:
The right to family benefits;
The right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial
credit;
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The right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all
aspects of cultural life.
Article 14. 1. States Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural
women and the significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their
families, including their work in the non-monetised sectors of the economy, and shall take all
appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of the present Convention to
women in rural areas. 2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men
and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular,
shall ensure to such women the right:
To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development
planning at all levels;
To have access to adequate health care facilities, including
information, counselling and services in family planning;
To benefit directly from social security programmes;
To obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal,
including that relating to functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the
benefit of all community and extension services, in order to increase
their technical proficiency;
To organise self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain
equal access to economic opportunities through employment or selfemployment;
To participate in all community activities;
To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities,
appropriate technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian
reform as well as in land resettlement schemes;
To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to
housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and
communications.

PART IV
Article 15. 1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law. 2. States
Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and
the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal
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rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all
stages of procedure in courts and tribunals. 3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all
other private instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the
legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void. 4. States Parties shall accord to men
and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and
the freedom to choose their residence and domicile.
Article 16. 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
The same right to enter into marriage;
The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage
only with their free and full consent;
The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its
dissolution;
The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their
marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the
interests of the children shall be paramount;
The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and
spacing of their children and to have access to the information,
education and means to enable them to exercise these rights;
The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship,
wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions
where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the
interests of the children shall be paramount;
The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to
choose a family name, a profession and an occupation;
The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership,
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition
of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration.
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary
action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to
make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory.

PART V
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Article 17. 1. For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation of the
present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) consisting, at the
time of entry into force of the Convention, of eighteen and, after ratification of or accession
to the Convention by the thirty-fifth State Party, of twenty-three experts of high moral
standing and competence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts shall be elected
by States Parties from among their nationals and shall serve in their personal capacity,
consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the representation of
the different forms of civilisation as well as the principal legal systems. 2. The members of
the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by States
Parties. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals. 3. The
initial election shall be held six months after the date of the entry into force of the present
Convention. At least three months before the date of each election the Secretary-General of
the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit their
nominations within two months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical
order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have nominated them,
and shall submit it to the States Parties. 4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall
be held at a meeting of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General at United Nations
Headquarters. At that meeting, for which two thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a
quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain the largest
number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties
present and voting. 5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four
years. However, the terms of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at
the end of two years; immediately after the first election the names of these nine members
shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee. 6. The election of the five
additional members of the Committee shall be held in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article, following the thirty-fifth ratification or accession. The
terms of two of the additional members elected on this occasion shall expire at the end of two
years, the names of these two members having been chosen by lot by the Chairman of the
Committee. 7. For the filling of casual vacancies, the State Party whose expert has ceased to
function as a member of the Committee shall appoint another expert from among its
nationals, subject to the approval of the Committee. 8. The members of the Committee shall,
with the approval of the General Assembly, receive emoluments from United Nations
resources on such terms and conditions as the Assembly may decide, having regard to the
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importance of the Committee’s responsibilities. 9. The Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the
functions of the Committee under the present Convention.
Article 18. 1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, for consideration by the Committee, a report on the legislative, judicial,
administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of
the present Convention and on the progress made in this respect:
Within one year after the entry into force for the State concerned;
Thereafter at least every four years and further whenever the
Committee so requests.
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of
obligations under the present Convention.
Article 19. 1. The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 2. The Committee shall
elect its officers for a term of two years.
Article 20. 1. The Committee shall normally meet for a period of not more than two weeks
annually in order to consider the reports submitted in accordance with Article 18 of the
present Convention. 2. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at United
Nations Headquarters or at any other convenient place as determined by the Committee.
Article 21. 1. The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social Council, report
annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make
suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of reports and
information received from the States Parties. Such suggestions and general recommendations
shall be included in the report of the Committee together with comments, if any, from States
Parties. 2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the reports of the
Committee to the Commission on the Status of Women for its information.
Article 22. The specialised agencies shall be entitled to be represented at the consideration of
the implementation of such provisions of the present Convention as fall within the scope of
their activities. The Committee may invite the specialised agencies to submit reports on the
implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities.

PART VI
Article 23. Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions that are more
conducive to the achievement of equality between men and women which may be contained:
In the legislation of a State Party; or
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In any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for
that State.
Article 24. States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national level
aimed at achieving the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Convention.
Article 25. 1. The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States. 2. The
Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated as the depositary of the present
Convention. 3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 4. The present
Convention shall be open to accession by all States. Accession shall be effected by the
deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary- General of the United Nations.
Article 26. 1. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time
by any State Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. 2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the
steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request.
Article 27. 1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date
of deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of
ratification or accession. 2. For each State ratifying the present Convention or acceding to it
after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall
enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of
ratification or accession.
Article 28. 1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all
States the text of reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession. 2. A
reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be
permitted. 3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall then inform all States
thereof. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received.
Article 29. 1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request
of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request
for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organisation of the arbitration, any one
of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in
conformity with the Statute of the Court. 2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or
ratification of the present Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider
itself bound by paragraph I of this Article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by that
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paragraph with respect to any State Party which has made such a reservation. 3. Any State
Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article may at any
time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 30. The present Convention, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.1

1

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Full
Text of the Convention in English, (2009), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw /text/econvention.htm
#Article17 (accessed 3 July 2014).
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Appendix 2. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women
Article 1. A State Party to the present Protocol (“State Party”) recognises the competence of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“the Committee”) to
receive and consider communications submitted in accordance with Article 2.
Article 2. Communications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of
individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of
any of the rights set forth in the Convention by that State Party. Where a communication is
submitted on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, this shall be with their consent
unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such consent.

Article 3. Communications shall be in writing and shall not be anonymous. No
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the
Convention that is not a party to the present Protocol.

Article 4. 1. The Committee shall not consider a communication unless it has ascertained that
all available domestic remedies have been exhausted unless the application of such remedies
is unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief. 2. The Committee shall
declare a communication inadmissible where:
The same matter has already been examined by the Committee or has
been or is being examined under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement;
It is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention;
It is manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently substantiated;
It is an abuse of the right to submit a communication;
The facts that are the subject of the communication occurred prior to
the entry into force of the present Protocol for the State Party
concerned unless those facts continued after that date.

Article 5. 1. At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on
the merits has been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its
urgent consideration a request that the State Party take such interim measures as may be
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necessary to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged
violation. 2. Where the Committee exercises its discretion under paragraph 1 of the present
Article, this does not imply a determination on admissibility or on the merits of the
communication.

Article 6. 1. Unless the Committee considers a communication inadmissible without
reference to the State Party concerned, and provided that the individual or individuals consent
to the disclosure of their identity to that State Party, the Committee shall bring any
communication submitted to it under the present Protocol confidentially to the attention of
the State Party concerned. 2. Within six months, the receiving State Party shall submit to the
Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any,
that may have been provided by that State Party.

Article 7. 1. The Committee shall consider communications received under the present
Protocol in the light of all information made available to it by or on behalf of individuals or
groups of individuals and by the State Party concerned, provided that this information is
transmitted to the parties concerned. 2. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when
examining communications under the present Protocol. 3. After examining a communication,
the Committee shall 4. The State Party shall give due consideration to the views of the
Committee, together with its recommendations, if any, and shall submit to the Committee,
within six months, a written response, including information on any action taken in the light
of the views and recommendations of the Committee. 4. The Committee may invite the State
Party to submit further information about

any measures the State Party has taken in

response to its views or recommendations, if any, including as deemed appropriate by the
Committee, in the State Party’s subsequent reports under Article 18 of the Convention.

Article 8. 1. If the Committee receives reliable information indicating grave or systematic
violations by a State Party of rights set forth in the Convention, the Committee shall invite
that State Party to cooperate in the examination of the information and to this end to submit
observations with regard to the information concerned. 2. Taking into account any
observations that may have been submitted by the State Party concerned as well as any other
reliable information available to it, the Committee may designate one or more of its members
to conduct an inquiry and to report urgently to the Committee. Where warranted and with the
consent of the State Party, the inquiry may include a visit to its territory. 3. After examining
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the findings of such an inquiry, the Committee shall transmit these findings to the State Party
concerned together with any comments and recommendations. 4. The State Party concerned
shall, within six months of receiving the findings, comments and recommendations
transmitted by the Committee, submit its observations to the Committee. 5. Such an inquiry
shall be conducted confidentially and the cooperation of the State Party shall be sought at all
stages of the proceedings.

Article 9. 1. The Committee may invite the State Party concerned to include in its report
under Article 18 of the Convention details of any measures taken in response to an inquiry
conducted under Article 8 of the present Protocol. 2. The Committee may, if necessary, after
the end of the period of six months

referred to in Article 8.4, invite the State Party

concerned to inform it of the measures taken in response to such an inquiry.

Article 10. 1. Each State Party may, at the time of signature or ratification of the present
Protocol or accession thereto, declare that it does not recognise the competence of the
Committee provided for in Articles 8 and 9.2. Any State Party having made a declaration in
accordance with paragraph 1 of the present Article may, at any time, withdraw this
declaration by notification to the Secretary-General.

Article 11. A State Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that individuals under its
jurisdiction are not subjected to ill treatment or intimidation as a consequence of
communicating with the Committee pursuant to the present Protocol.

Article 12. The Committee shall include in its annual report under Article 21 of the
Convention a summary of its activities under the present Protocol.

Article 13. Each State Party undertakes to make widely known and to give publicity to the
Convention and the present Protocol and to facilitate access to information about the views
and recommendations of the Committee, in particular, on matters involving that State Party.

Article 14. The Committee shall develop its own rules of procedure to be followed when
exercising the functions conferred on it by the present Protocol.
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Article 15. 1. The present Protocol shall be open for signature by any State that has signed,
ratified or acceded to the Convention. 2. The present Protocol shall be subject to ratification
by any State that has ratified or acceded to the Convention. Instruments of ratification shall
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 3. The present Protocol shall
be open to accession by any State that has ratified or acceded to the Convention. 4. Accession
shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.

Article 16. 1. The present Protocol shall enter into force three months after the date of the
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the tenth instrument of
ratification or accession shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of its
own instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 17. No reservations to the present Protocol shall be permitted.

Article 18. 1. Any State Party may propose an amendment to the present Protocol and file it
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon
communicate any proposed amendments to the States Parties with a request that they notify
her or him whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering
and voting on the proposal. In the event that at least one third of the States Parties favour
such a conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of
the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and
voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations
for approval. 2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States
Parties to the present Protocol in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 3.
When amendments come into force, they shall be binding on those States Parties that have
accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the present Protocol
and any earlier amendments that they have accepted.

Article 19. 1. Any State Party may denounce the present Protocol at any time by written
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation shall
take effect six months after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General. 2.
Denunciation shall be without prejudice to the continued application of the provisions of the
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present Protocol to any communication submitted under Article 2 or any inquiry initiated
under Article 8 before the effective date of denunciation.

Article 20. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States of:
Signatures, ratifications and accessions under the present Protocol;
The date of entry into force of the present Protocol and of any
amendment under Article 18;
Any denunciation under Article 19.
1. The present Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations. 2. The
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the present Protocol
to all States referred to in Article 25 of the Convention.2

2

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women,” Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/54/4 (Fiftyfourth session, 6 October 1999, agenda item 109), (distributed 15 October 1999).
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Appendix 3. Ten-Point Programme of the Association for the Restoration of the
Fatherland (1936)
To mobilise the entire Korean nation and realise a broad-based anti-Japanese united
front in order to overthrow the piratical Japanese imperialist rule and establish a genuine
people’s government in Korea.
To defeat Japan and overthrow its puppet state “Manchukuo” by the Koreans resident
in Manchuria through a close alliance between the Korean and Chinese peoples, and to effect
full autonomy for the Korean people residing in Chinese territory.
To disarm the Japanese armed forces, gendarmes, police and their agents and organise
a revolutionary army truly fighting for the independence of Korea.
To confiscate all enterprises, railways, banks, shipping, farms and irrigation systems
owned by Japan and Japanese and all property and estates owned by pro-Japanese traitors, so
as to raise funds for the independence movement and use part of these funds for the relief of
the poor.
To cancel all loans made to people by Japan and its agents and abolish all taxes and
monopoly systems; to improve the living conditions of the masses and promote the smooth
development of national industries, agriculture and commerce.
To win the freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association, oppose terrorist
rule and the fostering of feudal ideas by the Japanese imperialists, and to release all political
prisoners.
To abolish the caste system, which divides the yangban (nobles) and the common
people, and other inequalities; to ensure equality based on humanity irrespective of sex,
nationality or religion; to improve the social position of women and respect their
personalities.
To abolish slave labour and slavish education; to oppose forced military service and
military training of young people; to educate people in our national language, and to enforce
free compulsory education.
To enforce an eight-hour day, improve working conditions and raise wages; to
formulate labour laws; to enforce state insurance laws for the workers, and to extend state
relief to the unemployed.
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To form a close alliance with nations and states which treat the Koreans as equals and
to maintain comradely relations of friendship with states and nations which express goodwill
and maintain neutrality towards our national-liberation movement.3

3

Kim Il Sung, Ten-Point Programme of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland, (5 May 1936),
(United Kingdom: the Association or the Study of Songun Politics, 2009), http://www.uk-songun.com
/index.php?p=1_303_THE-TEN-POINT-PROGRAMME-OF-THE-ASSOCIATION-FOR-THERESTORATION-OF-THE-FATHERLAND (accessed 10 November 2014); Baik Bong, Kim Il Sung:
Biography Volume 1: From Birth to Triumphant Return to Homeland (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1969), pp. 282, 283.
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Appendix 4. Declaration of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland
(1936)
Compatriots, brothers and sisters at home and abroad,
It is already 26 years since the 20 million Korean people with a long history of five
thousand years were robbed of their dear homeland by the enemy, the Japanese imperialists.
Under the colonial oppression of Japanese imperialism, our compatriots lead the miserable
life of a ruined nation, worse than that of animals, undergoing all manner of hardships and
privations and dripping with sweat and blood. No longer able to endure the Japanese
imperialist tyranny, large numbers of our fellow countrymen were compelled to leave their
beloved home villages and wander about in quest of a livelihood. Even in strange lands, all
alone, they are subjected to every form of humiliation and contempt and are being trampled
underfoot and slaughtered everywhere they go.
Our nation is, indeed, in an unheard-of wretched plight. Which road should our people
take now, deprived of their homeland and weighed down with a terrible misfortune? For our
nation, there is no alternative but to fight against the Japanese imperialist marauders. This is
the only way to usher in the dawn of national liberation.
That explains why tens of thousands of Korean youths burning with love for their
country joined the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army and are fighting bravely against the
Japanese imperialists with arms in hand. Now, in all parts of the country the struggles of
workers, peasants, youth and students against Japanese imperialist colonial rule are taking
place one after another.
In the past, too, the ardent patriotism of our nation was displayed fully.
A great many people took part in the Righteous Volunteers’ Army Movement and
fought bloody battles for several years against Japanese imperialism’s occupation of Korea,
and at the time of the March First Movement, the whole nation rose in an anti-Japanese
uprising in every nook and comer of the land.4 As a result, the spirit of our nation, ingenious
and valorous, was demonstrated to the whole world. This fact proves that the Korean nation
with its earnest desire for independence and sovereignty and a passionate fighting spirit will
certainly accomplish the cause of national liberation.

4

After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and until 1933, large volunteer armies waged war against the
Japanese and Manchukuo forces over much of Northeast China. In the DPRK, those Koreans who volunteered
are known as the Righteous Volunteers’ Army Movement. While the March First Movement was launched by
the Korean people on 1 March 1919 in the Korean capital, Seoul. This movement is discussed in chapter 2.
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However, the aim of national independence and liberation was not achieved, though
in the past many patriots had fought courageously, falling and dying. The principal cause is
that all movements for the country’s liberation were not conducted according to a unified
political programme and a correct line of struggle, and that an unsupported fight was fought
without achieving the solid unity and cohesion of the anti-Japanese patriotic forces. Not only
that. An allied front against the common enemy, the Japanese imperialists, was not built up in
close contact with countries and nations opposed to Japan. This is also a major reason for
failing to win the final victory.
We put forward the main political programme and the struggle tasks to fulfil the
sacred duty for the liberation of the country on the basis of the bitter lessons and experience
of the past. In accordance with this programme, we are setting up the Association for the
Restoration of the Fatherland as a general leading body for uniting as one all the antiJapanese forces at home and abroad and ensuring a unified leadership for them, and are
adopting its Ten-Point Programme.
On the basis of the main content of the Ten-Point Programme of the Association of
the Restoration of the Fatherland, we declare to all our compatriots at home and abroad as
follows:
The whole Korean nation will fight in unity against the enemy, the Japanese
imperialist aggressors, irrespective of class, sex, social status, party affiliation, age and
religious belief, so as to win back the country and establish a genuine people’s government in
Korea.
We 20 million Korean people are leading the life of a homeless race, condemned to
indescribable national oppression and ill-treatment and cruel exploitation under the colonial
rule of predatory Japanese imperialism. The Korean nation’s liberation is the supreme task
facing all Koreans.
If all 20 million of us, united in a body, join the anti-Japanese national liberation
front, those with money contributing money, those with food donating food and those with
skill and knowledge devoting their skill and knowledge, whether men or women, young or
old, regardless of all distinctions, the Japanese imperialists will be destroyed and our national
liberation and independence will be achieved.
Koreans living in Manchuria will strive to overthrow the aggressive machines of
Japanese imperialism and its puppet state “Manchukuo” through a close alliance with the
Chinese people, and to bring about genuine national autonomy for the Koreans in Chinese
territory.
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The national autonomy of the Koreans in Manchuria we assert has nothing in
common with the “autonomy in Jiandao” advertised by the predatory Japanese imperialist
aggressors and their agents to hoodwink and alienate the Korean and Chinese nations from
each other. All Koreans in Manchuria will achieve genuine national autonomy for the Korean
residents in Manchuria by resolutely opposing the deceptive enemy-vaunted “autonomy in
Jiandao” and overthrowing the Japanese Manchurian rule in close alliance with the antiJapanese masses in China.
For the liberation of the fatherland, we will expand and strengthen the revolutionary
armed ranks. The Japanese imperialists and their agents are villainous aggressors and
hangmen armed to the teeth. We must counter the armed foes with arms.
We can topple the accursed system of colonial rule and achieve the independence of
Korea only when we further strengthen the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army and form
various armed units with the revolutionary masses everywhere to defeat the Japanese
imperialist aggressive army by fighting bloody battles against the enemy. 5
In order to build a wealthy and mighty independent and sovereign state, we will carry
out economic and cultural policies that are genuinely popular and democratic.
We will unconditionally confiscate factories, mines, landed estates, shops, banks and
all other property owned by the predatory Japanese imperialist aggressors and treacherous
pro-Japanese agents, promote the steady development of national industry, agriculture and
commerce, ensure our people freedom of speech, press, assembly and association and
equality of the individual, abolish the system of slave education and introduce an eight-hour
day for the workers.
In order to facilitate the cause of national liberation, we will receive special donations
and other forms of active assistance from capitalists with national conscience and from
conscientious patriots and personages.
We will form a common front against the enemy, the Japanese imperialist aggressors,
in close alliance with states and nations, which express goodwill and maintain neutrality
towards the Korean national liberation movement.
We should crush the robber-like Japanese imperialist aggressors in close alliance with
China and other countries hostile to Japanese imperialism and with the people oppressed by
Japanese imperialist colonial rule.

5

The Korean People’s Revolutionary Army was founded on 25 April 1932, as part of the anti-Japanese
revolutionary struggle. The army later developed into the Korean People’s Army on 8 February 1948.
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We must regard as friends the countries and nations, which sympathise with the
Korean national liberation movement and approach it with good faith and treat as enemies
those who help the Japanese imperialist marauders and oppose the Korean nation.
Compatriots, brothers and sisters, who love their country and nation and want to cast
off the yoke of bestial slavery and lead a worthwhile and hopeful existence as human beings.
We sincerely hope that you will immediately form organisations of the Association of
the Restoration of the Fatherland in the factories, mines, railway service establishments,
schools, newspaper offices, army barracks, shops and elsewhere in the urban and rural areas
and will wage a vigorous struggle to win back the country through the concerted action of the
whole nation under the banner of the Ten-Point Programme of the Association of the
Restoration of the Fatherland.
The cause of our people fighting in firm unity for the country’s liberation is
invincible.
Let us all fight for the complete independence of the country and the freedom and
liberation of the nation!
Long live the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland!6

6

Kim Il Sung, Declaration of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland, (5 May 1936), (United
Kingdom: the Association or the Study of Songun Politics, 2009), http://www.uk-songun.com/index.php?p=
1_412_THE-INAUGURAL-DECLARATION-OF-THE-ASSOCIATION-FOR-THE-RESTORATION-OFTHE-FATHERLAND (accessed 10 November 2014).
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Appendix 5. “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche
in Ideological Work”
Today I want to address a few remarks to you on the shortcomings in our Party’s ideological
work and on how to eliminate them in the future. As you learned at yesterday’s session, there
have been serious ideological errors on the literary front. It is obvious, then, that our
propaganda work also cannot have been faultless. It is to be regretted that it suffers in many
respects from dogmatism and formalism.
The principal shortcomings in ideological work are the failure to delve deeply into all
matters and the lack of Juche. It may not be correct to say Juche is lacking, but, in fact, it has
not yet been firmly established. This is a serious matter. We must thoroughly rectify this
shortcoming. Unless this problem is solved, we cannot hope for good results in ideological
work.
Why does our ideological work suffer from dogmatism and formalism? Why do our
propaganda and agitation workers only embellish the facade and fail to go deeply into
matters, and why do they merely copy and memorise things foreign, instead of working
creatively? This offers us food for serious reflection.
What is Juche in our Party’s ideological work? What are we doing? We are not
engaged in any other country’s revolution, but solely in the Korean revolution. This, the
Korean revolution, determines the essence of Juche in the ideological work of our Party.
Therefore, all ideological work must be subordinated to the interests of the Korean
revolution. When we study the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the
history of the Chinese revolution, or the universal truth of Marxism‑Leninism, it is entirely
for the purpose of correctly carrying out our own revolution.
By saying that the ideological work of our Party is lacking in Juche, I do not mean, of
course, that we have not made the revolution and that our revolutionary work was undertaken
by outsiders. Nonetheless, Juche has not been firmly established in ideological work, and this
leads to dogmatic and formalistic errors and does much harm to our revolutionary cause.
To make revolution in Korea we must know Korean history and geography as well as
the customs of the Korean people. Only then is it possible to educate our people in a way that
suits them and to inspire in them an ardent love for their native place and their motherland.
It is of paramount importance to study and widely publicise among the working
people the history of our country and of our people’s struggle. … Only when we educate our
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people in the history of their own struggle and its traditions can we stimulate their national
pride and rouse the broad masses to revolutionary struggle. Yet, many of our functionaries
are ignorant of our country’s history and so do not strive to discover, inherit and carry
forward our fine traditions. Unless this is corrected, it will lead, in the long run, to the
negation of Korean history.
Once I visited a People’s Army rest home, where there was a picture of the Siberian
steppe on the wall. Russians probably like that landscape. But we Korean people like the
beautiful scenery of our own country. There are beautiful mountains such as Kumgang and
Myohyang in our country. There are clear streams, the blue sea with its rolling waves, and
fields with their ripening crops. If we are to inspire in our People’s Army men a love for their
native place and their country, we must display more pictures of our own landscapes. … I
noticed in a primary school that all the portraits on the walls were of foreigners, such as
Mayakovsky and Pushkin, but there were none of Koreans. If children are educated in this
way, how can they be expected to have national pride? …
We should study our own things in earnest and get to know them well…
It is important in our work to grasp revolutionary truth, Marxist-Leninist truth, and
apply it correctly to our actual conditions. There should be no set rule that we must follow the
Soviet pattern. Some advocate the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is it not high time
to work out our own? The point is that we should not mechanically copy the forms and
methods of the Soviet Union, but should learn from its experience in struggle and from the
truth of Marxism-Leninism. So, while learning from the experience of the Soviet Union, we
must put stress not on the form but on the essence of its experience. …
Merely copying the forms used by others instead of learning the truth of MarxismLeninism does us no good, only harm. In both revolutionary struggle and construction, we
should firmly adhere to Marxist-Leninist principles, applying them in a creative way to suit
the specific conditions and national characteristics of our country. If we mechanically apply
foreign experience, disregarding the history of our country and the traditions of our people
and without taking account of our own realities and our people’s political level, we will
commit dogmatic errors and do much harm to the revolutionary cause. This is not fidelity to
Marxism-Leninism nor to internationalism. It runs counter to them...7

7

Kim Il Sung, “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work”
(Speech Party Propagandists and Agitators, 28 December 1955), in Kim Il Sung, Selected Works 9 (Pyongyang:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982), pp. 395–408.
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Appendix 6. “Ten Principles for a Monolithic Ideological System”
Preamble 1. “1: Struggle with all your life to paint the entire society the single colour of the
Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary thought. It is considered the highest
doctrine of our party to paint the entire society the single colour of the Great Leader’s
revolutionary thought, and a higher level of task is to construct our party’s unitary ideology
system.
The implementation of a unitary ideology system must be constantly strengthened in
connection with the principles.
Strengthen the Party of the glorious Leader Kim Il Sung, for the Great Leader Kim Il
Sung who founded our Party.
Fight with devotion to protect and create a solid foundation of the authoritarian rules
of a proletariat and socialist system established by the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.
Dedicate everything to fighting to maintain the great revolutionary value of Juche
Ideology, for unification of our motherland and the revolutionary victory of the whole
country, for our nation’s socialism and the accomplishment of communism.
Fight till the end for the victory of Juche Ideology all over the entire world.

Preamble 2. Respect and revere highly and with loyalty the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il
Sung. Highly revering the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is the noblest duty of the
revolutionary warriors who are endlessly loyal to the great leader. Within this lies the glory of
our nation and the eternal happiness of our people.
The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is a genius of the revolution, the sun of the
people and a legendary hero whom we must respect unendingly, revere eternally and come to
with the greatest happiness and glory.
Even in a short life, live only for the Great Leader, devote our youth and life for him
and keep loyal minds toward the Great Leader even under unfavourable circumstances.
Believe firmly in the way pointed to by our Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung,
entrust our fate to the Great Leader and devote our bodies and spirits for the revolutionary
fight driven by the Great Leader, carrying with us always, the strong belief that there is
nothing impossible if we are under the leadership of the Great Leader.
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Preamble 3. Make absolute the authority of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.
Affirming the absolute nature of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s authority is the
supreme demand of our revolutionary task and the revolutionary volition of our party and
people.
Have a firm position and perspective that no one else has the knowledge required,
only the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.
Protect through the political thought and defend ‘till the end of life the Great Leader
Comrade Kim Il Sung.
Propagate inside and outside the greatness of our Dear Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.
Protect the Great Leader from attacks and criticism of every possible revisionism and
enemy and defend the power and authority of our Dear Leader Kim Il Sung.
Regard as an emergency situation and pursue unyielding the fight against even the
smallest challenge that could damage the authority and power of the Great Leader
Comrade Kim Il Sung.
Respectfully worship our beloved Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s sculptures,
plaster casts, bronze statues, badges with portraits, art developed by the Great Leader, board
with Great Leader’s instructions, basic mottos of the Party.
Respectfully manage and thoroughly protect the records and sites of revolutionary
struggle and the revolutionary history of our Beloved Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and
the Party’s Unitary Ideology stronghold Museum of the Revolutionary Activities of Comrade
Kim Il Sung and the Research Institute of Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s Revolutionary
Thought.
Preamble 4. Accept the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary thought as your
belief and take the Great Leader’s instructions as your creed. Accepting the Great Leader
Comrade Kim Il Sung’s thought as one’s own belief and taking his instructions as one’s creed
is the most crucial element requested for one to become an endlessly loyal Juche communist
warrior. It is also a precondition for the victory of our revolutionary struggle and its
construction.
Our Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary thought and Juche ideology
must be realised through our united belief and must be experienced in the flesh and bones of
every person.
Our Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions must be adopted through a
steadfast belief and firm principles in regards to all enterprises and in each person’s life.
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Unconditionally accept, treat as a non-negotiable condition, and decide everything
based upon our Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions and in every act think only
about the greatness of our Leader.
Systematically and fully master the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s laborious
works, guidelines and his splendid revolutionary history.
Participate without absence in more than 2 hours of study groups, lectures and
collective studies devoted to revolutionary ideas of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung,
ensure discipline for these studies and make these studies a habitual part of daily life, at the
same time struggling with any contradictions or neglect towards ensuring such studies are
always completed.
The system of delivering the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s guidelines must be
thoroughly studied, and the Leader’s instructions and Party goals have to be communicated
exactly and without misinterpretations or usage of one’s own words, and in a timely manner.
Use considerately the guidelines of the Leader when preparing reports, discussions,
lectures or printed materials and eliminate any words or writing that is contrary to his
instructions.
There must be a strict distinction between the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s
guidelines and individual party executives instructions and it must be investigated if
individual official’s instructions are matching the Leader’s ones. In the situation where there
is but a slight difference, we must see it as a problem and fight against it. We must not deliver
or collectively discuss the individual cadre’s statements as “conclusions” and “instructions”.
Struggle with provocative calumnies directed against our Great Leader Comrade Kim
Il Sung’s guidelines and Party policy or with anti-Party activities.
Fight with all one’s will against anti-Party and anti-revolutionary thinking trends that
have its origin in capitalistic ideas, feudal Confucian ideas, revisionism, dogmatism,
toadyism and are contrary to the revolutionary thought of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung. Hold
on to the purity of revolutionary thought and Juche ideas of the Great Leader.

Preamble 5. Observe absolutely the principle of unconditional execution in carrying out the
instructions of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. Unconditionally executing the Great
Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions is the basic requisite for proving loyalty towards
the Great Leader, and the ultimate condition for the victory of our revolutionary struggle and
its establishment.
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Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions must be viewed as a legal and
supreme order and unconditionally realised without excuses or trivial reasons, but with
endless loyalty and sacrifice.
Regard as a holy duty and supreme glory reducing the concerns of our Beloved
Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and fight for it with complete dedication.
To realise the guidelines of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, bring creative ideas and if
the Great Leader presents his conclusion on some issue it must be accurately executed
according to the centralism principle.
Once the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions and Party policy is
accepted, it must be collectively discussed, the right policy implemented, a suitable concrete
plan established and with creation of organised political work, pursue it in a Speed Battle
Campaign.
For the execution of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions the
registrar must be made, implementation of them must be standardised, taught to others and
implemented without ceasing.
Fight against those who accept our Beloved Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s
instructions only in letter and sabotage the implementation of these instructions, show
irresponsible or an incorrect attitude and oppose unhealthy situations that have its root in
formalism, self-protectionism and neglect.

Preamble 6. Rally the unity of ideological intellect and revolutionary solidarity around the
Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. The steel-like unity of the party is the source of the
party’s invincible power, and a firm assurance of the victory of our revolution.
Defend the unity of ideological intellect around the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il
Sung and consolidate it more ever more firmly.
At all localities and all guard posts, strengthen the solidarity of the ideological
intellect of the columns through revolutionary struggle based on loyalty to the Great Leader.
As a rule, evaluate and treat all people using the degree of loyalty to the Great Leader
Comrade Kim Il Sung as the yardstick and struggle against livelihoods that are at odds with
the sole ideological system of the Party regardless of one’s position and distinctions.
Strictly oppose any situation of having illusions about or idolising or advocating
through flattery individual officials and eradicate the problem of giving gifts to each other.
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Resolutely struggle in opposition to anti-Party elements such as factionalism,
regionalism, and nepotism that could destroy the uniform solidarity of the Party and never
waver at the slightest hint of such menace to completely overcome it.

Preamble 7. Learn from the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and master communist
dignity, the methods of achieving revolutionary tasks, and the people’s work styles. Learning
the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s communist dignity, the methods of achieving
revolutionary tasks, and the people’s work styles are the divine duties of all members of the
party and workers, and the prerequisite for fulfilling the honorary fate of revolutionary
warriors.
Possess a high disposition to the Party, the working class, and the people that puts the
interests of the Party, the working class, and the people first, and sacrifice everything for
them.
Fight on tenaciously with uncompromising combative spirit, firm revolutionary
principle, indomitable revolutionary spirit, and faith in certain victory against the enemy
class.
Handle all works frugally and boldly with responsibility and overcome the barriers by
assuming the attitude of a revolutionary master and highly exercising the revolutionary spirit
of self-reliance.
Oppose senility and stagnation, indolence and slackening and remain awash with a
flourishing fighting spirit and passion to always work militantly, and reject passivity and
conservative tendencies and embark in all undertakings boldly and grandly.
Solidly establish revolutionary perspective from a group point of view, thoroughly
carry through the Cheongsan-ri spirit and Cheongsan-ri method, and penetrate deep into the
crowd to teach them and study from them and live together with them.
Exhibit highly the revolutionary character of setting an example for others and always
take the lead in doing difficult and hard work.
Always be humble and unceremonious in undertakings and in life.
Thoroughly reject old methods such as bureaucracy, subjectivism, formalism, and
dogmatism.

Preamble 8. Preserve dearly the political life the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung has
bestowed upon you, and repay loyally with high political awareness and skill for the Great
Leader’s boundless political trust and considerations. It is our highest honour to have
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bestowed upon us political life by the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and repaying his
trust loyally can lead to a bright future for our political life.
Consider political life as the first life, never bend one’s political beliefs and
revolutionary integrity. Learn to throw away like bits of straw, one’s physical life for political
life.
Value the revolutionary organisation, subordinate personal interests to organisational
interests, and conspicuously display the collective spirit.
Consciously participate in organisational life to standardise and normalise the
undertakings and said life.
Faithfully execute organisational decisions and mandate notification.
Actively participate in two-days and weekly organisational life summing up to selfactualise the Great Leader’s teachings and Party policy and to sum up one’s undertakings and
life on a high politico-ideological level, to embark in an ideological struggle by the method of
criticism and continuously train and reconstruct oneself through the ideological struggle.
Engage in the execution of the revolutionary task, faithfully participate in labour and
bring near completion of the revolution through a revolutionary practice process.
Display high political fervour and elevate the level of political theory and technical
administration to handsomely execute the revolutionary mission to repay the Leader’s great
political trust and care of granting the most precious political life.

Preamble 9. Establish a strong organisational discipline so that the entire Party, the entire
people, and the entire military will operate uniformly under the sole leadership of the Great
Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. Establishing a strong organisational discipline is the essential
requirement to strengthen the party’s collective ideology, leadership, and its combat power. It
is also a firm assurance for the victory of our revolutionary struggle and its establishment.
Execute the revolution and associated construction with the Great Leader Comrade
Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary ideology as the sole guiding principle and thoroughly establish
the Great Leader’s sole leadership system that makes the entire Party, country and military
move in unison according to the teachings and orders of the Great Leader.
Establish a strong revolutionary order and rules that organise and advance all
undertakings according to the Leader’s sole leadership system and handle policy questions
solely through the teachings of the Great Leader and the conclusion of the Party.
Firmly secure the Party’s leadership on revolutionary struggle and all construction
undertakings in all parts and units and the state economic apparatus. Labor group workers
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ought to organise and advance all undertaking according to the Party and under the Party’s
lead.
Accurately execute the decisions and orders of the Party and State to carry through the
teachings of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung; struggle robustly against the situation of
wrongly interpreting or altering said decisions and orders, and strictly abide by the law and
rules of the State.
Do not allow any non-organisational phenomena such as individual cadre officials
arbitrarily summoning an organised meeting of the lower-level Party, state apparatus or
labour groups or arbitrarily reaching a “conclusion” in the meeting or bringing out an
organisation for social movement without organisational approval.
Oppose and actively struggle against all kinds of behaviours by individual cadre,
which go against the principles such as the individual abuse of power or authority.
Evaluate and position the cadre using the loyalty to the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il
Sung as the basic yardstick, robustly struggle against and thoroughly apply the order and
Party rules established by the Leader’s undertakings on handling problems with favouritism
and acquaintance of relatives, friends, region, school and teachers and individual leaders
arbitrarily firing or hiring each other.
Oppose and sharply struggle against the situation of leaking Party, State and military
secrets.
Timely report to the Party organisation the non-organisational and disorderly
situations that violate the Party’s unitary ideological system and sole leadership constitution
whether it is big or small.

Preamble 10. The great revolutionary accomplishments pioneered by the Great Leader
Comrade Kim Il Sung must be succeeded and perfected by hereditary succession until the
end. The firm establishment of the sole leadership system is the crucial assurance for the
preservation and development of the Great leader’s revolutionary accomplishments, while
achieving the final victory of the revolution.
Firmly establish the sole ideological system over the Party and whole society and
firmly establish the central Party’s sole leadership constitution under the lead of the Great
Leader to succeed and brightly complete the revolutionary accomplishments cultivated by the
Great Leader.
Adhere to and forever succeed and develop the glorious revolutionary tradition
accomplished by the Great Leader KIM Il Sung during the anti-Japanese revolutionary
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struggle period and oppose and resolutely struggle against even the smallest expression of
anti-Party activities that try to defame or obliterate the revolutionary tradition.
Do not connive towards the slightest phenomenon or element that depart from the
Party’s sole leadership system, to the contrary, struggle against it.
Make all of your family as well as yourself look up to the Great Leader and fulfil
loyal duty to him and remain endlessly faithful to the Party’s sole leadership.
Secure the authority of the Party through all means and defend the Party with your
life.
All Party members and workers may become like the Great Leader KIM Il Sung by
firmly establishing the Party’s unitary ideology system and must complete the revolutionary
accomplishment to the end, following the path pointed by the Great Leader. 8

8

Joanna Hosaniak, Kyung Eun Ha, and Markus Simpson Bell (translated), Ten Great Principles of the
Establishment of the Unitary Ideology System (Seoul: Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights,
2012).
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Appendix 7. The Twenty-Point Platform (1946)
To completely liquidate all survivals of Japanese imperialist rule in the political and
economic life of Korea,
To wage an implacable struggle against reactionary and anti-democratic elements at
home and strictly ban the activities of fascist, anti-democratic political parties, organisations
and individuals,
To grant the entire people freedom of speech, the press, assembly and religion. To
provide freedom for the activities of democratic political parties, trade unions, peasants’
unions and other democratic public organisations,
To ensure that the entire Korean people have the right and duty to form people’s
committees, the administrative organs responsible for all local affairs, through universal ,
direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot,
To grant equal rights to all citizens in political and economic life, irrespective of sex,
religion and property status,
To guarantee inviolability of person and residence and protect by law the property of
citizens and their private possessions,
To abolish all laws and judicial organs which were in operation in the years of
Japanese imperialists rule, the after effects of which the people are still suffering, elect the
people’s judicial organs on democratic principles and grant the citizens equal legal rights,
To develop industry, agriculture, transport and trade for enhancement of the people’s
welfare,
To nationalise big enterprises, transport services, banks, mines and forests,
To allow and encourage free activity in private handicrafts and trade,
To confiscate the land belonging to Japanese nationalist, the Japanese government,
traitors and landlords who have continuously rented out their land, abolish the tenant system
and distribute free all the confiscated land among peasants making it their property. To
confiscate without compensation all irrigation facilities and bring them under state control,
To fix market prices of daily necessities and combat speculators and usurers,
To institute uniform, equitable taxation and introduce a progressive income-tax
system,
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To introduce an eight-hour working day and fix minimum wages for factory and
office workers. To prohibit employment of children under 13 and institute a six-hour working
day for children 13 to 16,
To institute a life insurance scheme for factory and office workers and introduce an
insurance system for workers and enterprisers,
To introduce universal compulsory education and widely expand the network of
primary, middle and specialised schools and colleges maintained at state expense. To reform
public education in line with democratic state system,
To actively develop national culture, science and arts and build more theatres,
libraries, radio broadcasting stations and cinema theatres,
To set up special schools on a wide scale for training personnel to work in
government organs and in all fields of the national economy,
To encourage scientists and artist in their work and give them assistance, and
To increase the number of state-run hospitals, wipe out epidemics and give free
medical services to the poor.9

9

Baik Bong, Kim Il Sung: Biography Volume 1: From Birth to Triumphant Return to Homeland (Beirut, Dar
Al-Talia, 1973), pp. 107, 108.
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Appendix 8. The Women’s Rights Act (2010)
Article 1. (The Mission of Women’s Rights Act) Women’s Rights Act of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea serves to firmly guarantee the rights of women in all fields of
social life and heighten the position and role of women.
Article 2. (The Principle of Gender Equality) It is a consistent policy of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to guarantee gender equality. State shall strictly prohibit all forms
of discrimination against women.
Article 3. (Social Awareness of Women) Women play an important role in the welfare of the
family and the development of the society. State shall raise awareness of women and firmly
guarantee their rights in all parts of the society.
Article 4. (Plan to Guarantee Women’s Rights) State shall establish a basic plan to guarantee
women’s rights and execute it. Municipal People’s Committees shall establish detailed plans
on yearly basis according to the state’s basic plan to guarantee women’s rights and execute it
with precision.
Article 5. (The Responsibility of Institution, Corporate Association and Organisation to
Guarantee Women’s Rights) It is mandatory for institutions, corporate associations and
organisations to guarantee women’s rights. Institutions, corporate associations, and
organisations shall firmly guarantee women’s rights in accordance with this act.
Article 6. (The Responsibility of All Municipal People’s Committees to Guarantee Women’s
Rights) The guarantee of women’s rights is an important responsibility of each Municipal
People’s Committee. Each Municipal People’s Committee shall designate the guarantee of
women’s rights as an important assignment and take measures to ensure the rights of women
in the area of jurisdiction.
Article 7. (The Responsibility of Labor Organisations to Guarantee Women’s Rights)
Women’s Coalition is an organisation of women for guaranteeing the rights of women. The
Central Committee of the Democratic Women’s Coalition of Korea and each Women’s
Coalition organisation shall responsibly endeavour to guarantee women’s rights in
accordance with this law and the Charter of Women’s Coalition. Workers’ organisations
including the General Coalition of Vocations, the Agricultural Workers’ Coalition and Youth
Alliance shall establish plans to guarantee the rights of the women in their organisations in
accordance with this law.
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Article 8. (The Responsibility of Legal Institutions to Guarantee Women’s Rights) Legal
institutions shall strictly enforce legal control in order to prevent women’s rights from being
violated by any act of crime or violation of law.
Article 9. (International Exchange and Cooperation) State shall promote exchange and
cooperation with other countries and international institutions in the field of women’s rights.
Article 10. (The Extent and the Application of the Law) This law regulates matters, which
arise from guaranteeing women’s rights. Any item related to women’s rights, which is not
regulated by this law, shall be governed by relevant law. Concerning women’s rights, an
international treaty to which State is a party shall have the same force as this law.

Chapter 2 Social and Political Rights
Article 11. (The Basic Demands of Social and Political Rights) Women have the equal rights
with men in the field of social and political life. No one may restrict or violate the woman’s
social and political rights and status.
Article 12. (Suffrage and Eligibility) Women have the equal rights with men to vote and to be
elected. State shall actively encourage women to participate in social and political activities,
and increase the proportion of female representatives in each People’s Assembly.
Article 13. (The Right to Acquire, Change and Retain Nationality) Women have the equal
rights with men to acquire, change and retain nationality. The nationality of a woman shall
not be changed by marriage or divorce in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Article 14. (The Right to Work in State Organs) Women have the right to work in all State
Organs. State Organs shall actively take in female workers and guarantee appropriately their
conditions of work and livelihood.
Article 15. (Appointment of Female Officers) Institutions, corporate associations and
organisations shall systematically train and appoint female officers. There must be no
discriminations against women in the screening, training and appointment of officers.
Article 16. (Protection in the Legal Sphere) Legal institutions shall respect the personality of
the women and firmly guarantee their rights and interests when handling cases concerning
women.
Article 17. (The Processing of Claims and Petitions) Women have the right to make claims or
submit petitions. Institutions, corporate associations and organisations shall responsibly look
into any claims or petitions submitted by women and process it within due date. There shall
be no failure to receive any claim or petition submitted by women, nor shall such claims or
petitions be neglected.
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Chapter 3 Educational, Cultural and Medical Rights
Article 18. (The Basic Demands of Women’s Rights in Educational, Cultural and Medical
Sphere) Women have the equal rights with men in educational, cultural and medical sphere.
In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, women’s rights to education, culture and
medical aid shall be firmly guaranteed by the proper State policy for women.
Article 19. (Gender Equality in School Admissions, Advancement and Placement after
Graduation) Organs supervising education and Municipal People’s Committees shall firmly
guarantee women’s rights to equally enter or advance to each school and to receive equal
placement after graduation. In case of recruitments by universities or vocational schools,
there must be no exclusion or limitation of women in recruitment on grounds of gender,
except in departments of specialised majors.
Article 20. (Promotion and Protection of Female Students’ Body and Health) Educational
organs shall provide education that accommodates the physical attributes of female students
and facility for females, and protect and promote the health of female students.
Article 21. (Parents’ Responsibility Concerning Compulsory Education) Parents or guardians
shall perform their responsibility to ensure female children who reach school age receive
education in accordance with Secondary General Compulsory Education System. Except for
cases in which the relevant Municipal People’s Committee’s approval has been obtained due
to illness or other necessary reasons, all female children who reach school age must enter
school.
Article 22. (Vocational Technique Education) Each Municipal People’s Committee and
relevant organs shall provide adequate conditions for women to receive vocational technique
education in accordance with the actual circumstances of the province.
Article 23. (The Right to Cultural Life) Women have the equal rights with men to enjoy
cultural life. Institutions, corporate associations and organisations shall provide what is
necessary for women to equally participate in science, technology, literature, arts and
athletics.
Article 24. (The Right to Receive Medical Care) Women have the equal rights with men to
receive medical care. Medical institutions shall be furnished with professional medical
facility for women, protect the health of women and ensure that women are given access to
medical care without experiencing inconveniences. Relevant institutions, corporate
associations and organisations shall give priority to women’s access to medical care.
Article 25. (Educational, Cultural and Medical Rights of Women in Rural Areas) Municipal
People’s Committees and relevant organs shall provide necessary facilities and conditions for
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women in rural area to receive equal education and medical treatment with women in urban
areas and lead cultural life.

Chapter 4 Labour Rights
Article 26. (The Basic Demands of Women’s Rights in Labour) Women have the equal rights
with men in labour.
Article 27. (Guarantee of Labour Conditions) Municipal People’s Committees and relevant
organs shall provide all conditions for women to actively participate in social labour.
Relevant institutions, corporate associations and organisations shall run properly day care
centres, kindergartens and other facilities so that working women may participate in labour
without concern.
Article 28. (Prohibition of Discrimination in Labour Assignment) Institutions, corporate
associations and organisations, except for those professions or departments that are not
appropriate for women, are not allowed to not take in women or restrict them for reasons
such as gender, marriage, pregnancy and childbirth. It is prohibited to take in female persons
who have not yet reached the legal age for labour.
Article 29. (Protections in Labour for Women Workers) Institutions, corporate associations
and organisations must pay full attention to the protection of women workers. Prescribed
labour safety facilities and labour hygiene facilities shall be provided for women, and labour
safety must be ensured in accordance with women’s physical attributes. Women cannot be
assigned to work that is not appropriate for women. Women are given special protection
during the periods before and after childbirth and during the breastfeeding period.
Article 30. (Fields and Professions Prohibited for Women) The supervising organ for labour
administration shall determine which fields and professions must be prohibited for women
and enforce it. Institutions, corporate associations and organisations must not make women
work in prohibited fields or professions, nor make a women worker who is pregnant or has an
infant work at night.
Article 31. (Gender Equality in Wage) Institutions, corporate associations and organisations
must pay women the same wage as men for the same labour The working hours a day for a
women worker with three or more children is six, and her living expenses shall be paid for.
Article 32. (Gender Equality in Technical Qualifications and Grade Certificates) When
carrying out qualifications or giving certifications for technique, relevant institutions,
corporate associations and organisations must not discriminate women on grounds of sex.
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Article 33. (Guarantee of Maternity Leave) State provides women workers with maternity
leave of 60 days before childbirth and 90 days after, regardless of the length of service and in
addition to regular and complementary holidays. Women cannot be made to work during
maternity leave.
Article 34. (Prohibition of Unjust Dismissal) Except for when the worker demands to do so,
institutions, corporate associations and organisations must not dismiss a women worker from
her workplace for reasons such as marriage, pregnancy, maternity leave and breastfeeding
period.
Article 35. (Application of Social Insurance System) Each Municipal Peoples’ Committee
and relevant organs must thoroughly carry out Social Insurance System for women and
stabilise the livelihood of women who has temporarily lost the ability to work due to reasons
such as illness or injury and ensure adequate medical care for them.

Chapter 5 Personal and Property Rights
Article 36. (The Basic Demands of Women’s Rights of Person and Property) Women have
equal personal and property rights with men. No one may violate women’s rights of person
and property.
Article 37. (The Inviolability of Person) Women have the inviolable right of person. It is
prohibited to illegally restrict the liberty of women, damage the body of women by violent
and non-violent means, and search the body of women.
Article 38. (The Inviolability of Health and Life) Women have the inviolable right of health
and life. It is prohibited to kill a newborn infant because she is a female and to mistreat or
show contempt for women who give birth to a female child or are pregnant, ill, disabled or
old. The execution of criminal punishment is suspended for pregnant women from three
months before childbirth to seven months after childbirth.
Article 39. (Prohibition of Kidnapping and Trafficking) No one may kidnap, trade, rape, or
gang-rape women. Relevant organs shall thoroughly establish plans to prevent kidnapping,
trafficking, rape and gang-rape of women, and punish strictly anyone who has committed
such act, in accordance with the law.
Article 40. (Prohibition of Prostitution) Anyone who engages in prostitution shall be
punished in accordance with the law. Anyone who organises, promotes or coerces
prostitution shall also be punished in accordance with the law.
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Article 41. (Respect for the Personality and Honour of Women) Women have the rights of
personality and honour. Institutions, corporate associations, organisations and citizens must
respect the personality and honour of women.
Article 42. (Property Rights of Women within the Family) A married woman has the joint
ownership of family property with her husband. A woman may possess, use and dispose of
family property equally with her husband regardless of her income. When she divorces her
husband, a woman may claim her individual property rights.
Article 43. (Gender Equality in Inheritance) Women have equal rights in inheritance with
men. When the order of inheritance is the same, women must not be discriminated on
grounds of sex.

Chapter 6 Marital and Household Rights
Article 44. (The Basic Demands of Women’s Rights in Marriage and Family) Women have
equal rights in marriage and family with men. Marriage and family are under State’s
protection.
Article 45. (The Freedom of Marriage of Women) Women have the freedom of marriage.
Women’s freedom of marriage may not be violated or be interfered with.
Article 46. (Prohibition of Domestic Violence) There must not be any form of domestic
violence against women in the family. Municipal People’s Committees, institutions,
corporate associations and organisations shall adequately educate residents and employees
against domestic violence so that domestic violence does not appear in the district or at the
homes of the citizens under their supervision.
Article 47. (Suspension of Filing for Divorce) When there is an issue of divorce between the
married couple, the male may not file a divorce if the wife is pregnant or has given birth
within a year. The foregoing does not prejudice a woman’s right to file a divorce against her
husband.
Article 48. (Division of Property in Divorce) When a married couple divorces, the question of
dividing the house and family property shall be decided by the agreement between the two
parties. When agreement is not reached, the presiding court shall decide the matter based on
the specific circumstances of both parties and the principle of protecting the interests of the
children and the woman.
Article 49. (Right and Responsibility Regarding Underage Children) A woman has equal
right and responsibility to protect underage children with her husband. When the husband has
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deceased, lost his legal capabilities, or for other inevitable reasons cannot be the guardian of
the underage children, the woman has the right and responsibility to protect the children.
Article 50. (The Freedom of Childbirth) Women have the right to give or not give birth to
children. Nationally, it is encouraged that women give birth to and raise many children. A
physician shall be designated to a woman who gives birth to and raises triplets or more, and
her child, and special benefits and considerations such as good residence, medicine, grocery
and household goods supplied free of charge shall be given.
Article 51. (Protection of Pregnant Women) When women give childbirth, the relevant
medical institution shall provide safe and effective medicine and technology and responsibly
ensure the health of women. Medical institutions and relevant institutions, corporate
associations and organisations shall show deep concern for the protection of pregnant women
and take good care of the mother and the child.
Chapter 7 Supervision of the Protection of Women’s Rights
Article 52. (Supervision of the Protection of Women’s Rights) The supervision of the
protection of women’s rights shall be executed under the uniform direction of the cabinet by
the relevant central organs and Municipal People’s Committees. Relevant central organs and
Municipal People’s Committees shall rightly establish the supervision system for the
protection of women’s rights and give adequate supervision and have control.
Article 53. (The Responsibility of Women’s Organisations) The Central Committee of the
Democratic Women’s Coalition of Korea and each Women’s Coalition organisation shall
organise and execute enterprises of various forms and methods to raise social awareness on
women’s rights and to raise the status of women.
Article 54. (Monitoring of the Protection of Women’s Rights) The monitoring of the
protection of women’s rights shall be carried out by the relevant central organs, Municipal
People’s Committees and monitoring organs. The relevant central organs, Municipal People’s
Committees and monitoring organs shall strictly monitor the situation regarding the
protection of women’s rights.
Article 55. (Administrative or Criminal Liabilities) Administrative or criminal liabilities shall
be imposed according to each situation on individual citizens and responsible workers of
institutions, corporate associations and organisations that have hindered the protection of
women’s rights by violating this law.10
10

Joanna Hosaniak, Status of Women’s Rights in the Context of Socio-Economic Changes in the DPRK, NKHR
Briefing Report No.7 (Seoul: Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR, 2013).
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Appendix 9. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Pillar One: The protection responsibilities of the State
Pillar one is the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its
populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their
incitement. The latter, I would underscore, is critical to effective and
timely prevention strategies. The declaration by the Heads of State
and Government in paragraph 138 of the Summit Outcome that “we
accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it” is the
bedrock of the responsibility to protect. That responsibility, they
affirmed, lies first and foremost with the State. The responsibility
derives both from the nature of State sovereignty and from the preexisting and continuing legal obligations of States, not just from the
relatively recent enunciation and acceptance of the responsibility to
protect;

Pillar Two: International assistance and capacity-building
Pillar two is the commitment of the international community to assist
States in meeting those obligations. It seeks to draw on the
cooperation

of

Member

States,

regional

and

subregional

arrangements, civil society and the private sector, as well as on the
institutional strengths and comparative advantages of the United
Nations system. Too often ignored by pundits and policymakers alike,
pillar two is critical to forging a policy, procedure and practice that
can be consistently applied and widely supported. Prevention,
building on pillars one and two, is a key ingredient for a successful
strategy for the responsibility to protect;

Pillar Three: Timely and decisive response
Pillar three is the responsibility of Member States to respond
collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is
manifestly failing to provide such protection. Though widely
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discussed, pillar three is generally understood too narrowly. As
demonstrated by the successful bilateral, regional and global efforts to
avoid further bloodshed in early 2008 following the disputed election
in Kenya, if the international community acts early enough, the choice
need not be a stark one between doing nothing or using force. A
reasoned, calibrated and timely response could involve any of the
broad range of tools available to the United Nations and its partners.
These would include pacific measures under Chapter VI of the
Charter, coercive ones under Chapter VII and/or collaboration with
regional and subregional arrangements under Chapter VIII. The
process of determining the best course of action, as well as of
implementing it, must fully respect the provisions, principles and
purposes of the Charter. In accordance with the Charter, measures
under Chapter VII must be authorised by the Security Council. The
General Assembly may exercise a range of related functions under
Articles 10 to 14, as well as under the “Uniting for peace” process set
out in its resolution 377 (V). Chapters VI and VIII specify a wide
range of pacific measures that have traditionally been carried out
either by intergovernmental organs or by the Secretary-General.
Either way, the key to success lies in an early and flexible response,
tailored to the specific needs of each situation.11

11

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), “Implementing the responsibility to protect”, Report of the
Secretary-General, A/63/677, (Sixty-third session, Agenda items 44 and 107) (distributed 12 January 2009),
paragraph 11, pp. 8, 9.
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